"Information Dominance (ID) is the new new for ever-weaker great powers" 2 of 2: Gregory Copley, Defense & Foreign Affairs.

Nov 10, 2019, 01:01 AM
Photo: English: A map of China from 1900 with China being divided among various European powers
Date | 30 June 1900
Source | Daily Inter Mountain., June 30, 1900, Page 4, Image 4
Author | Authors and Editors of the Daily Inter Mountain
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Information Dominance (ID) is the new new for ever weaker great powers" 2 of 2: Gregory Copley, Defense & Foreign Affairs.


 By Gregory Copley, Editor, GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs.1 The sole object of power is the imposition of will. Now, finally, technologies are beginning to exist which take much of that task of “imposing will” away from physical force capabilities and into the realm of information dominance — ID — systems and doctrine. 
This very fact must transform the way national security forces think about deterrence, power projection, nation-building, and defense. ID is at the core of the entire govern-mental and social structure, and therefore determines the stability of currencies and economies. It can be used to build national cohesion, and erode it in opposing nations. 
ID warfare has its own set of technological capabilities, firmly rooted in all uses of the electronic spectrum. This has only been possible as a result of scientific advances over the past century. 
So now, for the first time in a century or more, defense procurement and acquisition strategies must account for threats and operational responsibilities which extend be-yond the conventional, kinetic defense spectrum. 
At the same time, because of sociological and population changes, alliance structures which have been in place for decades are now under extreme pressure, and in many areas may have lost their utility. When great sociological and historical upheavals occur, the threat of change creates uncertainty among populations, and this automatically trig-gers a turn away from globalist thinking toward nationalism. This has been the case throughout history. It is the case now, as we enter a period of great upheaval in the bal-ance of power. 
This means, as we enter a period of greater emphasis on state sovereignty (national-ism), that self-reliance in national security will become of primary importance. It does not, however, afford us the luxury of abandoning entirely old alliances, nor even of abandoning entirely the doctrine, force structures, and technological patterns on which we have relied. But we will now need to look at new frameworks which accommodate hybrid and proxy conflict in both the military and social spectra.