Chris Carr: Hello, everybody, and welcome to Espresso Martini. Matt, how are you doing?

Matt Fulton: I'm alright, Chris. It's, it's, it's friggin cold here. Um, and it has been for the past few days. Like, I'm straight up not having a good time right now. It's like down in like the twenties, so I don't know what that is for Celsius, but it would, it would be below zero.

Chris Carr: Wow. Okay. Well, it's not, it's cold here, but not that cold.

Matt Fulton: Yeah, it's, it's, it's below freezing and has been for a few days. Me and me and my cat were, uh, we were, we had some trouble getting going this morning. Uh, yeah, it was, it was a little chilly, but we're, you know, and I also feel like as I get older, I don't know, maybe this is a sign of me getting older.

I just get more like, my tolerance for like the really cold weather, this just gets less and less and less and less and less. Like I need to, I don't know, move to some suburban track housing in Florida because that's what happens. Maybe that's like a natural thing that it's just like a siren that just calls to you, you know?

Chris Carr: I'm, I'm, I, I hate the extremes of weather. It's a bit like my politics really. I hate extremes of politics. I hate extremes of weather. So I hate it too hot. I hate it too cold. Um, so yeah, so I'm, I'm generally only happy about three months of the year.

Matt Fulton: That's fair. That's fair. We get like, it's weird thing where, I mean, I think this winter, at least for us here in the Mid-Atlantic, Northeast has been more of a winter than it has been in, in recent years, like this feels like a fairly normal kind of winter. You know, we've had a few little-ish snow storms, nothing crazy, but, um, I don't know, it's like, every summer is just like ridiculously hot for like a couple months on end. And then yeah, January and February, it's just like just cold and wind nonstop.

And it feels like there's like three to four weeks in like early summer where it's nice and then like kind of mid to late fall where it's also nice and like that's it and everything else, it's just it just sucks.

Chris Carr: Yeah, yeah that feels about Right?

Matt Fulton: Maybe I'm just a pessimist, though. I don't know.

Chris Carr: Well, oh dear, no. Well, the thing I hate as well is the humidity. That's the thing because like, um I can cope with heat without humidity, but being in London we get a lot of humidity and I just feel like from out Too much information, but from about June to about mid September, I just feel like I'm just permanently in a state of sweat.

It's horrible. Yeah, it's horrible.

Matt Fulton: Yeah, it's not fun.

Chris Carr: Yeah, I knew it gets like that in DC for about May or something, doesn't it?

Matt Fulton: Yeah, it gets, it gets, yeah, it gets, it gets pretty nasty around these parts. Yeah, it's not fun.

Chris Carr: Not fun. So from our sponsors, uh, was it, uh, Gillette deodorant?

Oh dear. No, if only we were sponsored by a deodorant company, but all these one that cures sweat from, uh, humidity would be happy. There we go. Well, uh, moving away from, uh, the annoying weather, um, today, uh, well it gets a little bit chilly because we're looking at Russian intelligence, so we're going to be looking at a new reports of a new Russian intelligence unit that, uh, has been sort of designed for, uh, covert attacks.

Then we've got a Russian-linked Telegram channel that's been trying to incite violence in the UK, and that's based on a report from Hope Not Hate. Then we'll be moving on to listener questions and comments. So today is our episode where we've got listener questions and comments, and we've had quite a few.

So I'm pleased we've got a nice little collection there. Um, so, uh, thank you very much, everybody who participated in that. And, um, I hope that it will become a regular thing. We'll probably try and sort of work into the last episode of each month, a kind of listener questions section. So we'll, we'll, you know, figure that out as we go along.

So, uh, Matt, we will start with the story you picked out about this Russian unit called SSD.

Matt Fulton: Yeah. So this is a Wall Street Journal article that's been making the rounds this week I've seen. So one of the biggest stories in the world of espionage right now is the emergence of the GRU's Department of Special Tasks, a clandestine unit operating out of GRU's headquarters in Northwest Moscow.

According to the Wall Street Journal, this new division, known by its Russian acronym S. S. D., has rapidly become the nerve center of Russia's covert war against the West. Its operations include attempted assassinations, industrial sabotage, and even the recently uncovered plot to smuggle incendiary devices onto commercial cargo planes.

Formed in 2023, the SSD is a direct response to Western military support for Ukraine. It consolidates elements of Russia's security apparatus, including elements of the FSB and the notorious Unit 29155. Chris should take a shot. The GRU division behind the poisoning of Sergei Skripal in 2018 and the sabotage of a Czech ammunition depot in 2014, which we've talked about on here previously.

Intelligence officials believe SSD operatives are responsible for a string of recent attacks, such as the attempted assassination of Germany's Rheinmetall CEO, uh, whose company supplies weapons to Ukraine and the arson attack on a Berlin factory that produces air defense systems. The SSD operates under broad orders from Putin, but its commanders, Colonel General Andrei Averyanov and his deputy, Lieutenant General Ivan Kasyanenko, are given significant autonomy to execute operations.

Averyanov, a veteran of Russia's wars in Chechnya and Ukraine, is already wanted in Europe for past attacks. His deputy, Kasyanenko, is believed to have played a role in the Skripal poisoning and is also connected to Russia's paramilitary operations in Africa. Adding another layer of complexity, Kasyanenko is a Persian speaker who has worked in Tehran, where he reportedly helped facilitate military technology transfers between Russia and Iran, an alliance that has fueled Moscow's war in Ukraine.

One of the most alarming revelations is the SSD's apparent attempt to target Western aviation. Last summer, operatives tested a method to smuggle incendiary devices onto DHL cargo planes in Europe. The devices ignited in transit hubs in Germany and the UK. But intelligence officials believe the real objective was to refine the technique before targeting flights bound for North America.

The threat was so severe that National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and CIA Director Bill Burns at the time personally contacted Russian officials warning them to back down. Moscow, of course, denied any involvement. This raises urgent questions: how far is Russia willing to go in its covert war against the West? What does the SSD's is growing footprint mean for NATO and European security? And is the West response largely defensive so far enough to deter further attacks? Chris, what'd you think about this one?

Chris Carr: Yeah, well, from an intelligence and war fighting perspective, I can understand why the SSD was set up.

Putin and his regime have a history of using violence against those who stand up to them. So a more consolidated agency that is able to benefit from using all of the intelligence resources Russia has to carry out campaigns of retribution and sabotage makes a lot of sense. Um, with regards to sabotage in the West, Matt, you said a few weeks, well, it was a few weeks or a few episodes back that, you know, obviously this is an understandable kind of consequence of war, and that we need to be ready for such things, and, um, you know, I agree, as much as I'm still against Russia doing things, uh, doing such things, we do obviously have to be aware of, uh, units like SSD is an inevitable cost of war, uh, with, uh, regards to this unit and its operations against the West, um, this is one thing that I think should be brought up by President Trump's negotiating team.

I doubt it will, but it should be. Russia should be made to halt all hostile activity directed at the West, the murders, the sabotage, the disinformation campaigns. I know this is wishful thinking, but the end of disinformation campaigns against the West is at least measurable and the very least that we should insist on.

Um, and you know, you can give Russia a good deal for doing that. You know, you could cancel certain sanctions so they can economically get back on their feet. But likewise, any violation of, of that should be, you know, met with more severe sanctions. Um, I don't think it's going to happen, but I still feel that, you know, Trump, uh, should do something about Russia's sort of hostile activity against the West, because it's been going for a long time.

And if they, if this war with Ukraine does manage to end, then there really should be no excuse for Russia behaving in this way. Um, then I see the SSD have also taken over the Wagner operations in Africa. Um, it's not surprising that Yevgeny Prigozhin's death in 2023, uh, in the end was a kind of minor blip or an inconvenience for Russian operations in Africa, which were apparently very important to Russia, and it gives them access to sort of resources. Russia have been working very hard to rekindle Cold War ties in Africa and build a kind of reciprocal relationship. And they undermine democracies and back authoritarian regimes in Africa. And the African Center says that Russia's approach is distinctive among external actors in that Moscow typically relies on irregular and frequently extra legal means to expand its influence.

Deployments of mercenaries, disinformation, election interference, support of coups and arms for resources deals, among others. This low-cost, high-influence strategy seeks to advance a very different world order than a rules-based world order. Um, and you know, it kind of goes in the face of democratic political systems to which most Africans aspire.

Now with the SSD being kind of called a new unit, obviously it technically is new units, sort of a merger of things. To me, I think they should add an extra D it should be the S-S-D-D, which stands for the "Same Shit, Different Day."

Matt Fulton: That's a good one.

Yeah, I think it, um, as you said, this is, you know, kind of, uh, a reorg, a reorganization of, um, previous units and efforts that were already out there.

You know, it's, uh, an amalgamation of covert action-focused units that are put under one roof, or at least in one org chart, um, something that was really similar, that seems similar to me in this, as far as the SSD is concerned, is CIA's Special Missions Center, um, previously called the Special Activities Division before the 2016-ish, uh, reorganization that, that CIA had, um, and that sort of, you know, loops in a lot of the, the, the covert action, psychological warfare, um, directed, uh, organizational units of CIA with kind of the paramilitary, direct action side of things, right?

So Air Branch, Ground Branch, um, Special Operations Group, you know, those kinds of, those kinds of activities. Um, the SVR, Russia's, uh, Foreign Intelligence Service that was kind of cut off from KGB's old First Chief Directorate, I believe it was, um, has had a paramilitary unit called Zaslan, uh, very little is known about it, but it's considered to be under the Spetsnaz umbrella, right, which is, Spetsnaz isn't like, and when, when, when someone says Spetsnaz, that's not like, a specific organization, right?

Chris Carr: Like the SAS or something, right?

Matt Fulton: Um, it's a, there's a variety of units across the Russian Armed Forces and the National Guard and the police services and stuff that are like special purpose Spetsnaz units, right? So it's more of an, an adjective than a noun, I guess you could say. Um, but so Zaslan is sort of, has been considered to be SVR's, um, Spetsnaz kind of unit.

Uh, they're understood what's, what's known about them at least in open source information in the West. Um, they're tasked with the protection of Russian intelligence and diplomatic personnel overseas. So I guess you could say, um, somewhat similar to uh, CIA's Global Response Staff or the GRS, right? They kind of do the same thing.

I think they also have a bit larger. Zaslon has a bit larger remit also. You could perhaps consider them somewhat in the way of how, um, the special, Special Missions Center at CIA or MI6 is, uh, what is that? Echo Squadron or the Increment? Right? Is that the Increment? Yeah. Yeah. That's sort of tied to the SAS in some way.

Right? Um, it's, it's, it's, it's interesting though, as you said, it's, it's, um, it's. I think shows Russia's seriousness of, of sort of committing to, um, hybrid warfare, covert action as a kind of overall strategy. Right? And them trying to sort of make the organizational structures that kind of formalize that and make that make sense.

Right? Um, something also that I found interesting here is that a, uh, FSB, um, uh special training center called Senezh, uh, was put under, was brought under the GRU's control here. So that I think speaks to kind of an interesting, um, inter power dynamic between the Russian security services, you know, um, FSB is very powerful, um, FSB is very large, uh, and I, I would love to see behind the scenes, what that was like taking that part of S at that part of FSB and moving it under GRU. Remember, FSB took quite the reputational hit, um, in the lead up to the war in Ukraine, they had all the kind of happy talk intelligence estimates that, you know, uh, 48 hour, what is it, 72 hours special military operation, uh, Russian airborne troops would march right into Kyiv and, you know, it will be all like, you know, sunflowers and rainbows and shit.

And it, it, that wasn't, wasn't the case. Um, and you know, the FSB took, took quite the reputational hit for that. So I do find it interesting now that they're, you know, Losing some of those resources that are being brought under GRU's control. I don't know if that speaks to any kind of a larger trend or like, I mean, I'm sure, yeah, there are analysts at Langley right now and at MI6 who, you know, I'm sure would look at this and say, okay, what does that say about how Putin feels about, um, the FSB's, uh, you know, long term reputation and stuff?

I don't, I don't have an answer to that. I just find that part interesting here.

Chris Carr: Yeah, and if anything, it's almost like the GRU are benefiting from this because they're the ones who have the experience of doing these operations and it feels, and I think the FSB have tried similar operations and failed at them whilst the GRU of Unit 29155 has been quite Um, effective. Um, you know, cause obviously Unit 29155 are the unit who are supposedly responsible for the Havana Syndrome attacks. And obviously the initial targets, um, the initial original targets were all connected to that relationship the CIA built with Ukraine intelligence before the, um, before the Russia's invasion.

And, um, you know, if memory serves, there was an operation that both the Ukrainians and the CIA worked on that led to the death of Russian backed forces in Crimea. And those people were then on this target list, uh, by Unit 29155, and then became the first victims of Havana Syndrome. Yeah. So it was definitely something kind of going on there.

Yeah. Um, so yeah. Uh, yeah, same shit, different day with, uh, yeah, Russia at the moment. And the GRU also, um, is, I think, I believe Russia's oldest still sort of functioning intelligence service as it is.

Matt Fulton: Yeah.

Um, the GRU was around, uh, largely in the same form it is today. Um, loosely, you know, there have been changes, but it's largely in the same form It was during, during the Cold War, it survived the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The KGB did not, famously. They were broken up into the FSB, the SVR, a few other units. Um, KGB also had control of Russia's border forces, um, their, their, their Border Guards and stuff too. Um, also a lot of the, um, sort of top-level leadership, communication assets and everything. Right? And that was all broken up, um, into several different agencies that were created after the Cold War.

But the GRU is still there. Um, kind of doing, doing the same thing it was during, during the Cold War under the Soviets. And I think that's certainly, uh, reflective, um, here now with this new, with this new unit, something else though, that interested me. Um, that SSD has taken the Africa file, at least we like officially, like they're responsible for the remnants of, of Wagner and, um, what has been spun off from the, from the Wagner Group.

That's interesting to me because I mean, the Wagner Group, at least on the surface level, provided a degree of deniability, right? Plausible deniability.

Chris Carr: They've given that up now.

Matt Fulton: Yeah. To, to Russia's operations in, in Africa or in Syria, right? Elsewhere. Um, yeah. And that's sort of, it's just mask off now. So I guess there's that famous engagement, um, that US special forces had with a group of Wagner mercenaries and Syrian, uh, military units, um, a few years ago in which, you know, the Pentagon famously used like that deconfliction, um, hotline with Russian forces in Syria said, you know, there's all these Syrian units and, you know, Wagner mercenaries advancing on our position here seemingly with hostile intent. Uh, what do you want to do about that, Moscow?

And the answer was there are no Russian military units in the area. And the response that came from the US was, "Okay, understood." And they were all vaporized.

Chris Carr: Yes.

Matt Fulton: You know, so do, would, would we still, would we still consider Russian mercenaries not official like Russian troops now because they're organizationally under, under the GRU?

Chris Carr: Yeah, very interesting question. I think it makes sense to put it under the control of the military because obviously most of the members of Wagner would have come from the ranks of the military. And, um, so I think operationally it just makes more sense to streamline it in that way.

Matt Fulton: I mean, to say that, like, even, you know, Wagner's activities.

I mean, maybe you could take the mutiny out of it, but to say that Wagner's activities in Africa, uh, especially weren't, um, you know, directed by Moscow was always sort of laughable.

Chris Carr: I've also, uh, one other thing I find interesting is the areas of responsibility of the SVR and the FSB. Um, so from my understanding as a rule of thumb, the SVR handles foreign intelligence.

Whilst the FSB handles domestic, but then the FSB end up providing intelligence in places like Ukraine and stuff. So I'm like, so I, so is it because that was in Crimea, they were operating as it was considered Russian territory, like with MI5, you know, operate British territory.

Matt Fulton: The FSB is charged with intelligence gathering in Russia's near abroad, which is former Soviet states.

Yeah, so that's Ukraine, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Baltics, they would say, um, the SVR is further afield.

Chris Carr: Yeah. Yeah. Okay. Yeah.

Matt Fulton: So like the us the UK, that's the SVR.

Chris Carr: Mm. Yeah. 'cause just sometimes in the past, as I get a bit muddled up in my head, like, hang on a minute, is that FSB or SVR, but mm-hmm . Yeah. Makes a lot of sense.

Um, but then, yeah. Yeah. So, no, it does make sense. Yeah. That's cool. Well, uh, shall we move on to, uh, some exciting things that have been going on in London with regards to

Matt Fulton: Yes, this is a really interesting story that you have that I think complements this well, and it's also probably, I mean, the, the article that we're working from here, um, I'll let you explain it and everything, but the article that we're working over here doesn't explicitly say that this is SSD activities, but it certainly seems to be of the sort that they would do.

Chris Carr: Exactly, exactly. Funnily enough, actually, there's a report I discovered online. That talks about Russian influence operations, but it's still, it is from an official, um, is from the National Cyber Security Centre and they still mention Unit 29155. And also the 161st Specialist Training Center of the GRU is being responsible for like cyber campaigns and hacking and stuff.

So, um, so I don't know how, how old is SSD? That was the only other thing I forgot to ask.

Matt Fulton: It was created in 2023. So not very old at all. Brand new. I think it probably is, I mean, I haven't seen an org chart or anything, but it seems like a lot of these units, like Unit 29155, is that it?

Right? Did I get that? Okay. It seems like that unit and these other like various separate organizational elements that were charged with covert action or direct action aimed at the West were brought, whereas. SSD was created and those units were brought under his control. So I think Unit 29155 would just be under this new org chart.

Chris Carr: Got you. So Unit 29155 still exists and still operates, but they're under the kind of remit of SSD.

Matt Fulton: I believe that is the case.

Chris Carr: Yeah. Yeah. So you like you were saying about like being a mission center. That makes, that makes sense. Cool. Okay. Well, um, yeah, there was a story by Hope Not Hate that kind of, as you say, links in nicely to this.

And it's all about these Russian linked Telegram, uh, networks that have been inciting sort of terrorism and hate crimes in the UK. So just to quickly summarize. At least seven Islamic centres in London were vandalised with racist graffiti seemingly orchestrated by a Telegram channel that encouraged and rewarded such attacks.

The network has offered 2,500 pounds to anyone willing to burn a police vehicle, and a cash prize of 100 pounds for videos of vandalism against mosques. The campaign appears linked to a network of Telegram groups posing as British but likely operated from Russia, based on language errors and digital traces. These groups provide not only ideological support but also terrorist training materials, including guides on making explosives and firearms.

The network has expanded, openly soliciting acts of violence and distributing extremist propaganda across European and Russian language channels. The investigation by Hope Not Hate suggests that this Russian influence operation is aimed at hoping to spark a civil war in Britain, quite a big aim there, um, and the determination to recruit British operatives to carry out violence against minority communities in the UK is obviously deeply alarming.

So Hope Not Hate have passed on information to the authorities and they're urging them to shut down the network and take legal action. It's unclear at this time what legal, uh, recourse is happening. I certainly, I've not really seen this as of yet reported like in the, um, like on the BBC or mainstream news or anything.

Um, literally Hope Not Hate articles the first time I've seen anything about this, um, at the moment, but I could be wrong. I could have missed that BBC report or Sky News report on it, but I've not personally seen anything. But Matt, what are your thoughts on this?

Matt Fulton: Yeah. I think to me, this Telegram network is a textbook example of how Russia weaponizes Western values--so, openness, diversity, freedom of expression--against democratic societies. Um, the operation here exploits racial, religious, and social tensions, much like past Soviet and Russian intelligence operations aimed at the West. So a few historical parallels, the Soviet propaganda during the Cold War that amplified racial tensions in the US uh, using the civil rights struggle to paint America as, you know, hypocritical, racist, decadent, right? Uh, Operation Denver in the 80s, where the KGB spread the false claim that HIV/AIDS was a US bioweapon to undermine trust in Western institutions, right? Laundering it through, uh, various newspapers and news agencies in the Third World, right?

And kind of letting it seep into the bloodstream in the West that way. Um, and we still see consequences of that today, uh, in, in, in many respects. A few more recent examples, uh, Russian disinformation aimed at COVID-19, election interference, all of which just fuels polarization in the US and Europe. I think this, this network's tactics definitely align with, you know, what we just discussed with this new GRU unit, the, uh, SSD.

The reason why I think it's squarely falls into that category is it, this isn't just spreading disinformation, right? That's a very kind of classic thing that we saw in like the troll farms that, uh, Yevgeny Prigozhin had running in St. Petersburg, right? During the 2016, uh, elections here, you know? Um, but this is, this is something different.

It's, it's recruiting Britons to commit real-world acts of vandalism and potentially terrorism. Um, and that shift from online trolling to direct incitement of violence, I think is a major escalation in hybrid warfare. Uh, you know, I think something that is potentially a question to ask then with this report is do those efforts to recruit Britons to do that dirty work mean that the Russians don't have their own network on the ground that are able to do these things effectively, right?

Like, are they trying to outsource this because it, it, it pulls at the fibers of British society, right? Inflaming those tensions or they outsourcing it because they don't have another way to do this stuff on their own within the UK? I don't have an answer to that, but it's something that that stood out to me. Um, real question though, will the UK and European nations facing similar operations just complain, or will they actually act?

Um, UK authorities have been handed the evidence, what will they do? Uh, will Starmer's government take a hard line against those who act on Russia's behalf, Britons who act on Russia's behalf? These Telegram groups are useless if no one on the ground is willing to take action based on the propaganda and disinformation that they provide.

Um, and that's sort of the key here. If there are no Britons willing to look at these messages and take action based on what they're claiming, then they're just, there's just more noise online, right? In, on social media. Um, uh, but yeah, Russia's waging a war on Western society through sabotage, diversion, and social division.

The question's not whether Russia will keep doing it. They will. The question is whether it will. The UK and Western allies will make an example of those who help Moscow's agenda. And to me, that also includes public figures who play along with it, wittingly or unwittingly.

Chris Carr: Yeah, I agree with you on that. I agree with you on that.

It's interesting, but not surprising that these Telegram groups are set up just after the race riots last summer that were experienced in the UK. Now you mentioned, um, about the recruitment of Brits to kind of carry out these attacks. And, um, there is a new national security act that came out in 2023 that is designed to deal with, uh, British people who do get involved in stuff like this.

So, so in April, 2024, two British men were charged with helping Russian intelligence services in a suspected arson attack against a Ukraine-linked business in London. Then in August, that went up to seven arrests. Connected to the same crime. And one of the suspects, a 20-year-old man named Dylan Earl from Leicester, pled guilty to one of the arson attacks against a Ukrainian linked business.

And Earl was the first person, or Dylan Earl was the first person to be charged under section 18 of the National Security Act of 2023, which was introduced in response to the threat of hostile activity from states targeting the UK. Um, so certainly in 2023, you know, something was done. And obviously, with regards to, um, Starmer and Russia at the moment, I mean, he's actually proposing potentially putting British troops on the ground as a peacekeeping force in Ukraine, which is pretty bold.

Whether that will actually happen or not, I don't know, but it's a pretty bold statement from a British Prime Minister. And he also set up a, I think, a hundred year kind of pact with Ukraine not long ago. Um, so it's, yeah, I think he's still taking it very seriously.

Matt Fulton: I think it's certainly that speaks to the degree to which he is willing to put UK forces and UK resources on the line to actually back those things up.

Yeah, I think that's important.

Chris Carr: Yeah. So, and it obviously concerns at the moment in the UK about whether our forces are kind of, um, Yeah. Uh, have the ability to be able to stand up to Russia if a push came to shove, um, is a very good question because there's been successive cuts to the British Armed Forces for years that have, uh, decimated them, uh, by all the services, uh, you know, um, imperfect at this time and, um, you know, uh, different gripes depending on which service is dealing with, uh, and that, you know, I might have a podcast about that in a few weeks time.

Uh, So, um, yeah, it's very interesting. And now, um, I also want to just mention some other things as well, because they're connected to this. So. Last, as I mentioned earlier, last year in September the National Cyber Security Centre published a report titled UK and Allies Uncover Russian Military Unit Carrying Out Cyber Attacks and Digital Sabotage for the First Time and the NS, sorry, the NCSC obviously named Unit 29155 and this Specialist Training Center, 161, uh, of the GRU as being responsible for it.

So there may well be, you know, some connections, what Hope Not Hate is, um, just talking about here. And then in October of 2024, the head of MI5, Ken McCallum gave his annual update and said that the Russian intelligence agency has been on a mission to generate sustained mayhem on British and European streets.

And he added that the GRU agents had carried out arson, sabotage and more dangerous actions conducted with increasing recklessness. Um, and then MI6's chief, Richard Moore in November, 2024 said a similar thing at a speech in Paris where, you know, he said, we have recently uncovered a staggeringly reckless campaign of Russian sabotage in Europe.

Even as Putin resort to nuclear saber rattling to sow fear about the consequences of aiding Ukraine, the chiefs of Germany's three intelligence branches also echoed these concerns reporting a very quantitative and qualitative increase in Russian acts of, uh, sponsored espionage and sabotage in their country.

And I've already mentioned, obviously, what happened in the UK with the British man who's arrested. So, yeah, it's, it's an ongoing thing, this. Um, and as you were saying, what are Europe gonna do to stop this? And obviously, again, As I asked earlier, what is the Trump administration going to say to Russia with regards to these operations whilst they're negotiating the peace, you know, the peace process with Ukraine?

Um, because if Russia is going to end its war on Ukraine, um, the sabotage campaigns need to stop. And also this, this, uh, state sponsored disinformation campaigns that are kind of designed to undermine Western democracy needs to stop as well. Uh, because I don't think Russia should at all be allowed back into kind of the international fold until this is brought to a head really.

Um, and then what you were saying about like, uh, Whether the Russians have this capability to do it themselves or not, and why are they recruiting locals? I guess the recruiting of locals is always more desirable because their hope is that obviously this operation would go under the radar. So should said local get arrested for it, there wouldn't be any kind of fingerprints pointing back to the GRU, etc.

So is that plausible deniability?

Matt Fulton: It's quite presumptive.

Chris Carr: Yeah, it is, but I think, I think the Russians like to think that they're very good. And sometimes they are very good, let's be honest about it. Yeah. You know,

Matt Fulton: I mean this Hope Not Hate, they sort of were able to connect this Telegram network to the Russians because the default, there was a screenshot from one of these Twitter posts or something.

And it was showed that, uh, it was set to whoever was using the app and posting it, their default language on the Twitter app was set to Russian and was working on a time zone of which Moscow was in this time zone. Right? So if like, if, if Hope Not Hate, I mean, yeah, they do good work, but if Hope Not Hate can point to the Russians behind this, I'm sure MI5 can.

Chris Carr: Well, I think what's interesting with the NCSC report, they mentioned the, um, the 161st Specialist Training Center of the GRU uses a lot of junior officers. And I think they're the ones who kind of do the, should we say the finger work or leg work on the, the digital side of it and they're the ones who do make these stupid errors. Um, whilst the 29155 are the more kind of kinetic on the ground and more, you know, blow shit up or kill people kind of people. Um, and I think, I think arguably they're a lot better, um, than the digital people. So maybe there's, uh, some tension within, um, the, uh, the, what was it called again?

The SSD where they're like, uh, the geeks are fucking things up for the special forces guys. Yeah.

Matt Fulton: Yeah. Yeah. The geeks versus the chads.

Chris Carr: Yeah. So it could be an interesting being a fly on the wall at the annual Christmas party or something.

Matt Fulton: Yes. I don't know that I would want to be there. I don't know. You think like the, the, the, the Christmas party in Tinker, Tailor is quite depressing.

I'd imagine that's probably more depressing.

Chris Carr: Yeah, I'm sure it is. I'm sure it is.

Well, is there anything else you'd like to add?

Matt Fulton: No. Uh, it's just, just an interesting, um, it, it just. It honestly made me kind of angry looking, like reading through some of these messages and just, um, I don't know, it's again, as I've said here, plenty of times, I mean, in the past few years, we have launched some serious, seemingly launched some pretty serious covert action, uh, operations against Russia's ability to wage war in Ukraine.

And I think it has had serious impacts, right? So as I say on here all the time, don't throw a punch if you're not prepared to take a punch, right? Um, it just means you, they're gonna, they're gonna hit back and you have to be ready for that. You know, you have to be willing to counter it. Um, it's just something about, I'm more, I guess I would be more angry at the Brits or the, you know, citizens of any Western country that are going along with this than I would at the guys in an office building in Moscow that are sending these messages. Right? I mean, yeah, like, yeah, okay. The Russians are going to do what they're going to do, but it's the kind of willingness or whether it's intentional or just being useful idiots, right?

It's the willingness of, of people in Western countries to go along with it. That's, that's what pisses me off, right? That's who I'm angry at here. Yeah.

Chris Carr: Yeah, and as we've said before, you know, Russia presents itself as the saviour of the white Christian world, and, um, sorry, the white Christian world, and, um, I think there are a lot of sort of far-right people who get taken in by that narrative, and, you know, and this is why we're seeing, then, these are the people who get recruited to then go and, uh, attack a mosque or something terrible like that.

Um, and, and what worries me a little bit of all this is I still think the general public are not fully aware that Russia is trying to stoke racial tensions. I think people, you know, I, I could imagine people would see, I don't know, this mosque attack and they might assume it's just, you know, just the far British far-right with nothing else connected to it.

And then there might be some kind of counterattack to it, and it could escalate quite quickly if you're not careful. Thankfully, nothing like that has happened so far, but, um, I think if it happened enough times, or, or, if the, you know, the Russians then started trying to, I don't know, um, they go and bomb the local far-right chapter somewhere, you know, and then try and make it look like, uh, some Muslim group was responsible or they try to stoke tensions between Muslims and Sikhs somehow.

You know what I mean? It's suddenly you could press a lot of buttons and get a lot of things kind of going if you're not careful. And I think the general public. Do need to be made more aware of this. I think the announcements by MI5, et cetera, are all fine. If people actually watched the news and pay attention to it a bit like what we do.

But I think a lot of the time, you know, general people are not aware that this is even a reality. Um, and this, this is what concerns me because it makes society very vulnerable to this thing. And, um, you know, and there's this stuff around, um, there's stuff around some of the, you know, anti-Israel, um, you know, the understandable partly and the anti-Israel marches that happened last year and like calling, um, Joe Biden "Genocide Joe."

Yet there's a sort of silence now as Trump's in. There's no kind of equivalent name for Trump at the moment and here he is trying to destroy Gaza and kick all the people of Gaza out. Yet there's very little real significant protest movement of the same level. That we had last year before the election.

Matt Fulton: Yes.

Chris Carr: And I want to know why that is, because I suspect, I suspect there's something nefarious behind it. I could be wrong. I have no idea, but I have a, I have a feeling that there's something dodgy behind all that.

Matt Fulton: Yeah, well I don't think the entire the protests we saw, right, the, the protests that we saw against the war in Gaza and everything, the campus protests and stuff that happened at the DNC and all that kind of stuff, that's not entirely just astroturfed by the Russians.

There was legitimate, like, that was real. Right? To an extent. Did the Russians, the Iranians, outside actors try to exploit that and throw gas on the fire and everything and manipulate stuff to create more perhaps damaging or embarrassing images to the administration? Everything? Yes. But I think by and large, that was legitimate.

Why those same people aren't now legitimately protesting, you know, in the ways that you said, that's a, that's a great question. I mean, it's a classic issue with the far-left.

Chris Carr: Yeah. Yeah, indeed. Well, we don't know the answer to that question. Um, so we'll, we'll leave it at that, but, uh, the, yeah, it's definitely something to kind of ponder on there.

Well, let's move into a break and then we'll come back with listener questions and feedback. So, uh, catch you after the break.

Well, welcome back everybody. So our next piece is listener questions. So I'm going to kick off with our first one from Ben in Los Angeles who's asked, "What are your thoughts on the dilemmas of counterterrorism actions like bombings, assassinations that may eliminate a target, but create a new wave of enemies?"

So that's a quite a big question, actually, but Matt, what are your thoughts on that one?

Matt Fulton: Yeah, well, uh, hi, Ben. Thank you for your question. Greatly appreciate it. Happy to answer it as best I can. It is a, it's a tough one to get your arms around. I think I, I thought about this this morning with my, with my coffee, when me and my cat were still kind of like, you know, shivering cause it's so frigging cold here. Um, I would, I would look at it in a, in a, a couple of ways.

First, I would look at it in terms of like, I mean, the question is like, the dilemma is based on like, okay, you eliminate this terrorist leader, but the actions in which you use to eliminate said leader creates bigger problems and headaches down the road. Right? I think is kind of the gist of what the question is.

Um, so to start, I would look at the question of tactical success versus strategic impact. Right? So killing a high-value target can disrupt operations in the short term, but it doesn't necessarily weaken the broader terrorist movement that, that this person represents. Right? So, uh, the US campaign of drone strikes against Pakistan and like the 2010s and stuff, um, they killed a whole bunch of key leaders from groups like al-Qaeda, the Haqqani network, the Taliban. Um, but those groups adapted and, and persisted. It also really, I think, poisoned our relationship with Pakistan and pushed them further to China, which is strategically harmful, um, in the long run. So yeah, to that point, are we solving a problem or just managing it?

Right? Um, I think it's also. I'm going to re I'm going to relate this back to in the more contemporary sense, what we're talking about with the drug cartels in Mexico, potentially, right?

Chris Carr: Yeah.

Matt Fulton: Um, I think this also kind of feeds into the conversation we had last week. Um, then there's the boomerang effect, right?

Are you just creating more enemies? So targeted killings can sometimes inspire new work, new recruits and fuel radicalization. Um, Israel's assassinations of Hamas and Hezbollah leaders over the years have removed, um, those those figures as threats, but they've also led to revenge attacks and hardened oppositions.

An example that I could offer is the 2004 assassination of, um, Hamas leader, uh, Hamas founder, rather, uh, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. Um, Israel eliminated this, you know, founder of, of Hamas, but, um, the attack sparked massive protests, increased Hamas's legitimacy in, in Palestine and amongst the Arab Street, um, and escalated a bunch of violence.

Um, his death led to waves of suicide bombings and the rise of more militant Hamas factions. So does eliminating one leader create 10 more? I don't necessarily have an answer to that question. It really kind of depends on the context around it. Right? But that's, yeah, it's a factor.

Chris Carr: That's their one rule.

Matt Fulton: Right. Um, and there's the War on Terror paradox.

Uh, you have large scale counterterrorism efforts often start with clear objectives, but they involve into endless conflicts. Look at Afghanistan. Started as a counterterrorism operation, became a 20 year war, ended with the Taliban back in power. Iraq. US withdrawal created a vacuum that led to the rise of ISIS, partially.

Um, so are we, are we addressing these root causes or are we just playing whack a mole? I would ask that question too in terms of how we calibrate, how the Trump administration calibrates its response to the Mexican drug cartels, right? Are you getting to the root causes of the problem or are you just playing whack a mole? Are you blowing up a bunch of, you know, infrastructure to create a show that doesn't actually solve the issue in the long run and in turn just creates more strategic problems. Um, and again, the alternative; is doing nothing worse? Um, restraint has also has its risks. Ignoring threats can allow them to metastasize. I mean, you could, outside of counterterrorism, you could relate that to the issues that we've had with the Russians that we just talked about in the first half of the show.

Um, the US avoided targeting Bin Laden in the nineties. That decision didn't prevent 9/11, uh, in some cases, targeted strikes prevent imminent attacks, saving lives, but not, not always. It's a, it's a, it's a really hard thing to kind of get your arms around, but, you know, counterterrorism isn't just about kinetic action, um, it requires a blend of solid intelligence, diplomacy, and political strategy.

And while strikes may be necessary, uh, they should be always, I think, part of a broader effort to weaken terrorist networks at their core rather than just eliminating individuals because we're mad at them.

Chris Carr: Yeah.

Matt Fulton: I don't know what you think, Chris.

Chris Carr: Yeah, I, I feel generally the same as you. I was looking at is an interesting question.

Um, and I think there's a, so at the moment there's a danger of being risk averse because sometimes doing nothing is worse than doing something, but, um, and again, I think we kind of post-War on Terror, we tend to favor kinetic over, um, more socioeconomic, uh, sort of ways of dealing with something.

Matt Fulton: It's easier.

Chris Carr: I think about the Marshall Plan after World War II, you know, um, now you could argue Afghanistan, America was sort of trying that they were sort of trying to kind of rebuild the Afghan society, et cetera. And it for awhile was benefiting mainly women and, um, you know, in society was changing, but it. But the problem was, um, with regards to Afghanistan, I think culturally it was just going against the grain of the reality on the ground of their society.

And so it was always sort of semi doomed to fail unless US force backed it up. Um, so you kind of need to find, so I think, I think the big mistake with regards to Afghanistan was moving it from a special forces mission to an occupation.

Matt Fulton: Right.

Chris Carr: I think that was a bad idea. It should have always stayed US, um, special forces working with the Northern Alliance because Northern Alliance are locals who are our allies.

And they're the ones we will, you know, work with to change the shape, should we say, for hopefully the positive for Afghanistan society. But by imposing, you know, a kind of Western way of doing things or imposing democracy at the barrel of a gun, it kind of never works and it just pisses people off. And I think the one thing I've learned is generally most people don't like it when an outsider comes in and tries to fix other people's problems, you know, it's like in life if somebody turns up and says, you know, you're having an issue and somebody just comes up unsolicited advice about how you should do something. I'm just going to 360 view, but it may be right, but you instantly like fuck off, you know? And I think geopolitics can be a bit like that too. Um, so one should never forget the kind of the human nature side of things. I think this is the thing. I think there is an overreliance on kinetic action a lot of the time. And if one figured out like we've like Lebanon's an interesting place because Lebanon has been the center, especially in the eighties.

It was sort of the center of all sorts of terrorist organizations and things. I think Lebanon, um, You know, it has a lot of socioeconomic problems that kind of feed into that, that allow groups to dominate and, um, and, and the thing is, when people are desperate, they will turn to a group that will keep the lights running, keep the water flowing, keep the egg prices down, you know, um, And, uh, and so then it kind of, um, you know, this is, this is the vacuum that I think, uh, you know, the NATO, et cetera, should be considering as an option to sort of, um, disempowering terrorist groups rather than just bombing them with, um, missiles and stuff, maybe sending in a lot of aid or et cetera, and working with locals to try and figure out how to fix fundamental problems, then the extremists will be seen for what they are, extremists exploiting something. But all of that is very wishful thinking. It's a lot easier said than done, um, all of what I've just described there. But, but at least it should be tried.

And I was thinking of, um, the end of Charlie Wilson's War, the movie, I don't know whether in reality this happened, but I remember, um, Philip Seymour Hoffman's character is one of my favorite onscreen spies is sort of just, um, he said that the, you know, basically, um, something on the lines of that they messed up the follow through of Afghanistan because obviously the, the Mujahideen toppled the Soviets, but then America, once they toppled the Soviets, kind of like, we're not interested in Afghanistan anymore and walked away when in fact he felt they should have stayed there you and helped rebuild that society.

And instead it created a vacuum and allowed the Taliban to go in, bit like what you were saying earlier with ISIS. So I think those sort of socioeconomic issues need to be taken more seriously. Um, uh, and I think there's a, an aversion to kind of socioeconomic stroke, holistic sort of methods of dealing with crisis and so on.

Matt Fulton: It's also difficult, I think, just to your point there about, you know, kinetic options being always ranked ahead of the perhaps more difficult and nebulous effort to get to the root cause of these issues that cause the problems that you need the kinetic option that you need the kinetic option to solve.

Right? Of course. Um, the problem is a lot of the, I think it's, it's inherently seen as easier, at least from the outset to just throw a missile at it, you know, or, or, or a JSOC task force, you know, um, at least on a balance sheet, when these operations are being drawn up, that's cheaper and quicker.

Chris Carr: Well, yeah, because Afghanistan will come up as an example of the billions you wasted trying to rebuild a society that just turned on you and fell apart in 30 minutes.

Matt Fulton: Right. Okay. So if you're in Camp David in the week after 9/11, right? When, um, Bush, Condi Rice, Cheney, George Tenet are all sitting up there at Camp David and they're sort of, you know, have this war council and they're plotting out the invasion of Afghanistan and what became the war on terror, right? What they're looking at, what they planned, was a lot cheaper and quicker than what they actually ended up doing.

Um, you know, right? So they're planning, Hey, we're going to send, um, uh, CIA and special operations forces into Afghanistan. And we're going to work with the Northern Alliance to rout out al-Qaeda and the Taliban. And we're going to get Bin Laden and it'll be over by Christmas and that'll be great. And then we can sort of move on to address the root issues of terrorism elsewhere in the Middle East.

Right? Perhaps it's what they were thinking. I mean, yeah, that's pretty, cheap and quick and easy, but to your point of what you were saying, when you stay and you come into nation building and everything, that becomes a lot more expensive in the long run.

Chris Carr: Yeah. Well, this is it. I think with the nation building thing I mean, you could argue there's a case that the Americans should have stayed in Afghanistan because it wouldn't be half as bad as it is now for the people of Afghanistan.

Matt Fulton: I. Yeah.

Chris Carr: You should have almost like North and South Korea.

Matt Fulton: My struggle with that is, you know, whereas those images of how the occupation ended right, in, what was that? 2021, I think? Um, yeah, how that ended is a national embarrassment and a disgrace and the people that were left behind. And of course, you know, the outcome for Afghan children, women, other marginalized groups, horrible.

I don't know, and ultimately I think Biden's instinct here, I think at a point that, you know, how long do you, like, once you have a government that are just feckless and corrupt and, and unable to stand on its own and hold the country, has no national mandate to hold the country, like, do you just stay there in perpetuity just because you want to avoid the, the, the displeasure of what, you know, will happen when you pull out? I mean, like, I, I think I've related on here on the show before that, like, you got to a point where you had, um, service members, 18, 19 year old kids, service members being deployed to places forward operating bases that their parents, their father had served in when they were born, still being shot at, still dying, you know, like, that's not, that's not right.

Um, I just, uh, that, that, that that's not sustainable.

Chris Carr: No, but then look at Korea. We still have US service members there, and that's a much older conflict.

Matt Fulton: We're not being shot at in Korea, though.

Chris Carr: Not at the moment.

Matt Fulton: Not at the moment.

Chris Carr: That could change. Right? You know, um, the Korea situation's always, uh, it's a bit like a volcano waiting to go off.

Um, You know, it's like, it's, it's, it's a bad idea to build a resort near a volcano because one day it will go off and I feel like that with North and South Korea, um, and the Americans are almost just firefighters and waiting. Um, so yeah, but it's, it's definitely as imperfect as it is, at least it's given some peace to South Korea.

Matt Fulton: Yeah, the South Korean government is also not the Afghan government circa 2020, 2021.

Chris Carr: No, no, culturally, there's a lot more similarities between the American approach and etc. And back to my earlier point, really, not to talk myself out of my own point. It's like, yeah, I think if you culturally impose something on a totally different culture, it just never works. It's doomed to fail unless, unless you take the kind of communist approach and believe that it takes a hundred years to change a society because by then there'd be nobody left to remember how it used to be.

Matt Fulton: Right? Well, that's, I mean, if you, which is not good, but if you say, let's say, okay, South Koreans. For the sake of conversation, let's say South Koreans looked over the fence, over the DMZ into North Korea and said, yeah, they got a pretty good system there. I think they got it figured out. I think we should live the way they did. No amount of, no size of an, of a US occupation force could prevent that, you know, like if South Koreans didn't want to be a democracy, no amount of US power could, could prevent them from not being a democracy anymore. Um, you know, you can't, we can't want it. And this is true of any country, Afghanistan, South Korea, whatever, even the US, right? We can't want it more than they do. For themselves.

Chris Carr: Yeah. Yeah. Indeed. Wow. Um, I think, I think we've covered that.

Is there anything else you'd like to add or?

Matt Fulton: No. Tough question. But good question.

Chris Carr: It was. But thank you, Ben, for that. And, uh, cause I know, Ben, you're, I believe I remember correctly, you were saying your brother, um, was in the services. Um, so obviously, you know, um, he, he is, been on the front line of all these sort of things is obviously very easy.

I always, I always feel bad because I'm not from a services background, so I always feel like it's very easy to hear, sit at my desk and talk about these things, um, and, um, you know, I don't want people to think I'm being glib or anything about all these risks, because we, we do take a kind of very big perspective on things, but I'm aware of the, sacrifice and stuff on the ground because I've had friends who've been in Afghanistan, some who've lost limbs.

And, um, you know, I, I've seen the impact it has on people. And, uh, I, I don't think war should ever be taken on lightly, um, at all. Uh, and I, and I think it's something you've got to be really careful about, but like you were, I think saying earlier, Matt, there is a danger as well, isn't there, of um, being too risk averse, where you allow people like Putin to get away with things, and it keeps getting worse and worse and worse, until you end up with an invasion of Ukraine, and the situation we're kind of in now, so, careful balancing act that I think requires, uh, very, um, you know, uh, clued in view of the very, of the situation you're going into and the kind of culture of the place that you may or may not be going into.

Matt Fulton: I think that's a great, you know, final point there that, that, just how complicated this stuff is that we're talking about. And no one fully knows the answer to every question in these spheres at all times with a hundred percent certainty, no chance for failure in hindsight or anything. It's not possible.

And I think anyone who, who offers themselves up as having the answer for every single perceivable question, conceivable question under, you know, geopolitics, international affairs, counterterrorism, espionage, like any, all the stuff that we talk about, anyone who presents themself as having all the questions and being right all the time, you should run in the opposite direction of them as fast as possible.

Because they're wrong.

Chris Carr: Yeah, totally. Totally. And just to add as well. Obviously with your brother and anybody who does, has served on the front line, you have my utmost respect and I hope I never come across as disrespectful or anything like that. But, you know, it's, it's not an easy job. Um, and, uh, my people who, who decide to participate in that.

So we'll move on to, um, another question, which is another quite big one. Um, it's all about the Five Eyes. So it's from Ada Zandaton and this is via Instagram. And she asked, will the Five Eyes still function under Trump or will New Zealand, UK and Australia perhaps be better off creating a new Five Eyes type organization.

So, um, yeah, I mean, first of all, I don't know if like the Trump administration will pull out of Five Eyes and, or whether its foreign partners will want to either. I think a Five Eyes divorce will be very messy, um, as there are a lot of NSA monitoring stations in all those countries you mentioned, and also the US provides a lot of sort of technology and support that, uh, that enable many of those systems that Five Eyes use.

Um, I think the other issue the other issue may also occur in which Five Eyes partners might not want to share certain types of intelligence with the US. Um, and I suspect again that that's rare. Um, every, but, uh, but every country, especially Britain, do keep critical information sharing to a minimum. So, for example, it'd be very unlikely, um, MI6 would, you know, willingly give out the list of whoever their Russian assets are in Russia to every Five Eyes member because there's been many a situation where sometimes low ranking people in the Five Eyes community have, like in Canada was one example, I think it was a low ranking naval officer who shared an awful lot of information that compromised a few systems and stuff.

So I think, you know, all the intelligence services would be very careful to keep certain critical information, especially information that relates to their national security. to themselves. So I know, um, there are people online who are concerned about Tulsi Gabbard, and I share those concerns. Um, and I, and I jokingly shared a, a Bluesky post the other week about, you know, America's allies would be, uh, running behind the door and locking that door.

There may well be some damage limitation that might go on if they are really seriously concerned about Tulsi Gabbard. Um, I, I, I remained, um, I'm going to try and remain open minded about Tulsi Gabbard. I think the bigger issue is she's more under qualified for the role than she's a out and out like agent for Putin.

I don't think she's that, but she's definitely been sympathetic to certain Russian talking points. Um, and yeah, but, uh, you know, um, and you know, the other thing as well, I think it's sad that we are in a situation now where we're having to worry or think about there could be an end to Five Eyes. Um, you know, because only a few years back, the Biden administration, we had AUKUS, which is all about strengthening submarine capabilities with Australia and the Pacific.

And it's a good example of kind of the US leveraging its technological know how with allies and working with them to bolster mutual defense. And I kind of think Five Eyes is a bit like that as well. And I think, I think it would be very foolish of the Trump administration to mess with it. And I think the intelligence community and people serving him, and it will fight tooth and nail to defend the Five Eyes relationships on, you know, both, uh, foreign and, and in the US.

Um, so yeah, those are kind of my hope. Those are my sort of ramblings about Five Eyes, but Matt, what, what are your thoughts on all that?

Matt Fulton: Yeah, this is a, this is also another really good question and quite a pertinent one. Um, I would definitely like to look more into this in the future in upcoming episodes and stuff.

I've, I've one in mind in particular where I think this is a good question to ask, but I mean, so Five Eyes as an intelligence alliance is formalized under a multilateral agreement called the United Kingdom - United States of America Agreement, or yoo-koo-SAH, a kind of odd way of pronouncing it that doesn't quite feel right to me, but apparently that's, that's what it's called.

Chris Carr: Yeah, not to be confused with the Japanese mob.

Matt Fulton: Yes.

Chris Carr: Yakuza.

Matt Fulton: Quite different. Quite different, but not nearly as many tattoos. Um,

Chris Carr: Or fingers being removed.

Matt Fulton: So there is like, there are underpinnings of the alliance in international law and the agreements that have been signed between all the parties involved.

Um, so I don't, it's not, when you have stuff like that, it's a lot harder than just, it's like an on and off switch, whether we share that information you know? I would think this is purely just my gut, you know, of just institutional understanding of how this stuff works and what I've learned over the years and have seen and have spoken to someone. I don't have active current knowledge that this is the case right here and now, again, I said, I want to look into this a bit more closely. My gut, though, would say that I think once you get out of the C suites, the command decks of these organizations, right? And you get down into the liaison postings that really govern these partnerships, whether that's in embassies in DC or London or Canberra or Ottawa or Wellington, right? Or if you get into the actual operation centers where the sharing actually takes place, whether that's like Fort Meade or in Hawaii, uh, Menwith Hill, um, Bude, Scarborough, Pine Gap, right? Or even up at like CFS Alert, way at the top of the world, literally at the top of the world, as how big this thing spans, right? I think if you got into those operations rooms, um, I think it would look very normal. I think it, it's I think those relationships that, uh, the information sharing and stuff, the kind of, you know, the, the stuff that makes Five Eyes actually function on a day to day basis, I would bet it looks no different than to how it did a couple of weeks ago.

Um, yeah, I mean, you're talking, um, career military and intelligence officials, uh, civil servants. Um, I don't. I, I, I don't think it's, it's any radically different at all, given the past few weeks and I wouldn't really expect it to, you know, whether that's, you know, whether that means that Five Eyes shifts to also include more intelligence sharing between European, um, services, you know, that's a, that's certainly a potential that could come out of the next few years.

I don't know that it would be necessarily a bad thing, although, I mean, if I'm in, if I'm a, an executive at a French intelligence agency, or let's say the GCHQ or something, I mean, and I'm thinking about. Um, fully opening a taps to let's say Germany, you know, in a way that is unfiltered in that exchange of information between GCHQ and NSA.

Right? Um, I mean, AfD could be in the German government, uh, within the next few years, you know, so to act like, you know, okay, well there, there isn't complete ideological alignment between, within the transatlantic relationship anymore, therefore Europe should just focus inward on itself. There isn't ideological alignment within Europe either.

Chris Carr: No, well, no, Europe's, uh, you know, is full of countries, you know, that's completely different. Um, and have deep histories and, and no disrespect to the United States, but states are different. Um, they aren't countries. They're all theoretically a part of the same country, obviously with some minor caveats here and there differences between north and south, a little bit philosophically, but generally the, you're, kind of, you know, the United States, you know?

Yeah. And reason .

Matt Fulton: Yeah. Um, so yeah, I, I mean. Long winded way of saying, I think when you get down to the nuts and bolts of Five Eyes and stuff, and if, yeah, if you walked into, into, um, Menwith Hill or Bude or, yeah, Pine Gap or something, I, I think it, I think they're, these are professionals that are focused on the job, um, and the political sturm und drang at the top, per se, uh, I, I, I would be surprised if it reaches down to that level.

Chris Carr: Yeah, indeed. One recommendation I can give you with regards to the Five Eyes relationship in New Zealand is that the NSA monitoring station in New Zealand is in a place called, they nicknamed Spy Valley and they have their own, uh, there's a really cool, uh, wine brand called Spy Valley. Um, and they make great Sauvignon Blanc.

And I drove through Spy Valley not long ago and it was, well, my wife, Did the driving. I was the passenger, but we went through Spy Valley and it was great.

Matt Fulton: Did you get us a sponsorship with that winery? If not, why not?

Chris Carr: I've been trying. I have emailed them a couple of times, but, uh, yeah, and, and sadly, um, we didn't get a chance to go around it cause, um, the day we were in that area was New Year's day and they were closed that day.

Uh. So. Yeah, but did drive past it. Um, unfortunately, the NSA monitoring station is not as exciting as it was because they've taken the golf balls off because the technology has changed a bit that now I guess they don't need those golf balls anymore. So it just looks like.

Matt Fulton: Do they have the dishes there still that the golf balls cover up?

Chris Carr: No, they didn't have anything like that. So it was really weird. So it was just buildings. So I'm not quite sure what tech that they're running there at the moment. So yeah, unless they're doing renovations or something. So yeah.

Matt Fulton: Cyber stuff or the cables?

Chris Carr: Maybe, maybe. Yeah, I think that technology, but I, I like the, I think even if, I think one rule with Five Eyes with the monitoring stations, even if golf ball's not needed anymore, they should keep them because they look cool.

Matt Fulton: They do look cool.

Chris Carr: They do look very cool, and it's always interesting when you drive past one. There's a few in the UK, you drive past, you're like, oh, wonder what that's monitoring, etc. It's all quite interesting, so yeah. Especially when I was a teenager, I used to love that, you know, in certain parts of Hampshire and Surrey and stuff, you see these.

things like, wow, what's that? So yeah, well, let's move into a break.

Well, uh, we'll move on to, we've got some comments from Tim regarding our coverage of the Southport killings. So I'll read, uh, paraphrase, uh, cause Tim wrote some very lengthy comments. They're very good comments and thank you very much for them, but I'm going to paraphrase them for us here. So Tim noted that we, uh, examined the case thoroughly and with sensitivity.

So thank you for that, Tim. Um, but he also mentioned that it's important to note that the prime minister swiftly ordered a national judge led public inquiry following the sentencing and that inquiries aims was to investigate the case in depth and address and address key questions that have arisen. And Tim points out that if a defendant pleads not guilty, a jury trial is held, but a guilty plea removes the need for a jury while the judge will still hear the facts before sentencing.

So what he's saying there is obviously there will still be a case, but it's just not put to a jury. In the Rudakubana case, his unexpected guilty plea caught some right wing commentators off guard, with figures like Alison Phillips worryingly claiming victims were denied a day in court, which is not true.

So in reality, the sentencing hearing detailed the entire case with evidence presented, and the judge explaining his decision to a full court before passing the sentence. Far-right groups and some mainstream politicians falsely suggested that there was a cover up of the suspect's identity which fuelled conspiracy theories.

Riots broke out based on misinformation that the suspect was a Muslim illegal immigrant when he was actually a UK-born Catholic. The judge lifted reporting restrictions to counteract this disinformation. But figures like Tommy Robinson still spread falsehoods whilst evading legal consequences, and politicians like Robert Jenrick used the controversy to appeal to far-right sentiments, despite the facts being publicly clarified.

So, yeah, so thank you very much for that, Tim. Yeah, I mean, it was a very messy, uh, case, the Southport case in terms of the public discourse on it. And, you know, when a, when a case like this happens as well, I mean, um, the police and the Crown Prosecution Service obviously have to hold some information back, uh, because they're worried it might sort of perjure, um, uh, or influence a jury, uh, because obviously, um, if, you know, if you are going to go to court, uh, and a court in front of a jury, the defendant has a right to an unprejudiced jury, which obviously easier said than done.

So certain information always gets held back to stop, um, the jury being prejudiced, or at least, um, or the defense team claiming that the jury are prejudiced in any way against the defendant. So even in some cases, um, you know, a defendant's. Past criminal history is not read out to a jury because they're worried that it might influence their decision when obviously in reality, um, a court case should always be based on the facts of the specific case they're talking about, regardless of the suspect's history.

But obviously with this one, with this particular case, there was a public right to know what was going on to some extent, because unfortunately, as you're saying, these sort of far-right commentators were really sort of jumping in on the, the information vacuum and spreading that vacuum of conspiracy theories.

So, you know, thank you very much, Tim, for all your comments there, um, and forgive my paraphrasing. I hope I did justice to what you, you wrote there. So thank you very much for that. Uh, Matt, was there anything you wanted to add there?

Matt Fulton: Uh, no, I, I don't. It was a very useful perspective that, that Tim had. Um, I mean, it's certainly a story that hasn't been covered that much, um, in the US so to, yeah, hear what, what he had to say, that was, that was great. Really appreciate it. Thank you.

Chris Carr: Yeah. And our last question is from, uh, Brian, and it came via email and he's asked us about what our top non fiction and fiction spy books are. So, uh, Matt, I'll hand over to you. Um, you're going to go non fiction or fiction first?

Matt Fulton: I'm going to go fiction first. Uh, and this is by no means, um, exhaustive or definitive or in any particular ranking or whatever. It's just some thoughts that I put together as to, you know, um, definitely books that are inspirations to me in my own, um, work. So, I have two Clancys. First one that I would offer up is The Cardinal of the Kremlin.

Uh, it's a really humanizing portrayal of the Soviet Union during the Reagan era, the height of, of that kind of mindset. Uh, so, unlike Cold War era, spy fiction that often depicted the USSR as this like monolithic enemy, right? This like shadow-mantled lair of scowling villains, like Mordor or something, right? Um, uh, Cardinal depicts the, this is a more nuanced and humanized view. It's like a real country where actual people live. Um, I, I just found that very kind of progressive isn't the right word, but kind of, it was, it was a nice change for the eighties that, that, that, that Clancy did that. Um, so through Mikhail Filitov, the Soviet military officer and CIA agent who himself is based on Oleg Penkovsky, um, uh, Clancy shows the kind of moral dilemmas faced by individuals caught between the duty to their homeland and their conscience.

And I think the book also does a great job of showing the relationship between intelligence officers and their agents. So you have Mary Pat and Ed Foley, um, the two CIA case officers in Moscow who are running, um, Filitov, their kind of relationship with, with him and the, the duty that they feel to, to protect him and to sort of safeguard the information that he's giving to the CIA.

Brilliant portrayal of that stuff. Um, the next one, I would offer another Clancy, uh, The Sum of All Fears. Um, so, unlike traditional spy novels that focus on a single operation or a small cast of characters, um, Sum of All Fears is massive in scale, as were a number of Clancy's novels around this era, uh, very late 80s, early to mid 90s, right?

Uh, it, it weaves together geopolitical intentions, uh, So it weaves together geopolitical tensions, uh, intelligence operations, military strategy, nuclear brinksmanship. And, uh, it, it, um, it, it mirrors classical epics in that kind of like multiple storylines converging toward a single climate, uh, single climactic moment, right?

So you have I don't know, you think of this kind of classical epics that, you know, revolve around warriors and gods and fate. I think Clancy does a really good job in this novel of replacing those with like advanced technology, military hardware, and like the bureaucratic machinery of modern geopolitics.

Um, it's, uh, certainly a big inspiration for me with the Active Measures series. I think of the Active Measures series as a will be, um, spy novels that are kind of very much written in the classical epic tradition. Um, or at least they, they try to be. Another few I'd offer, uh, John le Carré's Karla trilogy. That's Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy; The Honourable Schoolboy; Smiley's People. Um, so unlike Clancy's sort of action heavy thrillers, they're not even that action heavy by modern, by like current modern standards anyway. But, uh, so le Carré's work is definitely more of a slow burn. It emphasizes the mind games, betrayals, and moral ambiguity of espionage. You know, you have George Smiley, famously the anti-Bond, um, an aging spy master whose battles are fought in interrogation rooms rather than on the battlefield.

And, uh, it, that trilogy as a whole, I think really strips away any kind of romanticized notions of spying showing Cold War intelligence operations, how they left a trail of kind of, you know, shattered lives and and broken loyalties and personal sacrifices. So I think those are really good. One more for fiction.

Uh, Graham Greene's The Quiet American, a favorite of mine, set in 1950s Vietnam, uh, captures the early seeds of American intervention in the region and how intelligence work is sort of an inseparable part of foreign policy there. Uh, you have Alden Pyle as a naive, dangerous American, um, represents idealistic interventionism versus Fowler, cynical British journalist and uh, embodies European disillusionment, um, really great stuff there.

Love that one. As far as nonfiction, and then I'll hand it over to you, Chris. Just a couple, just looking over the shelves that I've really enjoyed over the years. Uh, there's H. Keith Melton's Spycraft. So he, um, that's all about the history of CIA's OTS, the Office of Technical Service. So they, you know, basically like Q Branch, right?

You can think of them. Um, Keith Melton was, uh, uh, he was one of the founders of the Spy Museum. I think his, his collection is sort of like the core of what became the, uh, the, the Spy Museum. There's also Ronan Bergman's Rise and Kill First. Really, I think the best, um, and fullest history of, of Mossad, of Israel's Mossad and, and their various operations over the decades, uh, you know, using kind of kinetic direct action against Israel's enemies. Really great stuff there.

Sean Naylor's Relentless Strike, I would also offer is kind of like the finest history of JSOC, uh, yet written. Um, really just, I mean, it's not, espionage in the classical sense, but I think it's a core part of, you know, the, the tip of the spear side of the stuff that we talk about, you know, um, getting into this kind of the blacker side of things. Um, can't go wrong with that.

Uh, in that same vein is Michael Smith's Killer Elite, which is a history of, um, it's originally called the Intelligence Support Activity, but it's kind of the, uh, the intelligence gathering arm of JSOC. Really great stuff in that book. Also, Nada Bakos's The Targeter. Um, it's sort of her bio, uh, from her time as a CIA targeting officer.

Um, she was deeply involved in the hunt for Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the head of al-Qaeda in Iraq during sort of the worst days of that insurgency. Really great stuff there. I enjoyed that a lot. Um, there's also Jeremy Duns's, uh, Dead Drop. Which is, um, the history of Oleg Penkovsky and his involvement in the CIA and the Cuban Missile Crisis, the role that he played there.

Great stuff, would recommend that a lot. Um, there's also a series that I would recommend, um, it's, I'll explain why, but so, uh, Jeffrey Richelson, who was a senior fellow, he passed away in 2017, but he was a senior fellow at George Washington University's National Security Archive. And for many years, he published a series called the US Intelligence Community. Uh, there were the last edition, the seventh edition was published in 2016. Um, and it's a really good, it's, it's technical, but not too technical. I think if there's anyone in the audience who really is just wants to study like the nut and bolts of how the US intelligence community functions, whether that's through, um, org charts that they gathered through FOIA requests and just kind of, um, all the steps of the intelligence cycle, looking at different intelligence agencies with inside the US intelligence community, how they're organized, why they're organized that way, what each sort of part of them does. Um, I think it's really kind of the best book out there for that. I read an earlier, um, edition of it. I think it was the fifth or the sixth edition, read it cover to cover, um, the summer I was interning in Parliament in the House of Commons, I read it on the Tube on my trips in and out every afternoon, kind of, you know, I don't know. Weird to read that cover to cover. But, um, yeah, really, really great book. Uh, the seventh edition is the last one that was published in 2016. Um, and I've, I've said a few times, I would love for some enterprising intelligence scholar out there to, to, to, pick up that, that mantle and publish new additions to that series.

I would love to see it continued. Yeah. Cause the last one was published in 2016. So it's a bit, it's a bit, it's a bit dated. Um, I reference it back to, I referenced back to it all the time when I'm writing or looking into something, but it's, uh, it's still pretty good, but yeah, I would love to see an updated edition of that book at some point.

Um, yeah. Chris?

Chris Carr: Yeah, well, I'll start with non fiction then work back to fiction. So, um, I Wonder if any we can guess why these again not ranked but one of any we can guess what my first books gonna be?

Matt Fulton: I won't say it.

Chris Carr: So uh, Next Stop Execution by Oleg Gordievsky. So uh, Oleg Gordievsky was the first real spy I ever met, um, and possibly one of the most important spies of the latter part of the Cold War.

This is his memoir, which I first read when I was 18 years old, and it kind of changed my perspective on how spying works, and it kind of gave me a great insight, um, into as to what living in Soviet Russia was like and why Gordievsky at the time wanted to do what he could to bring the communist system down and allow Russia to become a democracy.

Sadly, obviously that aim failed. Uh, I don't think Russia is a particularly, uh, functional democracy today, sadly, uh, not, not Oleg's fault in any way. Um. But nonetheless, Oleg played a key role in the sort of downfall of the communist system in Russia. And that book just provides really interesting insight into what it's like being a double agent and the stress, the stress of being one, um, and the techniques you have to use to kind of avoid being found out.

So it's a very, very interesting book. Um, another, another early book of mine, um, from which I read in 2013, actually, was The Art of Intelligence by Harry Crumpton. And, um, this is just a great memoir by a retired CIA officer who joined in the seventies and left the agency in the mid two thousands. And he kind of gives a wide range of the different sort of, um, operations that he had been on in his career.

Um, and I think if I remember correctly, he talks a little bit about being stationed in, uh, certain African countries and stuff and enjoying the kind of culture there. Um, and also talks about how, um. You know, a little bit about like he had his family with him and, uh, when he was stationed in places and things, I think a lot of people forget that, uh, uh, career intelligence officer will go out and live in a country for a few years with their family, unless it's a considered a horrifically hostile place, then they won't.

Um. And in fact, like, you know, the partner of intelligence officers, uh, you know, they, they have interesting sort of lives as well. Um, so it's, no, it was a really good book, that one. Um, then my next book is the Black Banners by Ali Soufan. And I think this is a great book on the birth of al-Qaeda and how they operated.

And Ali Soufan was one of the FBI's first Muslim special agents. And he worked out of the New York Field Office under John O'Neill, who headed up the FBI's first task force against al-Qaeda. And John O'Neill famously was sadly killed in the 9/11 attacks because he, um, had been forced out of the FBI and ended up becoming the head of security of the Twin Towers.

And his first day on the job was the day when the attack happened. So terrible timing there. And there's a really great miniseries. Well. It's a good miniseries. I wouldn't say it's a great miniseries. The, um, Looming Tower, I have issues with that miniseries. I think they got a bit overly caught up in, uh, John O'Neill's sort of dodgy sex life and spent not enough time on the terrorism, in my opinion.

Matt Fulton: It's based on a book.

Chris Carr: It is. Yeah. The Looming Tower by Lawrence Wright. Um, and no, really, really good show. I think, yeah, as I was saying, I think my problem with it was it got a bit too caught up in John O'Neill's sort of, Uh, dodgy sex life, uh, where he had multiple lovers and stuff and, um, just didn't really spend enough time on the, the terrorism.

I kind of felt like, uh, it kind of lost track a little bit of what it was supposed to be about. Um, that was sort of my feeling of it. But, The Black Banners, fantastic book. If you ever want to learn about the kind of, um, origins of al-Qaeda, it's a must read. Um, and one of the takeaways I got from it, was how al-Qaeda was, in the early days, very desperate to be taken seriously so they could get more funding from wealthy donors.

And after the tepid US responses to both the Nairobi embassy bombing and the US 's coal bombing, they decided to take things to the next level with 9/11. And it wasn't until 9/11 happened that people realized that al-Qaeda was serious. And then suddenly donations came flooding in. So that's a interesting insight from there.

The next book is, uh, The Good Spy by Kai Bird. Um, and it's a really interesting book about a CIA officer called Robert Ames and his relationship with Yasser Arafat's intelligence chief, Ali Hassan Salameh. And it's, um, the true story behind my favourite spy novel, which I'll bring up in a minute. And it provides an interesting insight to kind of the CIA's counterterrorism efforts and covert deployment.

Diplomacy in the Middle East during the late seventies and early eighties. Um, obviously Ames's a sort of relationship with, uh, Salameh was slightly controversial, but it's what the CIA do, you know, you can't always talk to, you know, everybody, uh, you want to, and, and they, they kind of found a mutual respect for each other.

Cause that's the interesting thing when you are, um, sort of dealing with, shall we say, people who you feel are sort of unsavory. Um, if your job is to recruit them or at least get them on your side, then you have to find common ground with those people. And this book talks a lot about that and it's very interesting. And these two men did sort of find a common ground, um, and built a sort of mutual respect and then Ames unfortunately was killed in the Beirut embassy bombing of 1983.

My next book is Spymaster by Dr. Helen Fry and I think it's a great book about an MI6 officer called Thomas Kendrick who oversaw the surveillance of senior German prisoners of war and used tactics such as wining and dining the officers in stately manners across the UK and then purposely giving them uninformed and bad interrogations so when they went back to their friends later they would inadvertently spill the beans by remarking to their fellow prisoners about how the interrogators are so stupid and never asked me about X. But they were all being listened to. And so, uh, obviously the, uh, the bugging operation would pick up on whatever this thing was that the Germans, uh, has said that they hadn't been asked. And, um, this bugging operation with the German, uh, with a team of German translators may well have shortened the war, and it certainly saved Britain from a rocket attack in 1943.

So, uh, you know, uh, very interesting book. And also, actually, one other thing I picked up was it gave a different perspective on, um, Chamberlain. And this appeasement of the Nazis, apparently according to Dr. Helen Fry, Chamberlain was briefed by MI6 and was asked to find a way to delay starting the war with Germany because Britain wasn't ready.

And so, you know, Chamberlain is often seen and used as an example of appeasement, uh, and he took a big reputational hit over it, but it might be that, um, he was encouraged to do so by MI6 to kind of give Britain time. And that puts a new perspective on things as that was from Dr. Helen Fry, very interesting book, Spymaster. And I, and I did interview Dr. Fry a few years ago and, uh, and, uh, do recommend checking it out.

So my favorite sort of fiction books, I'll just go through them quickly. Cause we're getting a bit out of time now, but Agents of Innocence by David Ignatius. So that's the fictional story of The Good Spy. And I love that book. And I, and I learned a lot about sort of agent recruitment and things. It's all about the relationship of a CIA officer and, uh, trying to recruit some, uh, someone. And, uh, and I found that really interesting.

Then Matt, I got a similar as you, Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy by John le Carré. My favorite book of John le Carré's though is actually The Constant Gardener, but I wouldn't class that as a spy book, even though there is an MI6 character briefly in it.

Uh, it, to me, it's sort of one of, it's one of le Carré's sort of, um, post Cold War, uh, books. Um, and it's obviously about the pharmaceutical companies and, uh, so on, um, and there's a sort of big romance story in it. And, uh, I always loved The Constant Gardener, but Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, landmark book. That was my first le Carré book I ever read, and I was thoroughly engrossed by it, and I thought it was brilliant. It's such a great piece of writing.

Then, um, Ashenden by Somerset Maugham. Um, that's a really great book. Um, Somerset Maugham actually worked for MI6 during the First World War. And apparently there are some chapters of this book he was ordered to burn because Ashenden was so realistic and Ashenden's all about an MI6 operative during World War I sort of doing various sort of missions across Europe and it's a very interesting book. So allegedly there are some chapters that are missing from that book that may have been burnt and will never be seen again or they may be hiding in an archive somewhere waiting to be found.

Another, a book that I sort of found kind of fun, but I still was sort of informed by things was The Deceiver by Frederick Forsyth. Um, and that's, that's all about an MI6 officer whose career is sort of coming to an end and he's being in, it's a bit like Spy Game actually. He's being interrogated and he, he kind of flashes back to, to different sort of chapters of his espionage career, and I really enjoyed that book.

Um, and in my final book, uh, Damascus Station by David McCloskey, I think that's a really great book. It gives a kind of modern take on what it's like to be a CIA officer stationed in, in the Middle East and, um, you know, David has a lot of, uh, you know, respect and love for Syrian culture. And, uh, it really sort of shines through in the book.

And I think, um, you know, for me, I, I just don't read a lot of spy fiction, sadly. Um, and I, and I tend to be, and the reason I don't read a lot of spy fiction is just because I don't have the time sadly, because I've read so much non fiction for the podcast and stuff. Yeah, and so I sort of just generally drift towards books that written by former spies themselves because I just have a very sad to say a bit of a lower opinion of the genre to some extent unless it stands out as a, you know, that enough sort of people I respect say this is a really good book because because I I want the peak behind the curtain that's what I search for and not enough spy books by written by people who are not spies give me that sense of the peak behind the curtain and there's nothing worse when you're reading something and you know, that is definitely not how they'll do something, you know, I mean, obviously suspending a disbelief is important in certain situations.

Like I can enjoy a James Bond movie and a Mission Impossible. Um, but for some reason I have a real hang up with other books that try to portray themselves authentic, but are clearly are not. So that's my, my issue, I think. Um, but no, um, uh, great questions. So thank you for that. Um, and, uh, no, some very interesting books from you there, Matt.

So it was, yeah.

Matt Fulton: Yes. Yeah.

Chris Carr: So that was good.

Matt Fulton: Good list.

Chris Carr: So, um, that is us, I think done for today. Um, unless there's anything else you'd like to add.

Matt Fulton: No, uh, thank you for the questions. Uh, really, um, love, uh, seeing some of the questions we got in and taking the time to answer them. Uh, looking forward to doing this more.

Are we doing this monthly now or?

Chris Carr: Yeah, I think we should. I think it'd be really good.

Matt Fulton: Yeah.

Chris Carr: I think it'd be really good to do that. So we'll sort of, uh, make the last episode of the month. But there'll be a caveat to that because, uh, I'm gonna be away the last week of March. So we will not have a, um, an Espresso Martini that week.

But, uh, we'll have an interview in our place. Yeah. So, uh But, uh, so maybe the 22nd of March will be the episode for, uh, our, our comments, comments and questions.

Matt Fulton: Just a reminder folks, standing invitation, uh, you know, we're going to do this, uh, at the end of each month or for the most part, barring any other issues that we have that would, would be preclude us from being on the air the last week of the month, but, uh, yeah, you know, send us, send us your, your thoughts, your questions, and, uh, we're, we're happy to talk about them.

Chris Carr: Yeah, definitely. So thank you to Ben, Brian, Ada, and Tim for getting in touch. Uh, we will definitely do this again. So please, anybody who wishes to send us questions, uh, comments, uh, I don't know, topics for discussion, just email us at secrets and spies podcast at gmail dot com or DM us on our social media channels.

And in the message, please could you include the question or topic with a relevant news link or online publication link? Um, if it's something in particular you want us to talk about, um, also then please, can you tell us how you'd like your name to be read out on air? Um, you know, do you want me to read out your full name, part your name, a pseudonym, you just tell me how you want it and I'll read it out.

And that's really it. So thank you very much everybody for listening. Um, please obviously support the show by sharing this episode. Please share it with friends, families, cohorts, etc. Uh, the more we share it, the more it helps us. Uh, also if you wanna go ad free, uh, we're on patreon dot com forward slash secrets and spies.

Uh, you can also buy merchandise from our Red Bubble shop. Um, so that's in the show notes, the link to that. Also, we have a YouTube page. So if you want to look at us on, on YouTube, you can, um, you know, hello there if you're watching. Um, so yeah, we are down on YouTube. So again, the, uh, just type in Secrets and Spies podcast to YouTube and you'll find us, but there is a link in the show notes.

Connect with us on Bluesky, Instagram, Facebook, or Spoutable. Um, and you can follow both myself Matt personally on, on Bluesky as well. So, uh, that is, um, everything. So Matt, you up to anything exciting this weekend?

Matt Fulton: No. Uh, I am, um, staying in, working on the usual stuff I'm working on. Uh, it's, it's, it's too cold for me to be out and about.

Chris Carr: Fair enough. Fair enough. Well, um, I'm, what am I doing? I'm going out for a nice roast lunch on Sunday, um, so I'm looking forward to that. Uh, may or may not be seeing a movie. Last Sunday I saw the new Captain America film, which is called, uh, not Brave New World, it was the other title, or is it Brave New World?

Matt Fulton: That's it.

Chris Carr: It was Brave New World, because they previously called it New World Order, didn't they? It was all Right? Um, you know, it was standard stuff. It was mildly entertaining. It was, you know, it was a good sort of reasonably solid Marvel film. Uh, not an epic Marvel film, but not a terrible one either. It was somewhere sort of nicely in the middle.

Um, so yeah, no, uh, do go and see it if you get a chance. Um, also, Was it September the 5th out at the moment, which I went to a press screening of a few weeks ago. Um, and that's a very interesting film all about the Munich Olympics attacks and, uh, and the journalists, well, the sports, uh, journalists who ended up kind of covering it, um, live on the news.

So they were kind of out of their depth and, um, and it's all about how they kind of handle it. And it's a really interesting film. Um, so definitely worth checking out September the 5th as well. But, uh, yeah, I think that is us for today. So thank you very much everybody for listening. You take care and we'll catch you next week.

Matt Fulton: See ya.

Chris Carr: Bye for now.