[00:00:00] Announcer: Secrets and Spies presents Espresso Martini with Chris Carr and Matt Fulton.

[00:00:27] Chris Carr: Hello everybody and welcome to Espresso Martini. Matt, how are you?

[00:00:32] Matt Fulton: I'm alright, Chris. I woke up with like a, this like kink in my neck. I don't know, I, I'm trying to like, I've been trying to like get it out all morning.

[00:00:38] Chris: Yeah.

[00:00:38] Matt: But, you know, I don't know. Sucks to get old.

[00:00:40] Chris: Yeah.

[00:00:40] Matt: Other than that I'm okay. How are you?

[00:00:42] Chris: Oh good, good. I'm okay. I think maybe I've had too many coffees today, I dunno. Um, I, since getting that, uh, milk frother I'm probably averaging like five lattes a day now, which is probably not healthy.

[00:00:53] Matt: Oh yeah, yeah. Get like a little EKG scanner on the bottom of the screen here that we can see.

[00:00:59] Chris: Yeah, exactly. See how we're doing. But, so yeah. So today's our, um, last episode before our break. Uh, and I'm looking forward to having a bit of a break. Um, but it's, uh, yeah, so if it feels like the end of term or something today, I dunno.

[00:01:15] Matt: Well, I got, I got some stuff to do for this podcast, next week behind the scenes.

[00:01:21] Chris: Yeah.

[00:01:21] Matt: So it's not, it's not a complete, no. It's not.

[00:01:24] Chris: Oh, sorry, sorry. Yeah, no, I, I, I've got some behind the scenes stuff, but I'm doing it over the weekend so I can have next week off. So, uh, looking forward to that. But there we go. So anyway, today, we are still here. Um, and we have some interesting stuff coming up.

So we've got, um, does Putin hate making tough decisions? Then we've got Russian ghost ships spotted in Libya. Then we've got listener questions, and then we end up with a retired MI6 officer who comes out of the shadows to help save his local church. So, um, Matt, the first story is one you picked about does Putin hate making tough decisions, which is a very interesting piece. So I'll let you tell us all about that.

[00:02:02] Matt: Yeah. So this is a piece, uh, it was in The Times, The Times of London, not The New York Times, but it was in The Times, uh, by Mark Galeotti, who's a long-time Russia watcher, has written a ton of stuff.

[00:02:13] Chris: And we must get him on at some point.

[00:02:15] Matt: Yeah, yeah, yeah. And the various security factions around him. So, um, he, in this latest piece in The Times, he, uh, lays out how Putin, despite his strongman persona, tends to avoid tough decisions. So right now he's, Putin, is stalling on a proposed 30-day, well, at, at, at the time this article was, was, was written, Mark Galeotti reflects that Putin was stalling on a proposed 30-day ceasefire in Ukraine, neither accepting nor rejecting it outright. His typical playbook is to delay, nitpick, and test the waters before committing to anything. The problem for him is at this time the clock is ticking, especially with Trump pushing for a deal.

Putin's hesitancy comes down to political risk. A ceasefire could alienate Russian ultra-nationalists, but rejecting it, Mark says, uh, outright risks souring his relationship with Trump, who, despite Moscow's hopes, might not always be as friendly as the Kremlin would like, Mark says. Uh, that tension was on display in a recent call between the two. Trump proposed a full 30-day ceasefire. Putin refused, but was open to a pause on strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure, suggesting he's willing to deal, but on his own terms.

Beyond the immediate battlefield, Galeotti points to a bigger Kremlin calculation, securing long-term influence over Ukraine politically rather than through outright military conquest. Some in Moscow think a drawn-out post-war scenario where Kyiv is desperate for reconstruction and EU accession could work to Russia's advantage. The risk for Putin? If he dithers too long, Trump's patience could run out, and the window for a deal, one shaped on Moscow's terms, might close. And as one White House source put it, we're all living on Trump time now, where delays come with consequences. So, that's what, that's, that's his piece, that's what he says.

Um, an update on that ceasefire, though. So since, um, most of this sort of transpired yesterday and the day before as as we were recording. So after Mark's piece came out, um, in The Times, uh, we have an update on those ceasefire talks. It's a bit of a mixed bag. According to Axios, Trump has been personally working the phones, trying to broker a deal between Kyiv and Moscow. After a two-hour call with Putin, this, um, was yesterday as we're recording, so on, on Wednesday the 19th, I believe, um, after a two-hour call with Putin, the Russian president agreed to a partial 30-day ceasefire, not a full stop to the war, but a pause on attacks on Ukrainian energy and civilian infrastructure. Then Trump got Zelensky on board with the same terms. Now, US officials are set to meet with Russian and Ukrainian representatives in Saudi Arabia to work out the deal. Uh, if it sounds promising, there's still, um, quite good reasons to be concerned. Um, just hours after Putin's call with Trump, Russian forces launched drone strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure,

[00:05:00] Chris: Yeah.

[00:05:01] Matt: Something that the Kremlin insists was just a misunderstanding involving its own drones. What to make of that? I don't, I don't know.

[00:05:09] Chris: Oh, no, the drones have gone mad. You know, maybe testing out new AI or something.

[00:05:13] Matt: Yeah. Just, just saying what they, what they said.

[00:05:16] Chris: Yeah.

[00:05:17] Matt: Uh, meanwhile, as Trump, Trump is framing all this as a diplomatic win, saying the process is, quote, on track, unquote. But the reality is Putin is still playing his usual game, keeping his options open and pushing for leverage wherever he can. At the same time, Zelensky is using the moment to push for more military aid. He specifically asked Trump for additional US-made Patriot missile systems to bolster Ukraine's air defense, and Trump, uh, quote, agreed to work with him to find what was available, particularly in Europe, unquote. Found that interesting. And in an eyebrow raising offer, Trump suggested that the US could help run Ukraine's electrical grid and nuclear power plants, even floating the idea that an American ownership of those plants would be the best way to protect them from future attacks, from future Russian attacks. I think, uh, an American stake in those plants is what he was asking about. So, while this is movement, maybe even a step towards something bigger, it's far from a breakthrough. And with Trump running shuttle diplomacy, the clock is ticking on whether this ceasefire sticks, let alone leads to real peace talks.

Uh, Chris, what'd you think about this one?

[00:06:22] Chris: Well, I still fall in the pessimist camp currently, so I apologize to people in advance. Especially after my chat with Keir Giles, I do feel a little bit, sort of pessimistic about things. But, um, so about this piece, so obviously, it does paint an interesting picture of Putin and one I broadly agree with. Funnily enough, just this morning, I was listening to an interview with Mark, um, and he does say that he is more of an optimist than others with regards to Russia and its post-Putin future. This fear of alienating Trump is an interesting point. You know, when President Trump himself stands accused of siding with, or at least cosing up to Putin and the Kremlin view of the world. And this is, you know, and this is not without substance considering since Trump's return to office, he has alienated all of the United States' allies, risks causing a global financial, um, sort of slow down or crash potentially. Um, and he's been very critical, president Zelensky, calling him a dictator. So the idea that Putin is somehow fearful of alienating Trump is an interesting idea, but considering Trump falling over Putin quite openly, I do, I am a bit skeptical.

That, uh, uh, Putin is particularly concerned by Trump. But, you know, if he is, um, maybe this relationship is more delicate than we realize. Maybe Putin really is concerned that Trump could turn on him and he's not sure what that would look like. We can't rule that out. Um, I am skeptical of that, but I can't rule that out. Um, Mark also mentioned in the interview I watched, this interview I watched this morning that, um, Ukraine is obviously incredibly important to Putin and his personal legacy, and he also said it could be Putin's last war that would solidify his legacy. So, the outcome of this war for him has personal stakes. You know, and as per my interview with Keir Giles the other day, Putin does see himself at war with the West and Western officials refuse to acknowledge this publicly. Uh, but behind closed doors, they do admit that this is a reality. Um, and Putin, obviously, as we know, has been using hybrid methods such as disinformation efforts, co-opting the Western far-right and far-left, as well as using sabotage, assassinations to empower himself and divide the West, which is something we talk about often.

I don't think it's very realistic to see Putin's gonna make any real concessions on Ukraine. I could be wrong, but I kind of see, I could see him carrying on like he did with Chechnya and calling the West's bluff. I think that is the worst-case scenario that could happen. Um, you know, Trump has made it very clear he is not interested in allowing America to get further involved by refusing to give any security guarantees. And Europe is not in a position to help Ukraine for an extended period, especially without American support, despite Prime Minister Starmer and President Macron's efforts that are going on as we talk right now. Um, there are discussions going on behind closed doors right now of military leaders of Europe. Um, so it'll be interesting to see what comes out of that because there's been this talk of, um, not a peacekeeping force, they've given it a different name, I was just looking at it before we came on air. It's called, hang on, uh, Reassurance Force, is what they wanna call it. Um, and it's got a name already, the Multinational Force Ukraine, MFU is, its now its acronym. So, there's something brewing at the moment. It might involve 20,000-strong arm, um, yeah, sorry, 20,000 boots on the ground from a kind of coalition of countries of the willing. Um, so I dunno, there's, that's, that's an interesting development that could kind of, um, come out. So, we will see what the future holds for Ukraine because I, I just, yeah, there's no, uh, anybody who regularly listens to this, I want to see a positive future for Ukraine. I would like to see Ukraine being independent. I'd like to see it thrive and rebuild.

And on top of that, I'd like to see a positive post-Putin Russia. And Mark said something in his interview I watched this morning that really kind of stood out for me about how, um, a lot of Russian youth are much more kind of, um, Western orientated and kinda European orientated than Putin and people of Putin's generation. And so he being optimistic, Mark being optimistic, says that there is something we've got to be careful about of not, um, we've got to find a way to engage with future Russia. Yeah, younger Russians, the future Russian leaders, et cetera, and see if there is some way to kind of bring them back into the fold in a positive way. Um, but obviously, at the same time, got to be really careful about not rewarding Russia for bad behavior. So it's sort of finding this sort of careful balance, really. And this is the, this is the diplomatic kind of seriousness that needs somebody who knows what they're doing because we don't want Putin to walk away with all these prizes for doing bad things. And at the moment it feels like, to me, looking at it, that Putin's the one with the upper hand right now, not Trump. But I could be wrong, I hope I'm wrong, but I'm not sure.

[00:11:15] Matt: Yeah, I don't, Mark Galeotti, as I said at the, at the start of this is a long-time, serious Russia and Putin watcher who has been doing this, I mean, longer than the war in Ukraine, longer than Trump's been on the scene. So, while he sort of says out of the gate that he is a bit more of an optimist in his analysis and how he looks at this kind of thing, I do find it interesting what he says about the Russian youth, and maybe we'll get to that in a, in a, in a second, but I, I, he's, his, his perspective is, is definitely worth listening to, which is why I sort of wanted to flag this here today. I think, in terms of the timing of the call between Trump and Putin, um, that lasted like two hours, and apparently there was a, in that call, Putin agreed in principle with the terms of a limited ceasefire. Now there is some discrepancy, between the White House readout of the call, which has a ceasefire on targeting energy and critical infrastructure. The Kremlin readout of the call just says energy infrastructure, not critical infrastructure, so,

[00:12:26] Chris: Hmm. Is that down to, uh? Well, yeah, yeah, yeah.

[00:12:30] Matt: Is that just, is that just a, a, a translation thing or is the White House trying to be more sort of rosy in their assessment of how that call went than the Kremlin did? How the, how is that gonna play out on the, on the battlefield, so to speak? I don't know, but I find that part interesting, right? So, okay, so there was that two-hour call. Um, then there was that drone thing that happened right after. The Russians say it, it was an accident and they shot down their own drones. As to, you know, how likely that is or if there is intelligence to suggest that, even open source terms, I don't know. I'm saying that's what they said. Since then, um, Putin talked to Zelensky and that's when, I guess Zelensky backed the terms that Trump and, and Putin sort of came around to on the energy, on a ceasefire, on, on energy infrastructure, and that seems to be what's kind of in place right now.

[00:13:30] Chris: Mm-hmm.

[00:13:30] Matt: Again, with that discrepancy between energy infrastructure and critical infrastructure versus just energy infrastructure, I don't know how that's gonna go. But I do, as far as Mark's sort of analysis here, I don't know that it's, um, I don't know how much it would be correct to say that Putin is sort of worried about Trump per se. I don't know that I would go in that direction. I do think though it's worth keeping in mind, um, Putin's right flank, essentially, that kind of, like, ultra-nationalist, a lot of them are bloggers on, on Telegram, former military people, um, you know, that are very much arguing that Putin should go harder in Ukraine, you know, that it should be a, I think Keir Giles in your interview with him that came out yesterday as we're recording, was sort of speaking to this also, that there should be a, a larger and more effective genocide of Ukrainian, sort of is what is what Putin's right flank is saying. And I, and this is sort of, um, very much the stance of Prigozhin and a lot of his, his lieutenants in the, in the Wagner Group.

[00:14:42] Chris: Well, yeah, that was their complaint, wasn't it? That Putin wasn't going in hard enough and giving enough resources. It wasn't that Prigozhin wanted the war to end because suddenly became a humanitarian, and yeah.

[00:14:52] Matt: Right. So I, I, I find that interesting. Also, Mark's, sort of, broader analysis about how when it comes to these sort of tough decisions that would, are sort of, you know, fork in the road moments for Putin's legacy as he sees it, right, in this war, I agree, it's completely will, how it goes, for better or for worse, relative for Putin, will be in will in large part speak to what his legacy ultimately is. Um, that, that, that interests me, that, that interests me as well. But I do think there is, um, there are more pressure points on Putin than, than we would often think, you know? I think the kind of great boogeyman persona that he's pushed out, that a lot of people in the West now kind of just believe or accept, I think they accept it too easily. I mean, is he, is he completely in control of everything? Is he, does he totally have all the cards? Does he, are there, you know, no, I don't, I don't think that's, that's true. I don't know that we necessarily, we, we definitely don't have as much influence over him as we would like to have for sure.

[00:16:01] Chris: No.

[00:16:01] Matt: But, um, I don't know there, this, this whole thing is just, it's, it's more complicated than, than the discussion in the West often makes it out to be. And just one more point, there are factors and, and anxieties that Putin clearly has that I don't think we in the West often take into account and fully understand.

[00:16:21] Chris: Mm. Well, this is it. There's a lot of people who are on Twitter, Bluesky, and in think tanks who criticize President Biden for not seeking, should we say, um, some sort of regime change in Russia via the war in Ukraine, you know? So some people say that Biden should have gone in harder, given Ukraine, long-range weapons earlier, done all sorts of things, um, which would've then led to the defeat of Russia. And it is easy to say that from here in London, from wherever, but the reality is nobody really knows what happens next when Putin's gone. And I think that's the big fear.

[00:16:58] Matt: Yeah.

[00:16:58] Chris: We've talked about this in the past, like in that immediate aftermath of the um, and the fall of the Soviet Union, there was a lot of panic about what's gonna happen to all these weapons, will Russia become fractured, et cetera, because there's no guarantee Russia will stay a unified country. There's no guarantee there's gonna be an election. What's more likely, because of the environment Putin's kind of semi created, is that there's probably gonna be some source of, um, civil war-ish type situation. Maybe not like a full-blown, Syrian-type civil war that goes on for 10 years, but you might see a limited bit of fighting as various factions try and vie for power. You know, look what happened to Putin during the, um, was it '23? Wasn't it 2023, the, uh, the, the mutiny?

[00:17:44] Matt: Yeah.

[00:17:45] Chris: People weren't exactly willing to throw themselves in front of tanks for Putin, were they? I mean, Putin was having, you know, his, he disappeared and his generals were kind of calling up for support and things. I mean, Prigozhin, uh, we said this before, I think Prigozhin was a bit like Boris Johnson and Brexit. He didn't realize he'd get as far as he would, you know, and then suddenly, you know, he could have taken Moscow if he wanted to, most likely, and he realized that that was a mistake. But then obviously Putin then killed him.

[00:18:13] Matt: Yeah.

[00:18:13] Chris: Allegedly killed him through an alleged, uh, accidental explosion on an airplane, which then allegedly fell out of the sky because it was all an accident, you know?

[00:18:22] Matt: Allegedly.

[00:18:22] Chris: Allegedly.

[00:18:23] Matt: Yeah.

[00:18:23] Chris: So, just to cover ourselves. But, uh, it, it's, this is it, this is the problem about the strongman image, um, because Putin is ruthless and dangerous. I think his intelligence services are doing a lot of damage. Um, and they're doing everything they can to kinda keep Putin in power. And it, it just, yeah, so then the, the, the, so I've spoken to a lot of people off-air over the years about, you know, what they think about what will happen after Putin. And most people tend to say that whoever replaces Putin's probably gonna be of the right of Putin. Probably worse. It's not gonna be a Navalny-type figure who's a sort of, um. Uh, you know, sort of liberal leaning. I mean, I say sort of because Navalny was hardly a saint either.

[00:19:08] Matt: Navalny was not the sort of Western, small-d liberal democrat that, that a lot of people sort of project him and, and wanted him to be. That is not who he was.

[00:19:17] Chris: No, and this is the other thing. We tend to project what we want onto other countries, politics too often. Um, and, and sadly there is no rosy picture for Russia going forward, um, currently because Putin's created this environment where there's no clear succession. And it's not like Putin created an academy. Um, I mean obviously if he did, God help us because there'd be all sort of Putin-esque type figures. Um, so for the future of Russia, I think a lot of these, should we say the Western-leaning youth that, um, Mark talks a little bit about, I think they've got a lot of work cut out for them to kind of create a kind of more positive country for themselves.

[00:19:54] Matt: I don't know that you can have any kind of conversation about those Western-leaning youths without also taking into account the, um, the number of them who have been killed in Ukraine.

[00:20:05] Chris: Yes.

[00:20:06] Matt: The number of them who have fled the country because of the war in Ukraine and just what they, what the complete and utter propaganda chokehold that Putin's regime has on all, sort of, public discourse and civil society in the country, to the extent that it still exists anymore at all. Um, so that's, that's, I, I, I get sort of his argument there, what he was saying, you know, that, um, you can't essentially write off Russian people, as you know, they're, they're part of this like fascist state now. I don't, I, I, I agree. I think that's, that's counterproductive and also a self-fulfilling prophecy at some point. But there's, um, I, I don't, I don't know.

Um, one, one thing that also interested me as far as this, these sort of latest developments here, in your interview with Keir Giles, Keir was sort of saying towards the end there that any sort of new head of state, foreign minister, you know, that that has some sort of Russia-facing role, they usually come in and they think, you know, I'm different, I'm special, I can sort of, I can make peace now. I can, you know, I can make new gains where my predecessors couldn't. And it usually takes them two to three years to sort of come around to the idea that you can't. So he used, um, Macron as an example, who I recall when the war in Ukraine first started, he was very much about, you know, staying on the phone with Putin and trying to sort of like talk him down off the ledge. He was very much like that. And you know, three years later has completely reversed course, right?

[00:21:43] Chris: Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm.

[00:21:44] Matt: You're saying as of with Keir Starmer right now, you know, is sort of maybe coming around to that point. I'm curious if, I'm not saying this is going to happen, I'm not saying this is the case or that this is what sort of he needs to see, I'm curious because when the war started, right, when the invasion with Ukraine started, Trump was not in office. Trump had the luxury of sort of sitting in Mar-a-Lago and saying, that wouldn't have happened if I was in office, you know? Which is such an impossible thing to, you can just assert it and it's an, an impossible thing to prove or disprove either way. You know, someone with, with, with no responsibility completely on the outside just come in and saying, you know, oh, well that's because I wasn't there, you know? Um, I am curious over the next year or so, right, as, as he struggles to get a peace agreement or to just sort of end it as quickly and cleanly as he said, he would've, you know, coming in on day one or before he was even sworn in, if, if, if he also then comes around to the same kind of conclusion that Macron and, and perhaps others have, um, over, over time. And of course, trump is a very different figure from Macron. He has a very different, um, philosophy and, and, and viewpoint on the world, to the extent that he has one at all. But I mean, they are not, they're not complete one-to-one comparisons, right? But I am, this sort of theory that, that Keir Giles put out there.

[00:23:25] Chris: Yeah, that it takes about three years. Yeah.

[00:23:27] Matt: Yeah. I am, I, I'm curious to see if that also, if that, if that holds with someone like, like, like Donald Trump. I'm not sure.

[00:23:35] Chris: Yeah, because basically as, as you're getting at, you know, President Trump hasn't had to deal with a Putin who's going against his interest at this point, has he?

[00:23:42] Matt: No.

[00:23:42] Chris: Because in his first term, their relationship was relatively, um, stable. Obviously Crimea was still an issue, but it wasn't like

[00:23:51] Matt: That was, that had been frozen for years when he even came into office.

[00:23:54] Chris: Yeah.

[00:23:55] Matt: You know? It was not the sort of pressing, urgent international, transatlantic security issue that the end phases of the war in Ukraine are now, you know? He was dealing with a very kind of different, different world. And yeah, I, I think also the way he sees Ukraine and his, his relationship with Zelensky is entirely colored, it's wrong that it is, but it was entirely colored by, um, how Trump views his, his first impeachment.

[00:24:21] Chris: Mm, yeah, yeah. Indeed, indeed. So it's, uh, yeah, interesting. Sadly, we're in interesting times and, uh, I guess we're in the privileged position to be able to document it, but it's, um, yeah, it's certainly one to keep an eye on. It'd be very interesting in, let's say three years time Trump, it does become anti-Putin. I, I'll believe it when I see it, but it's, it's,

[00:24:41] Matt: I'll believe it when I see it, too. But it's just one of those things like, okay, let's test that case.

[00:24:46] Chris: Mm-hmm.

[00:24:46] Matt: You know, and just see, let's see what, what, what, what comes of it.

[00:24:49] Chris: Yeah.

[00:24:50] Matt: That, that, that bit about Zelensky asked for more Patriot missiles. One, I'm, I'm intrigued that Zelensky even asked.

[00:24:59] Chris: Yeah. But he's got to, hasn't he?

[00:25:01] Matt: He, he, he, he, he has to, but it's, it's also, it's telling to me that he thought that he could ask, you know? That it wouldn't immediately, you know, blow up whatever conversation that they were having. I find that interesting.

[00:25:15] Chris: When, when did he ask, when did he, was it after the drone attack? The accidental drone attack?

[00:25:19] Matt: Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.

[00:25:20] Chris: Yeah, good time to ask for that. Yeah.

[00:25:22] Matt: Right. They had like an hour call with Zelensky after he talked to Putin about, this was Trump trying to get Zelensky to come around to the terms of this sort of energy infrastructure ceasefire that he had discussed with Putin. There was that quote, unquote accidental drone attack in between.

[00:25:36] Chris: Yeah.

[00:25:36] Matt: Make of that what you will.

[00:25:37] Chris: Sorry I laugh. I just, I just find this accidental drone attack, I mean, it's not amusing because the people die? I hope not. But it, it just,

[00:25:43] Matt: I don't know.

[00:25:44] Chris: It's ridiculous, isn't it? But anyway, sorry. Yeah.

[00:25:46] Matt: It was Skynet.

[00:25:47] Chris: Yeah.

[00:25:47] Matt: Yeah. I find it interesting that he, that he asked, that Zelensky thought he could ask, but also that, um, Trump said that we would look to the Europeans perhaps to see is, can we help you along these lines? Let me ask the Europeans. Which is basically him saying, is there some sort of European system that they can give you to do that, I think is how I read that. I just find it in context in the last couple weeks. I just, I just find that interesting.

[00:26:13] Chris: Yeah. Yeah. It is. And maybe, maybe that's the way Trump's gonna play it is he is gonna just try and find European options to arm people. Um, you know, it's, you know, so the European equivalent of a Patriot missile, I don't know, I, I've heard of an Arrow missile system. But I, I dunno enough about missile systems to be able to say what the definitive equivalent of Patriot is. But I think what we are gonna see a rise in now, um, because obviously there are lasers being tested right now in Ukraine, uh, British-made lasers for anti-missile capabilities. So I remember, I remember back in, was it 2002, 2003, President George Bush re-floated the idea of a missile defense system, which everybody was anti. Um, and I don't under, I've never understood why people are anti and anti, uh, anti an anti-missile defense system, because I think a missile defense system is actually a very good thing. Um, and uh, you know, obviously we saw not long ago with the, um, Iranian attacks on Israel last year, how a missile defense sort of works at the moment. It is a kind of combined effort of on the ground, um, anti-missile missiles, um, and aircraft. And the problem is, like, as Keir Giles was saying, the UK doesn't really, if we get notice, we could sustain, uh, we could stop some missiles. But it, it, the impression I got was that actually the UK is at much more risk from missile, um, attack, uh, or should we say the bad effects of missile attack. We don't really have proper systems in place to defend ourselves against a missile attack. We've got some methods, based, you know, partly on what you saw in Israel with regards to aircraft.

[00:27:49] Matt: Right.

[00:27:49] Chris: But we don't have, as far as I know, Patriot missile systems. We don't have, um, the Iron Dome, also call it the Golden Dome, the Iron Dome, um, as far as I'm aware. But we've obviously got these new lasers and things, so this is gonna be a new thing, I guess in the arms trade now, isn't it?

[00:28:04] Matt: Yeah, yeah. The whole transatlantic security system has been built along the belief that the scenario in which Russian bombers would sort of come up from the, from down, would, would, would come down from the Arctic Circle, from above the Arctic Circle above Norway and fire long-range missiles at targets in, I don't know, Scotland or something, you know? That that's an impossibility. Um, that, that, that kind of scenario that it would, it would be diffused long before that ever happened, right? Which is the issue of yes, there is no, there is no sort of integrated missile defense system because, uh, the, the scenario in which you guys would need one, which is sort of like unthinkable and I think for many, many, many, many, many Britons is just sort of just a laughable kind of bad thriller scenario.

[00:28:57] Chris: Yeah. But, I, I think if we, let's say we go into the doomsday scenario that's been painted at the moment about this sort of, you know, let's say America does decide we're no longer gonna get involved with European defense, and Europe ends up in a situation where it happens to defend itself, and Russia feels empowered because it's made progress in Ukraine, suddenly thinks, right, we're gonna go and take Poland, et cetera. And then we do end up in an open conflict, which is what the palpable fear is at the moment, would Russia think, well, fuck it, we're already in an open conflict, we hate London right now because they've been, you know, against us in Ukraine. Fuck 'em. Fire a missile. You know, Trump's not gonna, America's not gonna come and save you. Why not, you know? Get, get as much damage in as possible. That's the, that is the world it feels like we're creeping into, um, whether we like it or not. Um, you know, and I think a lack of imagination now with regards to missile attacks is, you know, this is what I think Keir Giles is getting at, I think a lot of people do find it, do find it laughable at the moment, but it sadly is a possibility.

[00:29:58] Matt: Yeah.

[00:29:58] Chris: This, you know, and, and you know, when walking around London yesterday, I was just thinking, geez, imagine if we woke up one night and um, because again, Britain doesn't have a system, I mean, we now have the emergency alarm system, which was tested out two years ago, but his mobile phone. So if I woke up at three in the morning because my phone's going, beep, beep, beep, incoming missile attack, I'm like, well, where do I go? Because there's nowhere to go right now. Not, not like we live in Israel where they have bomb shelters, et cetera. There are no bomb shelters. What would you do? I'm, I'm, the first person who asked me would be my wife. Chris, what do we do? I'd be like, well, the choices are,

[00:30:33] Matt: Go on the tube.

[00:30:34] Chris: Go on the London Underground, get buried alive. Um, go, I don't know, go to an open field and just take your chances. I mean, what, what do you do? There is no, there's been no conversation. There is, and all our bunkers are now museums. Not that they were really bunkers for the population that, I mean, there were limited, uh, bunkers for population, but most of it was for more heads of government and stuff. But all of those are museums now. All of them, bar probably one or two, maybe three top secret ones. I mean, obviously we know about the one under the MoD we talked about, which can't sustain a,

[00:31:10] Matt: There's stuff around Corsham, too.

[00:31:12] Chris: Not anymore. It it, most of it's all shut down now. So it's like, unless you know of something I don't know, but majority of our bunkers, other than a very few, have gone. And that's, and, and like when you go around New York, you see like fallout shelter signs and stuff. Got none of that in the UK.

[00:31:28] Matt: Well, they're not, they're not. Um, they're, they're, those are, those are left there from the Cold War.

[00:31:33] Chris: Yeah, okay.

[00:31:33] Matt: They're just signs that are, they're still there. I don't know, there's not an active civil defense sort of planning organization here, still doing that, no,

[00:31:41] Chris: But it hasn't crossed anybody's mind, as you were saying, for a long time that this is a possibility. And I'm not aware currently of any real actual plans. There's certainly been no leaflets through my door about you should, uh, duck under your desk when a nuclear bomb goes off or anything like that. You know, they, they, what are the options if a missile attack happens in London? I mean, hopefully it's a very remote possibility, but we are creeping into a scenario where it could become more real if we're not careful. Um, and if Putin thinks he could get away with it, he might. Or, or let's say when Putin's gone and the, through this, uh, power struggle in Russia that some faction thinks they can get away with it, like a '90s movie, you know, anything could happen. And are we ready for that? Um, I don't think we are currently based on just the interviews we've been doing so, it's a bit worrying, really.

[00:32:30] Matt: Yeah.

[00:32:30] Chris: Good time to move to New Zealand, I think.

[00:32:32] Matt: Good time to move to New Zealand. It does, really, doesn't sound too bad.

[00:32:35] Chris: No, doesn't sound too bad, no. I've got to I'm 55. I've, I've been told. So, so we needs to do a bit better on this podcast and I might be able to immigrate to, to New Zealand. Carry on from there.

[00:32:45] Matt: Yeah.

[00:32:47] Chris: Well, is there anything else you'd like to add to this? Because it's a very interesting article and thank you for bringing it up, so.

[00:32:52] Matt: Yeah, no, um, just, yeah, I, I thought it was, was, was interesting as well. Um, a lot of, a lot of food for thought, stuff to, stuff to think about. Um, yeah.

[00:33:00] Chris: Yeah, cool. Well, let's take a break and we'll be right back with more.

Welcome back, everybody. So our next piece is about Russian ghost ships spotted in Libya. Um, so this is by David Kenner for the International Consortium of Investigative Journalism. So the cargo ship, Barbaros, part of Russia's ghost fleet, transported Russian-made trucks to Libya, raising suspicions about arms embargoes violations. The ship manipulated its tracking system to avoid detection and had a history of changing names and registrations. How I've heard that before. Anyway, um, we won't mention cables and things. Um, so Russia has strengthened its presence in Libya by supporting warlord Khalifa Haftar, supplying weapons, military personnel, and financial aid. This move is seen as part of Moscow's broader effort to project power in the Mediterranean and Africa.

European officials view Russia's growing influence in Libya as a security threat, particularly due to its impact on migration routes and regional stability. Despite this, western engagement with Haftar continues, including meetings with US and EU officials. Russia has increased its military shipments and naval presence in Libya. The Wagner Group has been replaced by the Afrika Corps, a new Russian military unit, and Russian forces have used Libya as a logistical hub for operations in Africa. Russia's intervention in Libya extends its influence to the Sahel region, securing access to valuable resources like uranium and gold. This development is viewed as a direct challenge to European security with experts warning of Russia's capability to destabilize the region.

So Matt, what are your thoughts on this one?

[00:34:59] Matt: Yeah, I thought this was, um, it was, it was a very interesting story and definitely, um, falls in line with some of the stuff that we've been talking about here in the past in terms of, you know, um, if, if Russia has lost its, you know, key ally in the Arab world in, in Bashar al-Assad's Syria, and if they do end up, um, losing access to the, uh, bases that they've had in, in Syria for the last decade or so, um, jury's still out on that, but doesn't, doesn't look quite good for them there. Um, I think there have been some indications that the Russians have sort of tried to cut a deal with the new Syrian government to sort of keep access to their facilities to some extent, however, if that falls through,

[00:35:42] Chris: Things are kicking off again in Syria at the moment. So, yeah, yeah.

[00:35:45] Matt: Yeah. Um, if that, if, if that does happen, you know, Libya is certainly their, um, next kind of logical, most likely ally that would give them a Mediterranean port. Um, you know, Libya also, it, it, as you sort of said in the intro, would allow them to, um, reinforce the mercenary groups and other sort of questionably aligned forces that they have in other, um, Sub-Saharan African countries. Um, you know, uh, there's also a lot of other, uh, attractive reasons to look at Libya. You know, as, as is sort of said in the article that this, it, it gives them a position under Europe's kind of like soft underbelly, you know? Not too far away from, from Italy, Spain, Southern France. Um, I mean, there's a, I think, uh, Libya would be an attractive site for Russian signals intelligence gathering stations, right? To look at Europe from the south. Um, there's a, there's a lot of interesting things there as far as, you know, migration. Um, yeah, very, very kind of, yeah. I, I, I, I thought for a long time that Libya is the obvious alternative to losing, um, Syria. And even, even if they didn't lose access to Syria, uh, Libya is, is a, very attractive place for them to have influence to try and to try and gain influence.

[00:37:09] Chris: Mm. Yeah, yeah. There's a good piece in the Atlantic Council also about this, which I'll put in the show notes. Um, and it gives us a bit of background to Russia's involvement in Libya. So, um, just to paraphrase some of this article, so after the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia significantly reduced its involvement in the Middle East and North Africa, prioritizing domestic stability. However, NATO's 2011 intervention Libya, which led to Gaddafi's downfall, triggered Russia's renewed interest in the region, seeing Western-backed regime change as a direct threat to Russian interests.

Um, so Russia's reengaged in Libya since 2017 supporting this warlord, Khalifa Haftar, in his civil war efforts by deploying mercenaries and leveraging political instability. Russia's used Libya as a strategic foothold for broader operations in North Africa and the Mediterranean. And then since 2019, Russian involvement has intensified, um, and its forces have fought alongside Haftar's forces in a unsuccessful bid to capture Tripoli. But despite setbacks, Russia maintains a strong presence in Eastern Libya, um, stationing thousands of mercenaries and securing control over critical oil facilities. And then Russia has extended its influence beyond Libya, particularly the Sahel region, which we mentioned before, with military juntas in countries like Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Um, and the Afrika Corps mercenaries have sort of filled power vacuums left by withdrawing Western forces. Um, and it's securing Russia's economic and political interest in that area. So as you've been saying, like, Libya is a critical hub for Russia's ambition in Africa, and it provides them access to like all sorts of interesting natural resources and geopolitical leverage.

And, um, there was a very interesting thing as well about like, uh, how some, some Western leaders are a bit hesitant to engage with this warlord, Khalifa Haftar. There's a bit of a, you know, debate going on within, um, the European Union about how to deal with Khalifa Haftar and, um, one official was saying in the article that what we don't do in the east, Russia will do. And that was, uh, Nicola Orlando, and he's the ambassador to Libya. And it is just a reminder that the more the US and Europe disengage from the world, the more that void will be filled by Russian and Chinese influence. Um, and Africa, right now, there's a lot of Russian and Chinese influence, uh, particularly Chinese, and they're after the natural resources. They're not acting like sort of, um, saints, et cetera. They like to, obviously a lot of, um, propaganda likes to bring up, you know, Britain and, um, uh, Britain's imperial past, america's sort of post-imperial past, um, or, you know, and, uh, you know, and, and, and try and sort of put this idea that Russia have always, you know, because the USSR backed these sort of independent movements, they try and paint it that Russia is somehow better than the West with regards to Africa, but they're not, um,

[00:40:06] Matt: No.

[00:40:06] Chris: And in some ways they're more ruthless. Um, but the West, you know, funnily enough, Mark, I think with Mark said this, that the West is kind of a seen at the moment as a declining power. And so we're withdrawing more and more from the world in different ways whilst Russia and China are kind of going in. Like, so anti-war protestors, you know, used to talk about how the Iraq War was all about America securing oil resources, but I don't see many, um, Western anti-war people talk about how Russia are securing, um, oil, uh, resources through force.

[00:40:42] Matt: Yeah. It's just not, it's just not mentioned.

[00:40:44] Chris: No, it's never mentioned.

[00:40:45] Matt: It's just, no, there's no protest about it. There's just, there's just no discussion at all.

[00:40:48] Chris: No. And again, like, um, a lot of younger people very much talk about our colonial past, but they don't talk about Russian and Chinese colonial interests now. You know, Russia and China right now are, you know, uh, using force to grab all sorts of resources and yet the, um, that point seems to be missing with a lot of people. And I wonder, and I've wondered for a while, because we talked about this a few times, a little bit about Russian disinformation efforts and propaganda, I'm starting to what question whether, um, some of the kind of, uh, fashionable anti-colonial talking points that have kind of grown up in the last 20 years, whether that's been exaggerated a bit by Russian propaganda efforts or not in the West? I could, I'm not sure I want to do some more research on that, but I'm, it's a sort of line of thinking I'm exploring at the moment.

[00:41:35] Matt: Yeah. Potentially, I mean, Russian propaganda isn't, isn't the reason why, why those views have such sort of prominent buy-in.

[00:41:45] Chris: No.

[00:41:45] Matt: You know, nowadays it, it, it is part of it. It's not, it's not the sole reason for it.

[00:41:49] Chris: No, of course.

[00:41:49] Matt: And I think the, the absence of that, the point that you raise about Russian and Chinese practices in Third World being very much sort of ruthless and, and exploitative and colonial, and imperialist in nature. Um, why that's not discussed at all, I think it's just a matter of, it's just not covered in those, it's, it's, the, the, the point is never raised in those spaces where those conversations on, you know, the far-left and such, where that, where they, where they take place.

[00:42:21] Chris: Yeah.

[00:42:22] Matt: Um, and you know, why that is in the, in, in, in the long run, again, I don't think it's as simple as to say, you know, it's not, it's, it's not all Russian propaganda, right?

[00:42:34] Chris: No, of course.

[00:42:34] Matt: Everything, everything is not, everything is not, everything that happens in the world is not the Russians behind it in some regard. That's, that's not, that's not real. Um, but yeah, no, it, it's a, it's a, it's a discrepancy that, you know, we, that we certainly see. You know, I would ask, I have asked why, you know, why in, in the West there's such rightful pushback and, and outrage for the conduct of some of, some of Israel's conduct during the war in, in, in, in, in Gaza over the last year and a half or so, whereas there was almost nothing about, um, Russia and Iranian support for Bashar al-Assad?

[00:43:13] Chris: Yeah.

[00:43:14] Matt: And all the numbers of Syrians who were slaughtered over the course of that war. Um, you know, it, it's, it's, it's the same sort of disconnect, whereas that gets focused on, but when it happens, when it's non-Western countries, it's just sort of ignored.

[00:43:26] Chris: Well, there are examples in the UK where I remember it's right about, I think it was around about 2014 and we, I talked about it in the previous episodes, so forgive me if I contradict myself now, but there was something in that sort of 2000, sort of, 10-to-15 period where, um, there was some Syrians who kind of were becoming vocal in the anti-war movement, who then got shut down by the anti-war movement because the anti-war movement saw them as pro-regime change in Syria. And so they didn't like that and they got silenced. And there was some episode in Parliament where a Syrian was forbidden from speaking and things like that, even though they have like direct knowledge and involvement with what's going on in that country, yet Western left, left-leaning Westerners silenced them. And to me that's, you know, a bit like what we talk about with the double bind with terrorism and things like that, there's something, kind of fundamentally wrong on the far-left with silencing authentic voices. They just champion certain voices who unfortunately sometimes are problematic, like with the, um, you mentioned, um, Israel-Gaza, I mean, some of the voices that were championed, um, from the Palestinian side by the left were deeply problematic, you know, putting it politely.

[00:44:40] Matt: Yeah.

[00:44:40] Chris: And, um, yet the people who are talking sense, who are talking about proper peace and reconciliation efforts are not particularly mainstream. They're kind of obscure voices, um, who you have to really seek out, you know, and they end up as in opinion columns in The Atlantic and that's about it. Um, so yeah, there's, I dunno, there, there, it, there's a very sort of messy picture of regards to, um, the far-left and let's not forget the far-right as well who like side with Russia on talking points, too. Um, but yeah, there's definitely some interesting things to kind of be further explored with this. So, uh, yeah, definitely want to keep an eye on. Um, so yeah. Uh, is there anything else you'd like to add or?

[00:45:22] Matt: No.

[00:45:23] Chris: No. Okay, cool.

[00:45:24] Matt: Good if you are.

[00:45:25] Chris: Yeah, thank you. Well, um, I think we'll take one more break and we're gonna come back with listener questions, so we'll be right back.

Welcome back, everybody. So now we're gonna look at listener questions. So our first one is from Richard in the UK and he wrote, With all the recent news stories about Russian hybrid warfare and sabotage of undersea cables, et cetera, is there any inkling that the West is retaliating in similar ways? It seems to me that this might be the only deterrent that Putin understands, yet media coverage of these stories gives the impression that all the West does is investigate and point fingers, but nothing concrete that would prevent it from happening again. So, uh, Matt, do you have any thoughts on this?

[00:46:21] Matt: Yeah, this is a very good question, and, and thank you for it, Richard. So, undersea warfare in general is, I mean, right up there with space-based operations, you know, or right up there with some of the most secretive and classified, um, operations that, that go on, on a, on a regular basis, you know? There is, um, very little that we know about our capabilities under the oceans, um, to say nothing of, you know, what we're doing down there on a, on a, on a regular basis. Um, so it's, it's, it, it's very hard to tell. I think, I would say though, just because it's not being reported in the press, um, doesn't mean there isn't anything going on. If anything, I think it's, if you don't hear something along those lines, it, it's, it's perhaps, probably, probably good, you know?

Um, I mean there's, uh, the, for, for years there's been rumor to, I guess it would fall under the Office of Naval Intelligence, but as whereas, you know, like the National Reconnaissance Office, um, at least in the US intelligence community, um, operates all of our various constellations of spy satellites, um, the National Underwater Reconnaissance Office, which for years has just been rumored to exist. Its official existence would still be classified if it does. For context, the, um, the NRO, the National Reconnaissance Office that wasn't, um, the NROs existence wasn't, wasn't declassified until, I wanna say the early '90s. I think it was after the Cold War.

[00:47:58] Chris: Hmm.

[00:47:59] Matt: But, you know, what's, what's going on under there? I am confident in saying there is a lot that goes on under, under the ocean that, that the US and, and NATO countries, the UK, NATO countries are, are doing. Um, you know, I'm thinking like for one, um, the USS Jimmy Carter, uh, which is a kind of, um, it's, it's, it's an attack submarine, but a very unique in its class in terms of the kind of capabilities that it has. And what we know of those capabilities are, it's very much of the sort that would, um, you know, go down and, and tap or tamper with, you know, an undersea cable in, in, in some way, right?

[00:48:39] Chris: Mm-hmm.

[00:48:39] Matt: All kinds of other systems and platforms that the existence of which we, we are unaware of. Um, under, undersea drones, you know, um, stuff like that. The question that I would have though, um, of those efforts that are certainly underway that we don't know about, are they focused on intelligence gathering or is it more operational preparation of the battlespace? You know, which I think is what a lot of these, um, the efforts about, you know, the Russian fishing trawlers and stuff that they'll like drag their anchor or whatever, right? It's sort of the same kind of thing. It's, it's sort of getting, mapping enemy critical infrastructure and putting certain taps or whatever in place so that in case a war does actually break out, those are the kind of systems that would go down very quickly. So are our operations in that space, are they focused more on intelligence gathering or do they have a more kind of offensive operational bent? That's an answer that I just don't have. But yeah, I, I think there, there is a considerable amount of, of stuff that the West are doing, um, in that same sort of undersea space that the Russians are. We just don't, we just don't hear about it nearly as often, which I would again say is good.

[00:49:53] Chris: Yeah, yeah, indeed. Just, um, you know, with regards to the capabilities, I mean, um, I remember my interview last year with Florian Flade when we talked about spy ships, he made the comment that, um, that in Europe at the moment, so we talking about Europe more than, uh, than the US, um, there's a feeling that America will dominate space and Russia might dominate the sea. It felt, it, uh, it was an impression I got from my interview that at least for Europe, were a little bit on the back foot with regards to sea mapping, because Russia are doing an awful lot right now to map the sea. Um, so check out that interview of Florian Flade from last year. I think it was December, I put that out.

Um, one thing I would say, I'm, I'm, uh, with regards to your question about are there any sort of tit for tat responses, I've not seen anything credible to say that NATO have been sabotaging any Russian undersea cables themselves as a tit for tat.

[00:50:46] Matt: Right.

[00:50:46] Chris: I've not seen anything that, to me, I don't think I've seen anything, actually, but I mean, there might be some, uh, pieces on Russia Today or something saying, Hey, the reason your internet went out is because NATO killed it. But I haven't seen anything credible to say that. Um, last year, well, yeah, it was last year, the Royal Fleet Auxiliary launched a new ship called the Proteus that has the capability to both protect and repair undersea cables. But I would assume it also has the capability to disrupt, disrupt and damage cables too in a time of conflict. Because I think for NATO, for NATO to do it, it would have to be in a time of open conflict. Um, and I've not seen anything credible suggest that, uh, yeah, we've gone out in any way to do what Russia have been doing recently. We certainly don't have any sort of secondhand cargo ships dragging their anchors around, uh, Saint petersburg, et cetera, um.

[00:51:36] Matt: Right.

[00:51:37] Chris: I've not seen anything that indicates we're doing that. Um, and, and again, with regards to Russia, it's sort of like this is a very Putin sort of tactic. He likes to sort of poke the West in different ways. Um, not enough to provoke a huge response, but enough to cause a bit of outrage and then debate about, um, internal debate in Europe about why we're not responding better. Um, and it then makes Western governments look a bit feckless. Um, but I think if we then did respond in kind, you know, if we did start like dragging anchors and disrupting Russian cables, we would instantly be made the villain. There'll be protests, et cetera.

[00:52:14] Matt: Yeah, yeah.

[00:52:14] Chris: And we would be accused of provoking Russia. Um, so there's always this sort of double standard I find. But, um, but it is good to see NATO have stepped up their protective measures. Um, they launched something called the Baltic Sentry, which this increased surveillance, um, of undersea cables and shorten reaction times to sort of repairing them and defending them. So yeah, it's an ongoing issue that hopefully will always stay academic. Um, and not because if, if we, you know, start getting into a tit for tat situation, that's probably when we're gonna getting into World War III territory, I think.

[00:52:47] Matt: Yeah.

[00:52:48] Chris: But, but I'm, I, rest assured, I'm sure we do have capabilities to deal with all this. Um, you know, we, we sometimes get presented as feckless, but when shit hits the fan, like with Ukraine. It was, I, I, you know, up, I remember when the Ukraine conflict kicked off, that early, those early few days, it just felt like there was gonna be a very muted response from Europe. And I was surprised at how united Europe was in wanting to defend Ukraine.

[00:53:14] Matt: Right.

[00:53:15] Chris: Because there was this air of, you know, European leaders were all divided. They're feckless. They're this, that, and the other. But all of that, you know, could well be due to Russian propaganda efforts. I don't know, so.

[00:53:27] Matt: NATO is definitely doing a lot more in that space than we, than we hear about, for sure. NATO navies are doing a lot more in that space than we hear about. Um, I mean, I, I would say it's almost certain that there are classified underwater drone systems that are equipped to act defensively in this space that, you know, we just, we just don't know about and for good reason.

[00:53:49] Chris: Yeah.

[00:53:49] Matt: Um, you know, also consider, um, the missile and drone attacks that Iran launched against, um, Israel a couple times in the last, um, year and a half. You know, last, last spring and summer, I believe it was. Um, you know, a lot of the press reports, uh, focused on the, um, US, French and, and British war planes that scrambled to help, um, intercept a lot of those missiles and drones before they reached, um, Israeli airspace. I'm certain that there were other platforms involved in that, that, that, that we're unaware of. So we have, we have, we have a lot of capabilities that, you know, just because you don't, you don't see them, doesn't mean that they're not out there and, and, and, and working.

[00:54:33] Chris: Yeah, and case in point, that drone ship we talked about last week, you know?

[00:54:37] Matt: Yup.

[00:54:37] Chris: That, that's only just sort of, it started to see, uh, the light of day and public consciousness and stuff. And even then, that's still in a specialist magazine. It wasn't like it was, uh, plastered over the BBC, et cetera. That was in The War Zone, which is a very sort of nerdy magazine that I think only real true enthusiasts really read. So, yeah.

[00:54:56] Matt: Yeah.

[00:54:56] Chris: So, uh, yeah, so there might be, you know, keep an eye out for stuff, I'm sure. You know, keep an eye on the Proteus. I think the Proteus is a really impressive ship. Um, and you know, it's got all sorts of things, from mini-subs and stuff, and I think that would be the sort of thing that NATO might use should it all go, uh, go bad.

[00:55:14] Matt: I would say at least on the, on the US on, on the, on the US Navy side, I would say look at the Manta Ray also, which is a, um, a, uh, an, an underwater drone system. It's quite large. That was revealed, um, a few, a few years ago now, a year or two ago.

[00:55:30] Chris: Okay, yeah.

[00:55:30] Matt: Not, not, not that long ago. But when it was, when it was advertised, it was not said, you know, this is stuff that would be used to destroy underwater cables or to spy on them. But it's the kind of thing that, um, it's, it's, it's the kind of platform that I was, that I was talking about, and I'm sure there are others that have been in development for much longer than the Manta Ray and are operational that we still don't know about, but they would be along the lines of that.

[00:56:00] Chris: Yeah, yeah. Oh, and historical, um, if you look back to the Cold War, read up about Ivy Bells, which was when the US tapped Russian communication cables for years.

[00:56:10] Matt: Yeah.

[00:56:10] Chris: Um, and it was very old school because it was all put on tape, and so they'd have to secretly go and get the tapes and come out. Yeah.

[00:56:16] Matt: Yup, absolutely. Yeah. That's, that's exactly the kind of stuff that I'm talking about that, you know, we only learn about, you know, it could be decades later.

[00:56:24] Chris: Mm-hmm, indeed. Well, uh, let's move on to our next question. Um, so this is from Daniel in Munich. Uh, so he asked, will NATO, or rather its non-US members, take a stand over Greenland or will it betray Denmark, one of its founding members, just to appease Trump and save the alliance, even if only temporarily. So Matt, what are your thoughts on this one?

[00:56:47] Matt: Yeah. The Denmark thing, like with Panama and with Canada being the 51st state, it's one of those sort of insane things that were not discussed at all during the campaign. No American went to the voting booth to make Canada the 51st state or to invade a Greenland or something. And it's just very clear that that is just not, I mean, when, when this came up at the State of the Union, Republicans laughed about it, you know?

[00:57:15] Chris: Mm-hmm.

[00:57:15] Matt: They sat there in the, in the House chamber, and they, and they laughed. Is it appropriate then? Is, is it appropriate for them to laugh at that? No, absolutely not. But it gives you a window into how serious they see that and how seriously they take it. There was a very, um, Trumpy member of the House here in Congress, who, this was a couple weeks ago, I wanna say it was last month, probably, um, introduced a bill in the House to rename Greenland, uh, Red, White, and Blue Land. And, no, I'm not kidding, that's a real thing that they did.

[00:57:45] Chris: Like the Gulf of America, isn't it, you know? It's, yeah.

[00:57:48] Matt: Yeah, dumber than that, I would say.

[00:57:50] Chris: Mm-hmm. Oh yeah. It's imaginative, is it?

[00:57:52] Matt: Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's one of those things that, you know, like, like Shane Harris told me a couple weeks ago, it's, it's, it's diplomatic shitposting. And that is not to say that it is not offensive and counterproductive and just wrong and that people should not get sort of worried and, and nervous about it.

It, it again, I think it comes back to those really kind of ass-backwards and unhelpful idea of these, you know, like negotiating tactics that they use, such as cutting off intelligence or military aid to Ukraine so that Zelensky will sort of come back around to the mineral deal and say the right things to sort of, you know, be so that Trump can be okay with him again for the time being. Um, as far as Trump says that, you know, we need Greenland, um, to sort of defend the Arctic, you know, and it's one of those things that we already have a base in Greenland. There's a, a missile defense warning site in Greenland that we have had going back well into the Cold War, you know? And, and there is a, a, again, going back to your discussion with Keir Giles yesterday about, you know, the threat of Russian bombers coming down from the Arctic, out around Norway, and firing long-range hypersonic missiles at sites in the UK, bolstering defenses of, of Greenland is something that would help make that scenario less plausible, right? So there are, like, there is a very serious clearheaded, I would say, smart argument to make about bolstering Greenland's defenses. It's not something that you need to demand that the US annex Greenland to do, you know?

[00:59:37] Chris: Yeah.

[00:59:37] Matt: Like if, if, if, if the Pentagon goes to Denmark through NATO channels or whatever and says, Hey, we're concerned about Arctic security. Here's what we see happening with Russian bombers and their long-range hypersonic missile tests and everything. We think it would be, um, much easier to, to defend Northern Europe, that sort of northern flank of NATO and potentially, you know, prevent Russian submarines or surface warships from entering the North Atlantic. Uh, we need to boost Greenland's defenses. That's something that could easily be negotiated within NATO. Like, that's not a controversial thing, it's in all our interests. But he does this stupid shit like, No, we have to annex Greenland, it has to be ours, that it just completely, like, it makes you wonder if he actually, if that's just sort of where his brain now is. And that's just how he kind of has to, in his mind, that's how it comes out, you know? And in the first term, there were people like Mattis, you know, or, or, um, several others throughout the first term who would sort of translate that, who would, who would hear that behind the scenes, him saying, We need to annex Greenland because of Arctic security. You know, that, you know, Mattis, that, that General Mattis would hear that and translate it into normal, sensible terms, and then go through NATO to Denmark and say, Hey, we think it would be in all of our interest to boost the defenses of Greenland for these needs for, for, for, for Arctic security. And, and those people like Mattis are just, are just gone now.

[01:01:06] Chris: They're gone, yeah. Yeah, Keir Giles touched upon it a little bit yesterday about like the civil servants who would do things behind the scenes, um, to kinda keep things going and then Trump would find out about it later, but then he would take credit for some things and be angry about others. It's, yeah, yeah. That's all gone now. Um, you know, again, I'm hoping this, well, here's the question about like Trump, so it feels like somebody's briefed him about the strategic importance of Greenland.

[01:01:34] Matt: Yes.

[01:01:34] Chris: And somehow he's misunderstood it and thinks that that means America must grab it. It's a bit like with, with regards to Canada, right?

[01:01:42] Matt: Yes.

[01:01:43] Chris: So we've talked about this previously about how Canada is part of NORAD. Obviously some radar things need updating. So it sounds like Trump got a briefing about Canada. We need to update our radars to improve NORAD and our defense capability and Trump's interpreted it as we need to invade, um, we need to invade Canada, you know?

[01:02:01] Matt: Right.

[01:02:01] Chris: And it's like, it's just weird. And, and this is where Trump doesn't help himself because I, I think I said this on like the, one of the first episodes where we started talking about Trump. You know, the, as you say, the bolstering Greenland's capabilities and security is important, but it does not require America to forcibly take Greenland.

[01:02:22] Matt: No, it doesn't. No.

[01:02:25] Chris: So basically what has happened is this important topic has been turned into, will Trump invade Greenland?

[01:02:31] Matt: Yes.

[01:02:31] Chris: And then it's dividing allies and it's causing anxiety and data because, like I was just listening to an interview, well, a chat with Rory Stewart and Alistair Campbell on The Rest is Politics. Um, and Rory Stewart is saying that we might need to start taking Trump seriously on his threats because it seems to be, if you go by Trump's biographer, that Trump likes creating headlines. And so we might wake up one morning where Trump has decided to invade Greenland, which is a really stupid idea, but I hope it's unlikely.

[01:03:01] Matt: He likes creating headlines. He's not gonna, like the headlines of US troops going to fight and die in the Arctic.

[01:03:07] Chris: No.

[01:03:08] Matt: For Greenland. You know, that's the thing that he's still, like, he still has that savvy TV presenter kind of idea.

[01:03:17] Chris: Yeah, yeah, yeah.

[01:03:17] Matt: You know? Where he, he is, he is still, I think, very sensitive to, to the reality of what a military conflict would be. You know, purely from a visual optics kind of, you know, standpoint and the kind of correct, um, instinct that Americans really don't like seeing, Americans don't care, most Americans don't care that much about what happens in the rest of the world. It still seems as a very kind of abstract kind of idea of things that happen over there that don't really affect me on a day-to-day basis at all.

[01:03:55] Chris: Right. Bird flu is a good example, especially in England. It was the thing that happened in Africa.

[01:04:00] Matt: Right.

[01:04:00] Chris: Wasn't gonna happen here, and then Covid hit.

[01:04:01] Matt: Right, right. And, right. And, and, and for, for many Americans, in many respects, that is, that is true, right? But they don't like seeing, um, bad things on their TV screens, on their phone screens, you know, and he's still very much in, in, in tune to that.

But yeah, I think what's, so, one of the things that I find so kind of infuriating about the Trump era in general, and I think people who in this last time around who certainly know better and sort of voted for us to, to be here anyway, is you have, as you said, a very kind of real and serious and sensible discussion about Arctic security. And you know, okay, yeah, maybe this is the time now that we need to bolster Greenland's defenses. And that's something that would help Canada, it would help the United States, it would help Denmark, it would help the UK. It would help the entire sort of transatlantic security structure to do that, right? That makes sense. And it would be very easy to do to have that negotiation.

[01:05:01] Chris: Hmm.

[01:05:01] Matt: Right?

[01:05:01] Chris: Yeah.

[01:05:02] Matt: But because this is who we got, that, who, who that gets translated, that comes out to, you know, Greenland must be called Red, White, and Blue Land now. Like, it's just so fucking stupid and unnecessary. That's what drives me nuts about the whole thing.

[01:05:15] Chris: Yeah, yeah. It is ridiculous. And again, also it then feeds into, because of the anxiety allies are feeling it feeds into, is Trump a puppet of Putin? Because it helps Putin, you know, all this anxiety and infighting helps China and Russia with their ambitions, so it feeds into that. Then also you've got the argument about, um, the, you know, the argument about, um, Trump's mental health. You know, it it, because we talked a lot about Sleepy Joe, didn't we, during Biden's term, but like Trump's not exactly a young man anymore. Is Trump going round the bend? I don't know. You know, I'm not a psychologist. There's many people out there who say it.

[01:05:53] Matt: Plenty about his health mentally and the rest of him that we really don't know anything about. It's an open question. But, yeah, but when you see stuff come out of his mouth like, like that, it makes you wonder. Yeah, okay. He got some sort of a, to your point, yeah, he got some sort of a briefing on Arctic security. You know, um, at some point during, during the transition and that got translated as we need to now, we, we, we must now annex Greenland. And it's very, again, I don't think, I would expect, um, Trump is going to happily absorb Greenland and Canada just as soon as he builds his big, beautiful wall and gets Mexico to pay for it. Um, but I mean, it's something that I can't sit here and tell, you know, Canadians or anyone in Europe to just sort of, you know, laugh it off the way Republicans in the House did during the State of the Union. It's completely inappropriate and yeah, it is, it's not something that, that you wanna, that you wanna hear or should have to hear.

[01:06:53] Chris: No. And in the unlikely event it does happen, I think it would create a massive crisis and cause a lot of infighting among NATO members and call into question even the legitimacy of NATO. So it would be a total clusterfuck, basically.

[01:07:07] Matt: Yes. It would, yes, it would, it would be a complete and utter nightmare. Yeah.

[01:07:10] Chris: Yeah, yeah. So I hope in God's name that this is just some, you know, diplomatic shitposting. Um, if it is more related to Trump's mental health that needs to be looked at. Um, but again, who, who knows what this is? I mean, I, I even heard the other day, I haven't seen it really properly, but I, I heard that apparently Trump didn't even understand what AUKUS was. I dunno if that's true or not, if you've heard anything about that, but, uh.

[01:07:36] Matt: Um, I haven't heard that specifically. But, no, it wouldn't, it wouldn't surprise me at all.

[01:07:40] Chris: Yeah, yeah. So it's this, it, it, this has always been my thing with a lot of these, sort of, the whole sort of Trump movement is a lot of the posts are being filled with people don't really understand what these things are. Um, and, and with the whole DOGE thing, it's like they're taking a wrecking ball to a lot of things they don't understand the consequences of. So anyway, that's for a different podcast, I think, that conversation, but yeah. But it's, it's, it's concerning. It's concerning.

[01:08:05] Matt: Yep.

[01:08:05] Chris: So, um, yeah, thank you very much Daniel for that, and I hope we have answered that. Um, obviously still a lot of unknowns with that one at the moment, but, uh, we'll see.

So, um, our final question is from Michael via Bluesky, and he's wondering what our thoughts are on a theory to explain why Trump is bringing Russia and Putin in from the cold. In the '70s, Nixon went to China to gain leverage over relations with the Soviet Union and he's wondering if Trump is using the same strategy in reverse, using Russia to gain leverage over China. So Matt, do you have any thoughts on that one?

[01:08:36] Matt: Yeah, I saw someone online call this, uh, not, not too long ago, call this, uh, The Bear and the Dragon Syndrome that I thought was kind of funny. Um, but there is a theory being, sort of, that attempts to sort of explain the administration's posture towards Russia as, um, an attempt to bring Russia back into the club to some extent and orient them away from China, right? That is how they would, they would argue it, um, how this theory attempts to argue it. And whether I, I think this is, this is honestly, I think a good, a good topic for discussion in a longer interview with someone who understands the, Nixon's opening with China and sort of historically the difference between that and what made that possible versus the situation that we are in now. And, and, because I mean, I, I think it gets to a point where you're sort of comparing like apples to oranges and so you would have to accept, A, that such a split between Russia and China is possible to engineer at all, and that, B, that this crew around Trump are capable of engineering it. And I am highly skeptical of both of those points. Um, but even in, you know, accepting their theory of the case that such a thing was possible and that they can do it, um, the cost of that should not be the transatlantic alliance.

[01:10:06] Chris: Mm, no, no.

[01:10:06] Matt: Like, I just think that's, you know, that's just not, that's not what you sacrifice to get that.

[01:10:12] Chris: Mm-hmm.

[01:10:13] Matt: At all. Um, so, you know, I, I don't know if you have any more thoughts about that.

[01:10:18] Chris: Yeah, no, I mean, well, when I first read it, I thought this is a very generous idea about President Trump, um, suggesting he has these sort of statesman-like qualities and international political vision and a grasp of political histories, would even consider this. Um, uh, and obviously that's me being very cynical there, so I apologize. But, um, the other joking thought I had was, well, could it be the other way around? Is Putin trying to woo America away from Europe? Maybe Putin's Nixon in this situation. But again, sort of joking. But, um, if Trump does have this sort of Nixonian master plan, uh, does this explain then why Trump has been fawning over Putin? Um, and you know, very much so in the second term, and he did so in the first term. Um, some have argued, is it too late now? Um, I was recording an interview yesterday of a man named David Marin. Not for this podcast, but for a podcast I produced called Warships Pod. Um, and David Marin's, a sort of political strategist, and he, he was asked about this and he said that he actually thinks if there were such an effort to be going on, it should have been done like five years ago.

[01:11:21] Matt: I agree.

[01:11:21] Chris: So, could this explain what Trump was trying to do in his first term? Uh, maybe it could be. Um, you know, and then obviously, uh, you know, uh, Putin went and invaded Ukraine after Trump left.

[01:11:35] Matt: Yeah.

[01:11:35] Chris: Um, so I don't know. It's an interesting, interesting idea. I know this, this idea is being sort of floated in MAGA circles at the moment and sort of gaining some traction online. And then lastly, Mark, um, Galeotti, who we talked about earlier. So again, um, he made an interesting and optimistic point that's worth considering. Um, Russia ultimately sees itself as more connected to Europe than China. Its elites send their children to schools in Europe, and they have their yachts in Spain and Italy. With China, which is becoming a more militarily powerful country day by day, Russia, it could become seen as a sort of satellite or client state of China, and then not be acknowledged as a proper world power, which might upset Russia. So he, he believes that, um, you know, Russia might potentially return to a kind of European-American world order because they would be regarded as an independent power whilst under China, they wouldn't. So, I dunno, that's a very optimistic view on things. But obviously, you know, right now, uh, Russia has formed a pact or an axis with China, Iran, and North Korea. That's the reality we're in right now, so.

[01:12:39] Matt: Yeah.

[01:12:40] Chris: Um, yeah. So I think maybe that ship has sailed. Who knows?

[01:12:43] Matt: I, yeah. I, I am sympathetic to the idea that if such a break in that axis of autocracy, we could say, if it, if it was feasible to engineer such a break, I think after the war in Ukraine and Russia's conduct, Putin's conduct, um, since then, especially, I, it just seems, even if it can be done, I would ask, A, should it?

[01:13:08] Chris: Mm-hmm.

[01:13:09] Matt: And then, you know, I come back to, is it feasible to engineer such a split as, you know, Nixon did with, with, with opening China? I don't have an answer to that, but an open question. And then, you know, even if it is, is it possible for Trump's team to do it?

[01:13:27] Chris: Mm-hmm.

[01:13:27] Matt: And I am highly skeptical on all three of those.

[01:13:30] Chris: Yeah. I, I sadly, I just don't think they've got the diplomatic skills to pull that off. Um, so yeah.

[01:13:36] Matt: But you know, I, I, I think, again, going back to the point that came up in your interview with, with Keir from yesterday, you know, the sort of, new people come onto the scene thinking that they're gonna be different and that they can bring the Russians on-side and, you know, they can change things where everyone else didn't. And it takes them a couple years to come to the understanding that they can't. Is that, is that part of Keir's theory at, at work here? I don't have an answer to that, but I find it interesting.

[01:14:04] Chris: It, it's not like people haven't tried, uh, you know?

[01:14:06] Matt: Mm-hmm.

[01:14:07] Chris: They've been trying it since the end of the Cold War. Um, I, I think actually, um, the only answer is Putin goes and somebody else more reasonable to steps in, but it requires somebody reasonable, uh, because, yeah.

[01:14:22] Matt: I think the expectation that someone more reasonable would step in if Putin goes, is quite a, a rosy assumption.

[01:14:29] Chris: Yes.

[01:14:29] Matt: And quite a dangerous assumption.

[01:14:31] Chris: Exactly, exactly. I think that's the problem.

So, uh, yeah. So, Richard, Daniel and Michael, thank you for your questions. It's been questions, it's been really great. We'll definitely do this again. Uh, so we'll do this again at the end of April. So, please send us an email to Secrets and Spies Podcast at gmail dot com, or DM us on our social channels. And in your message, please include the question or topic. Uh, and if there's a topic, please also include a relevant link, uh, that, uh, that you'd like us to talk about. And also let us know how you'd like us to read out your name and location online.

So we've got one final interesting piece of note. I, I just, it, I dunno, it just sort of came up in my, um, uh, my Bluesky feed. Uh, and it just amused me slightly because it felt very English. Um, so, on Saturday the 5th of April at 7:00 PM, a former MI6 officer will give a talk in Westerfield, Suffolk. So, Dr. Michael J. Reynolds is set to share stories from his nearly 30-year intelligence career to raise funds for St. Mary Magdalene Church. The event, which is titled The Secret World: Successes and Limitations of Spying, will take place on Saturday the 5th of April at the Westerfield Village Hall, and tickets are priced at ten pounds. Um, Reynolds was recruited straight from university and served with SIS/MI6 until the mid-1990s. Um, and he retired after the fall of the Soviet Union. It doesn't say whether he caused the fall of the Soviet Union, but he certainly retired after it. Um, his final posting was leading British Intelligence operations in Berlin from the late '80s to 1994. Um, and having lived in Westerfield for 53 years, he agreed to host a talk after a local suggested it as a fundraiser for his church. So, he'll be reflecting on his career and recall sort of Cold, his Cold War-era recruitment, often framed espionage as a way to combat the spread of communism, which he found quite interesting. So, if anybody is in Westerfield, Suffolk, please go along. So, I think you'll find it interesting. Um, I did have a quick look at trains from London. Um, unfortunately there's a lot of engineering works going on that weekend, so I think that'll prevent me from going, unless somebody's got a helicopter or a car that you could take me from London to Suffolk. I'd prefer the helicopter because that'd be more fun, but just drop me an email.

[01:16:53] Matt: Skip the traffic. Yeah, yeah.

[01:16:56] Chris: But there we go. So, uh, no, I just thought it was nothing more English than a former spy helping, you know, try and save his local church or raise funds for the roof or something. It just seemed very, uh, English, that.

[01:17:08] Matt: I had the, I had the topic for this story in my outline as, um, as, as, uh, the Spies of the Shire.

[01:17:14] Chris: Oh, yeah. Like it, like it. Oh my goodness, I hope there's a Victoria sponge to be eaten there, because you know, Victoria sponge and tea at the vicar's tea party, you know? Crikey.

[01:17:25] Matt: Mm-hmm.

[01:17:26] Chris: Couldn't get any more English than that, really.

[01:17:27] Matt: Yeah, yeah.

[01:17:27] Chris: Maybe a, a cucumber sandwich or two. But there we go.

Well, Matt, is there anything else you'd like to add? Anything we talked about today? Were you happy?

[01:17:35] Matt: No, no. Um, it's a good episode for me. Yeah, yeah, thank you. Thank you for those questions, folks.

[01:17:39] Chris: Nice. Yeah, thank you everybody for the questions and, um, yeah, so just uh, please, obviously, ping us an email at Secrets and Spies Podcast at gmail dot com or DM us on social media channels. And, uh, we'll read out your questions next month. Uh, Matt, you up to anything interesting, uh, this weekend or, or next week in your potential week of freedom, which might not be a week of freedom by the sounds of things, but.

[01:18:00] Matt: Yeah, no. I got, uh, I got, um, some, some stuff to catch up on, on for, for this over the weekend. And then, um, next weekend, I have, I have one interview that I'm recording.

[01:18:10] Chris: Oh, nice.

[01:18:10] Matt: Um, just one on Wednesday.

[01:18:13] Chris: Nice, okay. Well, good luck with that. Um, I'm trying to think I've got anything interesting coming up at the moment. I'm just going to a few, um, exhibitions. I've been, I dunno, a bit of on a photography bent lately and, um, I dunno where that's taking me, but I'm enjoying the ride and just going to lots of photography exhibitions. So, uh, yeah, I'll be doing that and just trying to get a bit of downtime because I've been editing a lot lately, uh, both for this podcast and some client podcasts.

[01:18:37] Matt: Yeah.

[01:18:37] Chris: And, uh, so, uh, I feel a bit edited out, so I'll be glad when it's, uh, the weekend. But there we go.

Well everybody, thank you so much. If you enjoyed this episode, please share it. We're gonna put shareable links in the show notes. So, there'll be a Podfollow link. And what that is, it's like a smart link that when somebody clicks on it, it detects where they listen to podcasts and send them, sends them to the right place. So, um, if you do share that link, please copy and paste it directly from the show notes and put it directly into however you're sharing it, like on a Bluesky post or Twitter, et cetera. But, um, the more you can share, the more it helps us out, it really does. Especially our YouTube page. Um, our YouTube at the moment is definitely, um, not doing as well as Apple. Um, I think the algorithm for whatever reason doesn't quite like us yet. Um, and maybe we're too controversial for YouTube, I dunno. But, uh, if you could share our YouTube link, that would be greatly appreciated. Um, so please do.

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Thank you very much for listening everybody, and I hope you all have a wonderful weekend. And um, yeah, check out my interview with Keir Giles if you haven't already. And then, uh, we've got some really interesting interviews coming up next week, so stay tuned. And, uh, thank you very much, Matt, for your time and uh,

[01:20:36] Matt: Thank you.

[01:20:36] Chris: Thank you, everybody, for listening. Take care, and we'll catch you next time. Bye for now.

[01:20:40] Matt: Bye.

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