[00:00:00] Announcer: Due to the themes of this podcast, listener discretion is advised.

Lock your doors, close the blinds, change your passwords. This is Secrets and Spies.

Secrets and Spies is a podcast that dives into the world of espionage, terrorism, geopolitics, and intrigue. This podcast is produced and hosted by Chris Carr.

[00:00:37] Chris Carr: On today's podcast, Matt and I are joined by former intelligence officer, Timothy Heath, who now works as a China specialist for the RAND Corporation. On this episode, we discuss Timothy's latest research, which looks at how likely China will go to war with the US over Taiwan.

I hope you find this episode interesting. Thank you for watching, and thank you for listening. Take care.

[00:00:59] Announcer: The opinions expressed by guests on Secrets and Spies do not necessarily represent those of the producers and sponsors of this podcast.

[00:01:22] Chris: Timothy, welcome to the podcast. Can you tell us a little bit about yourself, your work, and the RAND Corporation?

[00:01:28] Timothy Heath: Yeah, sure. Um, I'm a senior researcher at the RAND Corporation and, uh, my career has been primarily US intelligence, US military, and RAND. I have about 15 years in various, uh, intelligence agencies and 10 years at RAND Corporation. All of that time has been spent studying the Chinese military, politics, economy, and uh, and language. Um, I earned my PhD from George Mason University a couple years ago, and, um, I'm a senior researcher here.

RAND is a nonpartisan, non-profit think tank. It does research on topics of interest to policy makers, and I do wanna emphasize that the views I express are my own views and do not represent RAND.

[00:02:21] Matt Fulton: Thank you for that. So we're, we have you on today to talk about a new report that you had out, um, from the RAND Corporation called, uh, the Chinese Military's Doubtful Combat Readiness. Um, what are your key findings in the report and what, uh, motivated you to write it?

[00:02:35] Timothy: Yeah, so in the paper I make several points.

The first point to make is that all militaries are optimized to serve some functions, and when they're optimized to serve some functions that makes them less well suited for other functions. And it's a basic point that we overlook, but if you look at the militaries of the world, there are only a tiny number that are really optimized to fight high-tech, conventional war. The US military is the most successful, but there are not that many others. Even in NATO, there are very few countries that have figured out how to fight in the way that the US does. Um, most European countries rely heavily on the US military to help them in any kind of combat operation. And in the developing world, uh, it's even more rare. Um, you know, when you think about it, uh, most militaries in the developing world are not fighting other militaries. They're doing a bunch of other tasks. A lot of it has to do with keeping the regime in power. So that's the first point I wanna make, is that all militaries are optimized for some functions, and that makes them poorly suited for others. And in particular, political militaries, militaries that prioritize political loyalty, which is very common in the developing world, they tend to perform very poorly in combat. And that's documented in research. Second point I make is that the PLA prioritizes politics, not combat readiness, and I lay out all the evidence to show that. And then the third point is to say, given that this is the PLA's priority, in my analysis, the prospects of a large-scale war between the US and China is extremely small. Um, the leadership in particular, China's leadership in particular, has very little appetite for such a war, and in my opinion, they have no intent of risking that. So that's what it's, those are the main points.

Why'd I write it? There's three reasons. First, it was originally a companion piece to a larger report called Political Legitimacy and the PLA. And that's out in the public. And in that report, I show that the CCP's legitimacy has evolved in different forms, uh, over the past few decades and, uh, in general has gotten weaker and weaker, and this has profoundly affected the PLA and its willingness to, uh, risk war. Second reason why I wrote it is it's a follow on to other research I've done looking at how all countries ha have experienced a crisis of legitimacy in the past few years, including the US, and this is affecting again, how militaries operate. And then the third reason why I wrote it is, um, it's really the fruit of my 25 years of studying the Chinese military where my doubts about the PLA have, have grown over time. And, and I just wanna emphasize this, this is a relatively new development for me. You can look at all my research. First 20 years are pretty standard conventional analysis that depicts the PLA as, kind of, a near-peer of the US military, but the more I looked into the politics and the actual inner workings of the PLA, the more my doubts grew. And, and it's a major reason why I wrote this paper.

[00:06:01] Chris: How has this report been received?

[00:06:03] Timothy: Uh, there's been quite a, quite a lot of, uh, discussion and debate, which is what I was hoping. Um, as I expected, a lot of sharp criticism from conventional, you know, not conventional wisdom, but uh, you know, a lot of the experts in the military, on the Chinese military who have been writing and researching on the PLA. And I know many of them, uh, uh, they, they don't like the findings. They, you know, challenge my analysis. But I've also, uh, heard from quite a few people who are very, uh, enthusiastic and welcomed it as a breath of fresh air, as a needed, uh, voice in the discussion and, and debate about the PLA and where it's going.

[00:06:44] Chris: Mm-hmm.

[00:06:45] Timothy: So, I, I, I've found a very polarized reaction, which in my opinion, is the best possible reaction.

[00:06:50] Chris: Yeah, yeah, you don't want to please everybody. It is, uh, yeah. How has the PLA's historical role in upholding CCP rule shaped its priorities today, particularly in contrast to preparing for conventional warfare?

[00:07:02] Timothy: As I show in the paper, um, the CCP's basis of legitimacy has changed several times over the past few decades and every time it changes, what it requires of the PLA to stay in power has changed. So, in the early decades when, when the PLA was in, was, uh, armed, well, it still is, but it was very involved in the insurgency to seize power, the CCP urgently needed a combat effective military arm to help it achieve its goal of overthrowing, uh, the Chinese government, the KMT government, and seizing power, which the PLA did. But, um, later decades, um, in the '50s and '60s, the CCP was really struggling with factional fights and uprisings by the people, uh, in particular Tiananmen Square. And so the PLA was really needed to help suppress those challenges, control factions, and, uh, that involved shooting, you know, protestors as it did in Tiananmen Square, and the PLA carried that out. But what I think people overlook is just how much the CCP's legitimacy has changed in the past few decades, and what that means for the PLA. What, what has changed is that, um, the CCP, having succeeded in overseeing a transition to, uh, uh, economic growth as a basis of legitimacy, um, it's experiencing a problem common to many countries where people's expectations far exceed what the party can provide. So, what the party needs from the PLA is to do whatever it can to help with economic growth. And that means a lot of non-war missions, uh, whether it's patrolling the Red Sea to ensure, um, uh, uh, merchant traffic gets to China, protecting assets, protecting people, helping with, uh, evacuations. Um, there's building goodwill around the world where, where China has market partners, uh, through military diplomacy. There's a wide range of actions and missions that the PLA needs to carry out to help keep, uh, CCP rule, uh, appealing and popular. And that also includes, you know, it's very important for, for China, and as for a lot of developing countries to do things to bolster patriotism, bolster nationalists, uh, trust in the leadership, parades, demonstrations, exercises, coercion of, of, uh, enemies like Taiwan. Um, and, and the PLA is doing all that. So it's important to understand just how important the PLA is to, to upholding CCP rule. And it, but it's very different than, um, how it, how it did that in the '80s and, you know, and before.

[00:09:40] Matt: You argue that despite China's military modernization, combat readiness remained secondary to regime security. What are the main reasons for that?

[00:09:48] Timothy: Two main reasons. First, the regime itself has grown more insecure. Uh, this has to do with the fact that the basis of legitimacy, uh, has become, has deteriorated. Economic growth is getting harder and harder to sustain. Uh, the, the, uh, you know, the growth rates have come down. The debt problems are surging. Moreover, as I mentioned, the people's expectations of, of what the CCP should provide for them have grown and grown and, um, become very difficult to satisfy. So, the leadership urgently needs the PLA to help do what it can to bolster this economic and governance basis of legitimacy. The second reason is that the leadership views major war as unlikely, and unnecessary, and undesirable, uh, which it is. If you look at all the conflicts in the world, war between countries remains extremely rare. Last year there were, what two to three, three of those kind of wars. By contrast wars within countries, civil wars are 10 times more likely. War's also very unattractive for China. It doesn't, there's not a really a need for it. Uh, as, as I said, economic growth is still, and governance, uh, providing of social services, that's still a stronger basis of legitimacy, although national pride does play role. Um, and risking war, uh, damages the economy, could damage the economy, could lead to escalation, to nuclear annihilation, which of course totally undermines the whole effort to govern at all.

[00:11:32] Matt: Yeah.

[00:11:32] Timothy: Um, it's also worth noting there's no constituency in China for war. There's no, uh, you know, war mongering voice among elite or the public. So, the government doesn't really feel a compelling need to try to, uh, you know, build the case for war.

[00:11:50] Chris: Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Well, uh, many assume China's military buildup is aimed at Taiwan. So how does your research challenge this assumption?

[00:11:59] Timothy: Well, this is without question accepted wisdom, and one that I embraced myself for many years, but in my view, this is a fundamentally incorrect reading of the situation. The real driver is the mission to keep the CCP in power and what is, what is required for that? It's, there are a lot of parts. Part of it is purely political. Xi Jinping needs the PLA in his corner, which means he is willing to give them almost a blank check to build whatever they want as long as they remain loyal. A big part of it is, uh, requires the CCP to relentlessly indoctrinate the PLA to make sure that they understand their number one job is keep the party in power and they do that, uh, relentlessly. Part of it asking the PLA to do more to, uh, bolster the appeal and burnish the prestige of the CCP, um, through demonstrations, fielding of high-tech weapons and platforms. Uh, Taiwan is part of, part of the mission set, a very important part, uh, so we can see every day there's evidence that the PLA trains and prepares for a potential Taiwan contingency. Right now, most of it appears to be about deterrence, but the CCP does does want to PLA to develop capabilities for some, to have an option, uh, if they ever decide to do so. Uh, but that said, all these, uh, tasks and, and, uh, non-war missions and training and preparations, the fundamental focal point is on keeping the CCP in power. And, uh, that comes at a cost. As I said, militaries are optimized for some things and not others. The more that PLA focuses on the political job of keeping the CCP in power, the more it, it must accept that there will be cost to its ability to fight in a conventional war. And to me, this is a major reason why the Chinese have been so hesitant to risk the PLA in any combat, at all, with anyone. And, uh, I think it's, it's, you know, it's just not a priority for Xi Jinping to put these, uh, troops into combat.

[00:14:20] Matt: If a direct war between the US and China is unlikely, um, how else might China leverage its military power against US interests in the region, or I guess globally, you could say through, is that through cyber warfare, proxies, or other indirect means?

[00:14:33] Timothy: Absolutely. And this has been a view that I've arrived at just in the last few years, I think that, given the, uh, rarity of conventional war and the fact that the PLA is fundamentally not ready or is poorly optimized for combat, um, and add onto that, the, the reality of that US tensions are escalating and there is a real possibility that tensions could, could escalate to the point of hostilities if we arrive at that point, I think there are very strong incentives for the Chinese to avoid conventional war with the US military, which they know the US has a huge advantage and they are at a serious disadvantage, and instead rely on indirect means of fighting. This will probably be a global fight like all great power wars have been, historically. It will not be a fight confined to the Taiwan Strait, as a lot of war games try to suggest. Uh, I think it would play out in, in the economic domain, uh, at the very, at the very start, sanctions and punitive measures. There, there will be, uh, struggles in the information domain, propaganda, cyber, for sure. Uh, diplomatic struggles. I think an effective way that the Chinese could try to counter the US is to arm, equip, and embolden all adversaries of our allies and partners. So imagine a China that, uh, opens the floodgates to anything and everything the Russians want to fight whoever they want to fight. That might be kind of hard to say these days, you know, given our complex situation with Ukraine, but any, any friend of the US who could be fine that the, the Russians or the, or the North Koreans or, uh, you know, fighting the South Koreans are causing trouble provoking the South Koreans or Iran, or anywhere in the world, or even here. What, what if the Chinese provided more money, guns, and uh, resources to Mexican cartels, for example, to cause trouble on our, in our backyard? So there's a lot of ways that the Chinese could try to tie the US and complicate our ability to contend with them. And to me, I think this is much more plausible and feasible for the Chinese than trying to risk a high-end conventional fight, which they know they're not well prepared for.

[00:17:00] Chris: What, what do you make of China's relationship with Russia at the moment? Because there's been a lot of talk about this, this sort of axis that they've built with Iran and North Korea.

[00:17:08] Timothy: I, I think it's a very solid partnership. China, Russia, Iran, all share resentment towards the US and US-dominated world order. They are all mutually supporting each other's efforts to a limited extent to, to try to weaken and fracture US alliances and partnerships and, um, and, uh, and, and force the US to back off of their, well, back off of their backyards, essentially. It's not a tight alliance with these countries. They all have different interests and none of them have really offered to provide direct, mutual military aid in the way that the US does with its allies and partners. It's, it's much more, uh, political support, economic support through trade and, and in China's case buying oil from Russia and Iran, limited cooperation on exercise and training. But it's not, but not full interoperability and not, uh, military reinforcement. So I think these are, are very solid political partnerships that are durable and, um, are aimed in part at fracturing, weakening US power. But, uh, we should, should not overstate how tightly interlinked these countries are.

[00:18:30] Chris: Yeah, yeah, it makes sense. So, given China's economic slowdown and internal pressures, how might the PLA's priorities evolve in the coming years?

[00:18:38] Timothy: My view, I think the slowdown is real and it's not going to be reversed. Uh, China's economy has already peaked in terms of its size relative to that of the US, reached a high of about 75% of the size of the US economy in 2021, but since then has receded and is now, you know, more two-third-size, about 66% the size of the US economy. And the US economy continues to grow and the Chinese economy continues to struggle. Um, this slowdown is, is very likely to, uh, aggravate the problem of declining legitimacy for the state. Um, this has been a, a growing problem for China and one reason why Xi Jinping has carried out this centralization and crackdown, uh, is to maintain stability. Since 2011, of course, the internal security budget has exceeded the PLA's budget. That does not appear to have changed. So the Chinese are maintaining stability even as the economy grows, in part, by relying heavily on repression, and as, as the economy continues to slow and instability will likely grow, it will become more urgent than ever that the PLA prioritize keeping the party in power, which I think will mean more indoctrination, more focus on, on political work, more focus on all of those non-war missions I mentioned to try to keep the economy going and, uh, maintain a stable environment and, um, and try to burnish the reputation of the CCP with demonstrations and so on, and, and more chest dumping and coercion and gray zone of, uh, neighbors. But war is, uh, I think, will become even less appetizing for the Chinese. And it's worth emphasizing, I don't think it's appreciated, uh, among many of us analysts just how destabilizing and risky war is. If you look at the experience of most countries, especially in the developing world, war, large-scale wars is almost the single most important factor in, resulting in regime change, in the overthrow of a regime. Uh, it's highly destabilizing, and with a country that's experiencing declining legitimacy, I think war becomes incredibly risky.

And, um, and it's worth noting that, um, this process of downgrading the military's role in national security is already occurring. Uh, I wrote a short paper, it's out in the public, noting that under Xi Jinping, the, the party's definition of the military's role and national security has been downgraded to one of strategic support. This is characterized in a formula known as the historic missions. And it's, it's a striking development, one that doesn't seem to have, uh, gained much attention among analysts, but, uh, it shows that for the Chinese leadership, the real, um, center of gravity for national security is politics and economics. It's, it's not, it's really not conventional war to seize territory or, or you know, your external invasion. It's politics and economy is the real danger to CCP rule, and they're worried about that and they recognize that PA has a role, but it's mainly one of support to civilian authorities.

[00:22:06] Matt: The last actual combat experience that the PLA got, in like an actual war, real-world war, was in the, um, a brief war in the '70s that they fought with, um, Vietnam. Of course, the PLA of 2025 is much different from the PLA of the, you know, mid- to late-70s. But, um, how, in, in, in their planning, in their, in their war gaming, and I guess in, in your research and, um, analysis, how do, how does the, how, how does, how do we account for the fact that the modern PLA has no actual combat experience? And as you say, the CCP seems pretty hesitant to, to put it in a situation where it would get actual combat experience.

[00:22:49] Timothy: Well, I think it's a really important point. Um, so they haven't fought a war in decades, and their last experience was really quite disappointing, to say the least. Embarrassing.

[00:23:01] Matt: Didn't go too well for them. Yeah.

[00:23:03] Timothy: Yeah. Embarrassing, if you wanna be totally honest. They really performed poorly. Uh, and that's their last reference point for how they performed. Now, imagine you're a Chinese leader and you, let's take the conventional wisdom at its word, and they, they want to go to war to grab Taiwan. Your first fight you want to risk after 40 years of inexperience, 50 years, of lack of combat experience, the very first fight you want to pick is with a premier global military superpower who's been fighting almost nonstop for decades?

[00:23:39] Matt: Mm-hmm.

[00:23:40] Timothy: With that military, you know, it's riven with corruption and you know, it's optimized for political loyalty and poorly optimized for combat, it's just, it seems like almost a crazy risk and, uh, it's not surprising, in my opinion, that we have still zero evidence that the Chinese leadership is gunning for a war over Taiwan. None. Uh, and I've been asking people, please, uh, challenge anyone. If you have any evidence at all that the Chinese leadership is seriously preparing to start a war over Taiwan, please share it, because I, I'm not aware of any.

[00:24:14] Chris: Mm.

[00:24:15] Timothy: Now they do, the military has a job. It is to train and, and prepare for contingencies, like all militaries, even the most political militaries, realize they have some obligation to do that. Uh, and, and the PLA does it. But as I said, it's, whenever there's a choice between optimizing for combat and optimizing for political loyalty, in almost every cast that I've observed, political loyalty wins out and is prioritized, and, and, uh, you know, potential process or institutional change or feature that could, could improve its prospects for combat is downgraded in priority. And I'll just give a couple examples. So, now the commissar system. Commissars are political officers whose training is in politics and ideology. They have equal authority to the, to their, uh, peer military commander. Every level military commander has a commissar and he has equal authority. He can veto the commander's decision at any moment. This is like, uh, a recipe for disaster on the battlefield. And I'll note that, um, in World War II, Stalin who had started out with a similar system, uh, uh, quickly changed and abolished it. What he did was he made commissar subservient to the commanders so that they were second in command, and that restored a unified command, allowed local commanders to have flexibility and adaptability, and avoided the problem of a gridlocked, uh, you know, command with a co-commander who knows nothing about military operations. So, soviets made that change in World War II, the Chinese have not made that change.

Uh, they have party committees. Party committees have the authority to approve all major decisions, and those decisions are very sweeping. It's, it can go down to the most trivial things. There's, uh, some news reports in Chinese media where the decision, even for a submarine to surface, had to be approved by a party committee. Uh, so it's uh, incredibly cumbersome and difficult for a commander to operate under conditions where he needs approval from a commissar and a party committee for almost every decision. Not only that, the, the Chinese military spends a huge amount of time training in politics and ideology. Between 20 to 40% of the time spent in training is, is reading speeches by Xi Jinping and his theories on socialist, socialist economy and so on. That's really important for political control, but useless for preparing for combat, and yet it's an enduring feature that has now changed. And then last, I'll highlight that I have been so struck when I read all the research done by the Chinese version of RAND, their military think tanks, so struck at the utter absence of any serious analysis of how to actually fight and beat the US or even how to occupy and control Taiwan. None. I've looked for over 10, 15 years of writings. You know, what you find that they're prolific, that Chinese military academics, they write a ton of stuff, but it, a lot of it's just a military version of the, the party's political theory, which is useful for indoctrination and training on political topics. That's a, that, that takes up a lot of their time. They spend a lot of time on that. They do write, uh, in very abstract terms on operations and tactics, but almost never do you see a direct reference to a US or Taiwan, uh, military force, unit capability. It's just too politically sensitive, they're not allowed to write on it. So, all of this together suggests, you know, what is the real priority for the PLA, and my opinion is clearly keeping the party in power and making sure the military is, is subservient and loyal to the party. That is the number one priority, not combat.

[00:28:17] Chris: Well, let's take a break and we'll be right back with more.

[00:28:36] Matt: There's been a hot topic of discussion in the OSINT community and elsewhere in, in recent days of these, um, they recently emerged in, uh, commercial satellite imagery of Chinese shipyards and pictures of a, of a beach, of these, um, amphibious, a few different amphibious barges, um, that a lot of people think would be, could be used in sort of a similar way to the Mulberry piers during the Normandy landing, which would, like, rapidly allow the PLA to get equipment and, and other materiel, um, ashore during a JLOTS operation, right? So, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore, which would be between the period of an amphibious landing, say, in Western Taiwan, to when they could secure a port and use that. I was wondering what your, what your take is on those images.

[00:29:24] Timothy: Thanks. It, it has been a hop topic and, um, I confess, I'm not a, a maritime analyst, a ships analyst. I don't fully understand what, um, the civilian application of these, uh, barges could be. I'm told they have a dual-use capability. Um, but I don't, I don't fully know. Uh, so I, I am a little unsure, like, what, why are they making these? But I agree, they, they have a very obvious military function, military purpose, and a Taiwan contingency would be a good use. Um, they, they, there are some problems with these using these kind of barges. They are very slow, they're not protected, very vulnerable. They could be destroyed, I think, fairly easily. But even so, it's without question, these things could be extremely useful for offloading large numbers of armored vehicles onto Taiwan after the initial stages of combat or if there's a peaceful occupation. If Taiwan surrenders and the Chinese want to offload a lot of, uh, vehicles to help occupy the island, these could be real useful. So, but what does that tell us? So what does that, what that means is that the Chinese leadership has directed the military to continue to build up capabilities that provide an option for a Taiwan situation. And these are the latest manifestation of that, but it's just the latest version.

There are many capabilities that the PLA's been building relevant to a Taiwan situation. And, um, it's a, it's a, you know, it's a directive that's been standing for decades. They've added, uh, missiles that are, that clearly are meant to target large parts of the island. They've added, uh, roll-on, roll-off, dual-use ships that are useful. The military is doing its job in preparing all these capabilities. But the, to me, the key question is in politics, what is the evidence we have that the leadership is intends to use these any time soon, and to me that is still the most important question, that, and that's where I just don't see the leadership has changed over the past few decades in its willingness to risk a large-scale war. So the military, in my opinion, will continue to build these. My assessment that what they're really trying to do, and it's just my guess, is they're building all these capabilities and waiting for the day when the they can get the US out of the picture for sure, and there can be a deal they conclude with the US, or somehow, uh, there's some agreement that the US is done with Taiwan. Just done, and, and they, they tell the Chinese, you do whatever you want with Taiwan. We're done with this. When that day comes, I think then the Chinese are much more willing to risk some sort of combat action, or they, at that point they may not even need to, Taiwan will realize there's no point in, in trying to fight them and just surrender and then they can use all these capabilities to occupy and control the island.

[00:32:36] Matt: Yeah. There's satellite imagery, uh, that also just recently emerged of, um, the PLA built a essentially a, a replica of Osama bin Laden's compound in, in, in Pakistan. And I've, I've seen it theorized that they're, um, training the PLA to be able to conduct long-range special operations raids into contested airspace. In that, sort of, idea, the consensus around Iran's nuclear program for a long time has been that while the regime has not ordered the construction of a nuclear weapon, they would like to keep the option open to do so. And that means, of course, maintaining a lot of dual-use technologies and scientific know-how. Do you think that those barges could be explained that way, that they would like the PLA to have the option to do so, but they haven't, they're not building them because in, you know, two years time they plan to take Taiwan?

[00:33:27] Timothy: Yes. That, that's why I think understanding the civil use is really important. It'd be very weird to build these purely military platforms and just leave them taking up valuable dock space, harbor space, just sitting there. Um, there's probably some civilian use and to me the closest example that's similar to this are the roll-on, roll-off ships, which are built to military specs, could be useful in a Taiwan contingency, but they're put to use day-to-day making money for the Chinese, which is really what Beijing cares about. Uh, they are available if, if the time ever comes. That's optimal. As I said, if the US quits and gives up on Taiwan, it could be game on. Similar with these barges, there's probably some civilian use. Uh, offloading goods. I was wondering maybe, is it some of them for export for littoral nations? I, you know, I, I just don't know. Um, and, but I agree that it's a good capability to have. It could be useful in the event, someday, the Chinese leadership decides, you know, the situation's optimal, that they got some kind of solution for Taiwan. This could be useful.

[00:34:41] Matt: You maybe answered this a bit earlier in your discussion of, you know, how they're waiting for the US to sort of fully leave Taiwan's orbit, or, I guess, Taiwan to fully leave the US's orbit, rather. But, so, um, could the administration's, could, could the US administration's shifting geopolitical approach vis-a-vis European security and a potential negotiated settlement in Ukraine, could that change Beijing's calculus on Taiwan? Depending on how that goes.

[00:35:08] Timothy: I think, well, I think the, the main effect that could have is that Beijing may, may believe it's starting to see the light at the end of the tunnel in terms of a possible end to US security commitments to Taiwan. I think this is what there have been waiting for, and it's a reason why I just don't think a US-China fight is ever gonna work out, break out near Taiwan. The Chinese want Taiwan, but they don't want it bad enough to risk nuclear annihilation in a war with the United States. It's just not worth it. It's nothing about Taiwan that's worth that. Um, so, but if they can get the US out of the picture for good, if the US decides it doesn't really need the security relationship with Taiwan, doesn't need Taiwan at all, and is willing to write off all security obligations, then the Chinese military, which even though it's poorly optimized for combat and has serious problems in fighting, it's got enough firepower and equipment, it can probably best Taiwan. Just, I mean, just overwhelm them eventually if nothing else, it, it will beat Taiwan and, and be able to conquer it. They just, I don't think, they just don't have the confidence, that they don't have the desire to, uh, risk the war with the US over Taiwan.

[00:36:26] Matt: Yeah. In a full-scale war kind of scenario, has your research, um, analysis looked at the capability that the Chinese could leverage to, um, you know, really long-range operations to say, disrupt the Panama Canal to, to slow the US Navy's ability to respond and surge into the Pacific?

[00:36:49] Timothy: Uh, absolutely. So, I wrote a report a couple years ago on, um, scenarios of systemic war. And to me this is, uh, a, a possibility we have not paid enough attention to. If the US-China tensions escalate to hostilities and I, I think it's possible, I don't think it's likely, but it cannot be ruled out, I think that war would be a global war, a systemic war, just like all other great power wars have been. It will not be a local conflict around Taiwan. Taiwan is not an issue that either country is going to fight over. What they will fight over are the issues that previous great powers have fought over. That is leadership of a global system, uh, leadership of a global order, and if that's the case, yes, the Chinese will be looking for all kind of ways to strike the US, whether it's through cyber, though, I think in anticipation of war, we would see them, if they really thought it was gonna happen, they start building, uh, conventional-tipped ICBMs or other, uh, capabilities that could strike the US homeland, fearing that the US would strike their homeland. Um, they would, as I said, I, I could see them supporting proxy wars around the world to tie down and, uh, bleed the US in all different theaters. Um, support for non-state actors. It would probably carry out action to destabilize America politically following, uh, action or, you know, the playbook set by the Russians. Uh, cyber attacks, attacks on the Panama Canal. Anything would be fair game in that kind of conflict scenario.

[00:38:30] Chris: Hmm.

[00:38:31] Matt: Yeah. Thank you for that.

[00:38:32] Chris: In national security debate, there does seem to be this sort of feeling of inevitability that there's going to be a conflict with China. Do you have any thoughts on that feeling?

[00:38:40] Timothy: I do, and I think it's, uh, I don't agree with it. I think, um, one of the biggest stores, and it's really the main focus of my research now, one of the big stories is this overall regression in global politics towards, uh, almost pre-industrial norms. And what I mean by that is, and there's a whole report, my whole report on US-China Rivalry in the New Medieval Era makes the case that, that, uh, countries around the world are experiencing symptoms of regression, which I describe in five ways. First, the state's legitimacy is, is getting weaker and weaker and declining in every country. Second, societies are becoming more and more fractured and fragmented. Third, economic growth is becoming increasingly imbalanced and highly unequal and slow growing. Fourth, threats are becoming pervasive throughout, uh, the domestic situation, but, um, you know, out, outside threats are increasing and non-traditional threats are intensifying. And then, fifth, warfare itself is, is becoming informalized. And what I mean by informalization is, um, it's, it's, it's taking on characteristics that are common in the developing world and in the pre-industrial world. Features like the privatization of armies, mercenaries, uh, dominating the battlefield. That's certainly taking place. Uh, the prevalence of intra-state war. That's civil war over inter-state war. That's happening, and it's pretty common, uh, in regular warfare and the fact they have a lot of non-state actors involved with fighting and, and this ideal of a military made up of conscripted, uniformed, uh, troops, fighting and formations with allied, similar-looking troops. I think those days are over and, and we're looking at something much messier. Um, and, you know, involving populations that don't support war, that don't want to be drafted, that don't want to fight, which means governments have to rely on specialized, essentially mercenary troops to do the fighting. This is, again, very common already, and we're seeing many of these characteristics play on the Russia-Ukraine war. But all that makes it incredibly difficult, I think for, for the US and Chinese to fight each other in a World War II-style war. I just don't see that happening and I think, uh, the problems with domestic legitimacy are becoming increasingly all consuming for both countries and that leaves little appetite to risk large-scale war with, with anybody. Uh, so I, I, I expect my analysis, future warfare is gonna be much more small-scale, indirect, proxy, and, um, uh, irregular.

[00:41:34] Chris: Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Any thoughts on domestic legitimacy and how one can go about resolving that? Because as you're saying, it does, you know, across Europe, et cetera, as well, there is this sort of feeling of decline and, um, I'm not quite sure how we get over that.

[00:41:48] Timothy: Oh, yeah. Well, as I said, that's a whole nother podcast. Uh, but you know, in my view there is no silver bullet. I think, uh, states are gonna be grappling with, uh, contested and weak legitimacy for a, a long time. Economic growth just doesn't have the juice anymore to, to fund generous welfare states, which underpinned legitimacy in the '60s, 1960s and early '70s. Um, and that means instability is just persistent unless you go the Chinese route and just massively repress, to try to control that instability. But then that just, you know, makes the challenge of, of maintaining that your, the loyalty of your military and politicizing your military more and more of a priority and makes combat with other countries less and less appetizing, and you know, there's no, there's much less incentive for it. So, I think, uh, you know, as I said, it's a whole nother subject get into, but for the US and Chinese point of view, I think there's going to be a real constraint on their ability to fight each other directly, although there could be reasons for them to, um, struggle indirectly with each other.

[00:43:06] Chris: Yeah. Yeah. Matt, was there anything else you wanted to ask before we go into our kind of final questions?

[00:43:10] Matt: No, I mean, this is, um, you've raised a, a number of points that, yeah, I mean, I could, I could go on with you for another hour or two about. Maybe we'll have to do that, um, in the future. I'm definitely sort of interested in the, um, kind of societal buy-in that each country would have to make such a large-scale war possible. I mean, I've always, just speaking from an American perspective, I've always thought that we are pretty, um, lazy and, and, and, and apathetic now as to like, you know, what does Taiwan have to do with me? But I think just my gut is, I don't know, if we lose a carrier or there's missile strikes on Hawaii. I think it would be, it would be December, 1941 for us again, very quickly. But I mean, that's a, that's a whole nother subject.

[00:43:53] Timothy: Yeah. No, I, it an important subject and, uh, it's worth, worth noting, I'll just say this on this topic, look at Russia and Ukraine. In the middle of a major war, Putin says he is fighting NATO for Russia's survival, and yet he is fearful of, he won't conscript his people. He's afraid to do that.

[00:44:14] Matt: Right.

[00:44:15] Timothy: He has to rely on essentially, um, he is, he is paying, he's, it's a mercenary route. He's paying massive bonuses to recruit the desperately poor and the foreigners to fight the war because he's afraid of conscripting his own people. And the Ukrainians too are, they, they're in a more desperate situation, but there are hard limbs to how much they can conscript. Because people just leave. They're fleeing.

[00:44:39] Chris: Yeah. Well, what are the key takeaways for policymakers trying to understand and respond to China's military strategy?

[00:44:46] Timothy: Well, there's several points. First, I would say, um, don't be overwhelmed by the hardware. And, and the hardware doesn't tell the whole story.

[00:44:54] Matt: Yeah.

[00:44:54] Timothy: In my view, the field of analysis about the Chinese military is dominated by experts who study hardware. Tanks, ships, missiles. And, and their backgrounds of a lot of these experts are like mine, military and intelligence. And, and in the military and in intelligence, that's what you mainly pay attention to. So it's not a surprise, but that's not the whole story. You, to really assess the PLA's, um, capabilities and the Chinese leadership's intent with its military, you need to understand politics, you need to understand the, kind of, economic situation, and these issues of legitimacy and how that affects the military's, uh, ability and will to fight. And, to me, those other non-hardware subjects do not get adequate attention, but they're really critical to making sound judgements about, about the Chinese military and its potential threat. Second point I'll make is, it's important not to mirror image. And I think, again, this is a, a, a major issue in the community. Uh, like, like myself, many of our best analysts about the PLA come from a background in the US military and the US intelligence community, uh, all of which are very familiar with how the US military operates and, um, and, and may not be aware, like I wasn't for many years, that the US military is, is really an anomaly in, in the militaries of the world. Most militaries are more like China's. They're political. They prioritize politics and keeping the regime in power, not fighting wars with other conventional militaries. So, being aware of that and trying to understand the Chinese military more as a developing world military and less as a replica of the US military, I think can really uh, help, you know, bring accurate and more, uh, insightful understanding of, of the Chinese.

[00:46:49] Chris: Yeah. Timothy, is there anything else you'd like to add that we haven't talked about today that's important to you?

[00:46:54] Timothy: No, I appreciate the opportunity and, uh, I'm really grateful that, uh, we were able to have this conversation. So thanks for inviting me.

[00:47:01] Matt: Yeah.

[00:47:01] Chris: Well, thank you. And, uh, where can listeners, sort of, find out more about you and your work?

[00:47:06] Timothy: The best place is probably the RAND website. I guess reflecting my background in the intelligence community, I, I really don't do any social media. Uh, I just avoid it.

[00:47:16] Matt: Smart.

[00:47:17] Chris: Well, you're not missing much.

[00:47:19] Matt: No.

[00:47:22] Timothy: Thank you though. Thank you. Really appreciate it.

[00:47:24] Matt: Thank you.

[00:47:24] Chris: Thank you for joining us today, Timothy. Really appreciate your time and, uh, very interesting paper and I hope we can have you back on again in the future, um, and sort of talk about this some more. So thank you.

[00:47:34] Timothy: Okay, great. Thanks. Alright, take care guys. Thanks.

[00:48:08] Announcer: Thanks for listening. This is Secrets and Spies.