Announcer (00:00:05):
Secrets and Spies presents Espresso Martini with Chris Carr and Matt Fulton.

Chris Carr (00:00:26):
Hello, everybody, and welcome to Espresso Martini. Matt, how are you?

Matt Fulton (00:00:29):
Hey, Chris. I’m good. Busy. It’s a hive of activity here.

Chris (00:00:33):
Yes.

Matt (00:00:34):
Looking at this screen, I look like a ghost, which is how you can tell I’m busy.

Chris (00:00:40):
Oh man. Well, I’m recovering from a cold, so if I sound a bit monged up, I apologize to people. Yeah, I’ve luckily had a mild cold. Hopefully it won’t get any worse than that, but welcome to Autumn — or fall, as you guys call it in the States and in Canada. So yeah, the temperature’s changing and, with the season, no wonder you’re busy. There’s so much going on both in the world and in our lives. So today’s episode, if anything, is probably one of the more complicated episodes that we’ve dealt with in a while.

Matt (00:01:10):
Oh God, this one’s packed and it could have been three times as packed.

Chris (00:01:14):
Yeah, yeah. Oh yeah. I mean, each subject could be an episode in itself and maybe in the future with a guest. It might be, but...

Matt (00:01:21):
And there’s very important stuff that we’re aware of, but we don’t have time to get to it today.

Chris (00:01:27):
No, no, indeed, indeed. There’s a lot. I mean, even just this morning, I’ve been adding things to the next Espresso Martini before we’ve recorded this one because there’s some interesting stuff going on with Venezuela and the CIA at the moment, which we won’t be talking about today, but we’ll probably be talking about in a few weeks.

Matt (00:01:41):
We’ve got to make time for that at some point. Yeah, we’ve got to get to that.

Chris (00:01:44):
So apologies for anybody who was expecting that — today we’re not talking about that. But what we will be talking about is, obviously, the Israel–Hamas ceasefire that’s ongoing. Well, it’s still ongoing as we speak. And then we’ve got the China spy case collapse, which is a big scandal in the UK at the moment that’s pissing everybody off from every single angle possible for very different reasons. Then we’ve got the Select Committee in the U.S. on China has just released a report, which is very interesting and timely with the China spy case. And if we get time, the MI5 Director General Ken McCallum gave a threat update from MI5. So we may or may not get to that at the very end. So the first one is the ceasefire, which is — Matt, you had a piece about, well, a couple of pieces. One in Foreign Affairs, one in The Atlantic about this, and both are very interesting. So I’ll hand over to you.

Matt (00:02:32):
Yeah, so this is very much a fluid situation, so who knows how it’ll look by the time this airs, but here’s sort of how we got here. We have a shaky ceasefire in Gaza, and all the living hostages have been exchanged, which is very important and very good. I’ll break it down for us.

(00:02:55):
So almost two weeks after the Trump ceasefire brought a halt to two years of war in Gaza, the deal is already showing signs of strain. The agreement, the product of an intense, personality-driven effort led by the president’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, and special envoy Steve Witkoff, called for a phased IDF pullback, a hostage-for-prisoner exchange, and the creation of an international stabilization force to secure Gaza and oversee a technocratic, non-Hamas governing body. Ironically, the turning point came after Israel’s unauthorized strike in Qatar last month — the failed attempt to kill Hamas leaders in Doha. The attack infuriated Trump, gave Washington leverage to rein Netanyahu in, and pushed our partners to unite behind a single deal. Netanyahu’s apology to Qatar’s prime minister during a White House call helped break the diplomatic deadlock, leading directly to the ceasefire that freed the remaining Israeli hostages.

(00:03:53):
But no one close to the process believes this marked the end of the conflict. Hamas is badly degraded but not gone, fractured into dozens of semi-autonomous cells with no coherent central command. The organization’s surviving leaders are trying to reassert control, rebranding fighters as Gaza Security Forces and positioning themselves to exploit reconstruction aid once it starts flowing. Their history suggests they’ll adapt, recruiting from released prisoners, rebuilding networks with Iranian assistance, and using humanitarian channels to restore funding. Israeli officials, meanwhile, warn that without rapid progress on disarmament, Hamas could regenerate under a new generation of leaders, much as it did after previous prisoner releases.

(00:04:38):
For Trump’s team, the challenge now is keeping the ceasefire intact as the ground shifts beneath it. American officials are increasingly worried that Netanyahu could dismantle the agreement, and Vice President J.D. Vance has been dispatched to Israel alongside Kushner and Witkoff to study the process. Washington is also racing to define the plan’s unfinished pieces — chief among them the stabilization force to be led by Egypt and the still-vague timeline for Hamas’ demilitarization. Tony Blair is involved in this also, which strikes me as peculiar. We can talk about that. I digress. Fighting has already flared in recent days after disputes over the remains of repatriated hostages, underscoring how precarious the truce remains.

(00:05:22):
For now, Gaza’s guns are mostly silent, but the road ahead is steep; the enclave is in ruins, its political landscape shattered, and any outside coalition that hopes to govern or rebuild it will face the same dilemma that has haunted every previous peace effort: how to fill the vacuum before Hamas — and further suffering — does.

(00:05:44):
Chris, what do you think?

Chris (00:05:44):
Well, like you were saying, I think that the peace plan is a very positive step forward. Obviously it’s not over yet. I’m very glad to see the remaining hostages free. That was long overdue. Some of the commentary has been rather one-sided towards Trump, overlooking some of the progress made by the previous Biden administration, which did manage to secure the release of 140 hostages, and that should not be forgotten. There’s also been a sort of tendency to frame this as peace achieved in the early weeks it was announced, when peace has not been achieved in the Middle East just yet. Oh God, it was insane — the hyperbole insane. I’m surprised Trump didn’t just go to an aircraft carrier and do a George Bush, but Trump’s been doing other things with naval aircraft recently, which we won’t go into, but it definitely wasn’t mission accomplished there.

(00:06:36):
Obviously this war has gone on for too long, and Israel’s military actions have been widely condemned as disproportionate — even considered genocidal — in the way that they’ve targeted civilians whilst pursuing Hamas operatives embedded within the population. That said, it is encouraging to see the Arab nations working with Trump and the Trump administration to lay the groundwork for peace. Support for peace in the region is needed, and having the Arab nations on the side of that is very important. This current deal slightly reminded me of the case of — and I want to hope I get his name right — Gilad Shalit, the IDF soldier who was captured by Hamas and later released in exchange for a large number of Palestinian prisoners. Some of those released went on to participate in the October 7th attacks. And there’s a stark reminder that any sustainable peace must guarantee both security and dignity for the Palestinians whilst also ensuring the security of Israel. Neglecting either side’s needs will only set the stage, I fear, for another cycle of violence.

(00:07:40):
And I think we’ve talked about that a little bit in the past. One thing I’ve noticed for years now: some members of the United Nations have been very dismissive of Israel’s security concerns, and obviously, with what’s been going on with Israel’s actions in the last two years, those security concerns have taken a massive back seat for a lot of people. And I’m just worried that if that continues — and a lot of members of the United Nations like to reduce this conflict between Israel and Palestine to David versus Goliath and often portray the Palestinians, and even Hamas sometimes, as the underdog whilst overlooking or minimalizing acts of provocation and violence towards Israel. And tragically, I feel that complacency has helped lay the groundwork for October the seventh. And I really think that the UN needs to take a long, hard look internally at how they move forward with this as well.

(00:08:36):
They should not forget both the security concerns of Israel and the concerns for the Palestinians. They both need to be heard; otherwise it’ll fall apart before it even starts. I don’t see an easy path ahead for either Israelis or Palestinians. So much blood has been shed since October the seventh. The assaults themselves are not only brutal but deeply personal in some cases, often carried out by individuals known to their victims. We talked a little bit about the Hamas surveillance operation that went on before the attacks, where they’d recruited people like cleaners — people who had access to go across the border. So that has probably soured many relationships. And obviously some of the hostages were also known peace activists who spent years working for Palestinian rights. Meanwhile, in Gaza, countless families have been wiped out. Civilians have been killed in bombings and gunfire from Israeli forces.

(00:09:31):
And I don’t know how people on both sides begin to process that grief on both the personal and collective level. To me, it’s a bit beyond comprehension. It’s probably going to take a few generations to really get past all that. And I think sometimes there are activists in the West who aren’t directly connected to that region but are going to run the risk of making that pain even worse if they’re not careful. There was a guy who was charged in Oxford, I think about a week ago, who was basically saying along the lines of “the Zionists should be killed,” or some nonsense like that. And his justification was that he was standing up for the Palestinians. That kind of language is not helpful. It doesn’t help anybody. If anything, it’s servicing his ego more than it is helping anybody on the ground. So we’ve got to be careful about that. Now, you’ve mentioned a brilliant piece in Foreign Affairs that looked at how Hamas’ leadership in the nineties turned to Iran for help. This is after the Oslo Accords. Do you want to talk a bit about that, because that’s really interesting?

Matt (00:10:36):
Sure. Yeah. So this was in the early nineties, right after the Oslo Accords. This is an article by Matthew Levitt in Foreign Affairs. Matthew Levitt is a longtime think tank guy, expert on the region and on various Iranian proxy groups like Hamas and Hezbollah; he’s written a few books on Hezbollah that I have over my shoulder here somewhere. But in this article for Foreign Affairs, he talked about how Hamas was at a crossroads after the Oslo Accords. The armed-resistance side of the Palestinian movement was not really in favor after the Oslo Accords. There was a push to do so peacefully, and they looked for sponsors elsewhere — and then they kind of fell into Iran’s orbit, which is the point when Iran became the patron in many ways for the armed wing of the Palestinian resistance. And yeah, there’s a great article there that people should go look at. There was a meeting, actually, that Hamas had right after the Oslo Accords. It was at a hotel near the Philadelphia airport, which is probably about —

Chris (00:11:55):
That’s really interesting.

Matt (00:11:57):
About 10 minutes from where I’m sitting right now, which was kind of interesting. But yeah, I think going forward after this — first of all, to go back to the hyperbole that we saw right after this deal was announced and in its final phases — I mean, it’s a genuine win that the 20 living hostages that were left in Gaza have been released and exchanged. I believe, as of this recording, the remains of 14 hostages are believed to still be in Gaza; negotiating through Hamas, they’re trying to repatriate those remains back to Israel. I know there are also Israeli troops searching in Gaza with bulldozers trying to find those remains. So that’s still unsolved, but the hyperbole of taking what is a genuine win — a victory and a real good — that the nightmare that these people have endured for two years is over, and we got them out and that’s resolved —

(00:13:02):
That’s a genuine win. But the hyperbole of trying to frame it as an end to this war is premature. It could be — let’s hope so — but there are a lot of reasons to be cautious.

Chris (00:13:16):
Let’s hope so.

Matt (00:13:16):
Let’s hope so. And it could be if it holds and progress is built on this. It’s a very heavy lift. I think if I had to predict, it’s a new phase. I think we’re probably in the beginning of the end, I would guess. But there are clear incentives on either side — be that Bibi Netanyahu and the faction of far-right ministers in his coalition that want to keep this going and press annexations into the West Bank for a number of reasons. They have their incentives to keep it going. At the same time, Hamas — to the extent factions are still armed and active in the Strip — has incentives to keep it going. And there’s also what comes after this: getting some sort of stabilization force in Gaza — hopefully a largely Arab-led security force without Hamas’ presence, of course. Very important; very heavy lift. I think there are a million things that could go wrong in the meantime.

Chris (00:14:32):
Yeah, I mean, there’s been reports over the last weekend, obviously, of Hamas crackdowns at the moment. I mean,

Matt (00:14:39):
Mm-hmm.

Chris (00:14:40):
There’s a big concern that Hamas are not going to go easily, and I don’t think they will. If anything, that piece that you mentioned, they might go to another hotel — not necessarily in Philadelphia, but somewhere else — and work out how they can come back from the ashes in some other way. One thing that I find really interesting about the 1990s period with regard to Hamas: a lot of terrorist groups ended up coming to the peace table in the nineties, and it coincided, coincidentally, with the collapse of the Soviet Union. And I do wonder if there was some money that had just disappeared that may have forced some people at that time to the peace table.

Matt (00:15:19):
One sponsor and the beginning of another.

Chris (00:15:21):
Exactly.

Matt (00:15:22):
Which, during the Cold War, of course, the Palestinian resistance movement was largely secular and a Soviet-aligned leftist movement. And it was in the nineties, of course, as you said, when the Iranians came in and it became essentially an Iranian power-projection outfit — they hijacked that movement. I think there are a few things I would be watching for going forward. First would be the opening of the Rafah Crossing, which is the border crossing between the southern Gaza Strip and Egypt. The opening of that border crossing and the daily aid-truck volumes — right now, it’s still shut and I think is slated to remain shut indefinitely — if those numbers of trucks and what they carry are coming into Gaza, that’ll be a real litmus test, I think, for how serious the post-war reconstruction phase is, and whether we can consider ourselves in a post-war phase. Second, I would look for a clear demarcation and an Israeli pullback to what they’re calling the “yellow line,” which is not a full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, but it’s pulling out of Gaza City proper and more to the outskirts of Gaza. If we see that, I think we’ll see an entrenchment of Israeli positions in some places in Gaza — if not a full withdrawal — but at least if they’re pulling back to those lines and staying there, that’s positive. Of course, all the remains of hostages repatriated — that’s something I’ll be looking for going forward. And then that formal mandate and deployment of an international stabilization force. I think it’s crucial that Arab states are in the lead in that, and also trying to rebuild the Palestinian Authority, which is the Palestinian government in the West Bank, which has been old, ineffective, and hopelessly corrupt for a long time.

Chris (00:17:37):
Well, yeah, this is the interesting thing, isn’t it? Because there’s some old politics here with the tensions between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, because, as you were saying, the Palestinian Authority has been deeply corrupt, and many people got fed up with it — leading to the election of Hamas in 2006, wasn’t it?

Matt (00:17:52):
The election of Hamas in Gaza. So there was that split. There was the election of Hamas in Gaza in 2006 —

Chris (00:18:01):
And then all elections ceased after that.

Matt (00:18:03):
Yes, that was the last election. So from that point on, Hamas has controlled Gaza. The Palestinian Authority, led by Fatah — Yasser Arafat’s party — has controlled the West Bank.

Chris (00:18:19):
And I think, with regards to the Arab coalition, it is vital, but there needs to be a certain robustness to it because there are going to be provocateurs who are going to try and disrupt this — as we already had with October the seventh — because that totally disrupted the Abraham Accords that were playing out at that time. And I’ve mentioned it already — Mr. Russia Hawk here — has Russia’s relationship with Hamas been factored into this peace plan? Because Russia’s the great disruptor, as is Iran. And I’m sure those two are not going to be too happy with a peace plan that doesn’t somehow fit into their interests as well. And I think that any Arab coalition needs to be very much aware of that and needs to factor that in for when, inevitably, things are going to kick off somewhere — somebody somewhere is going to try and provoke this to fall apart in some way. And that’s the worry I have.

Matt (00:19:15):
To that point, if you want to prevent that from happening — or at least lower the likelihood that it will — I think that’s why the stabilization force has to be largely Arab-driven and have real legitimacy behind it. So Tony Blair is involved in standing up that stabilization force, and the Trump administration has said that he would be involved in some sort of leadership role in there. I don’t really know why. I mean, to me, Blair as some sort of foreign viceroy for Gaza strikes me as an incredible gift for Hamas in replenishing its ranks going forward and presents a really attractive opportunity for any jihadist upstart in the region to — you know —

Chris (00:20:01):
And anybody on the left who is skeptical about Israel and America and all that. His role in the Middle East — Tony Blair is the perfect propaganda example of why this plan should be treated with mistrust, because Tony Blair is obviously — he and George Bush were responsible for the Iraq invasion — and he’s tainted. He’s tainted goods.

Matt (00:20:24):
Yeah, if you want an artificial, temporary — shall I say — occupying government in the Middle East to have legitimacy and faith from the people it’s supposed to govern, I would not — no offense to Mr. Blair — I would not put him high on the list of people to have that job.

Chris (00:20:42):
No, no. I mean, yeah.

Matt (00:20:46):
The other big factor here is the Israeli domestic political situation, which can throw a lot of sand in the gears here. So Netanyahu is simultaneously facing a domestic criminal case for bribery, fraud, and breach of trust. He has an arrest warrant out from the International Criminal Court for Israel’s conduct during the war in Gaza. So his domestic trial — Bibi’s domestic trial — began in 2020 and is still far from reaching any sort of conclusion. Since October 7th, it’s been repeatedly delayed for security and diplomatic reasons. For example, a Jerusalem District Court recently canceled scheduled testimonies because the Prime Minister’s Office cited urgent meetings, and I believe that was over airstrikes in Syria. The collection of far-right ministers in Bibi’s cabinet means that if they leave the coalition he’s in, they would pretty much throw Netanyahu out of government. So he has to appease them to keep his job, and he has to keep his job to stay out of prison.

(00:22:01):
Interesting wrinkle there right now. So with the case that Bibi’s facing in Israel — yesterday Netanyahu’s part of the Likud Party; all the Likud ministers in Netanyahu’s cabinet signed a letter calling for Israel’s president, Isaac Herzog, to pardon him for those charges. I don’t know what’ll come of that. I’m not enough of a watcher of Israeli domestic politics to say. For what it’s worth though, Herzog is from the Labor Party and was the leader of the opposition under Netanyahu from 2013 to 2018. So I don’t know how likely that is. The other thing is, a lot of those far-right ministers represent settler groups in the West Bank — Itamar Ben-Gvir is one who comes to mind. They’ve talked a lot about, after this war is resolved, going forward and annexing chunks of the West Bank. That’s something that they’ve said they want to do, and they intend to do it.

(00:23:07):
Interestingly, Trump, as part of this ceasefire push in the last couple of weeks, has been pretty vocal that he doesn’t want that. He doesn’t support that. I guess he promised the Arab states — which have said to him, as part of the Abraham Accords and their push to normalize relations with Israel — that if the Israelis annex parts of the West Bank, “we’re done.” Trump has said very forcefully that he’s not in favor of that. With him, that could change at any time for any reason. Maybe it won’t, maybe it will. It’s impossible to predict with him. But I find it interesting that, so far right now anyway, Trump’s laid that sort of very bright red line — no annexation of the West Bank. I don’t know if that’ll hold, but I know there’s a lot of people in the Israeli far right who are not happy about that right now.

Chris (00:24:00):
Interestingly about Trump, one observation I’ve noticed is that he is respected by Middle Eastern leaders, and he respects Middle Eastern leaders to some extent in return as well. So maybe — I don’t know which relationship he’ll hold more important — but yeah, he might well hold the line on that. Who knows? It could be like the tariff.

Matt (00:24:24):
Can I be cynical for a second?

Chris (00:24:25):
Yeah, please.

Matt (00:24:26):
There’s a lot more money for him in the Gulf.

Chris (00:24:28):
Yes. Oh yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Oh yeah. So this is the thing. This is the other thing as well. This is where Israel has to be careful. I think we talked about this before as well. I’ve certainly banged on about this. Israel is very reliant on American and European support. I’m not the first person to say that. And I think their actions in the last two years have very much damaged that for the future. And so I hope, for Israel’s sake, that they do improve relationships with their Arab neighbors, because if they don’t, they could find, in maybe 15–20 years’ time, the future political leaders of America, Britain, and Europe may not like Israel that much anymore.

Matt (00:25:10):
They will be alone.

Chris (00:25:13):
And that very much is a real possibility. I think this war has done a lot of long-term damage that we will see down the line. And obviously there will be people who will attempt to exploit that for various reasons, whether it be Hamas, whether it be Iran, whether it be, I don’t know, far-leftists, far-rightists. People will exploit it for various reasons. And we’ve got to be — I think Israel needs to be very careful. Nobody needs to rest on their laurels about this. So Israel should be focusing on making a lot of friends, I think.

Matt (00:25:42):
It’s going to take generations to rebuild from what happened over the last two years.

Chris (00:25:47):
Yeah, especially — as I was saying earlier — how on earth do Israeli–Palestinian relations move forward from this? There’s been so much blood, so much mistrust, so much everything ramped up a hundred percent. How do you get past that? It makes the Ireland–Britain relationship look kind of very tame in comparison — and even that’s still problematic today, so...

Matt (00:26:12):
Yeah. They managed to get past it. They live near each other but separate, and they kind of do their own thing, and they put the past in the past. I’m not saying that’s necessarily possible for Israel and Palestine, but there were certainly times in the 1970s where that reality today seemed impossible. Right?

Chris (00:26:34):
Oh yeah, yeah, yeah. Again, the 1990s — I mean, that was a very interesting time and certainly opened up a lot of doors for peace and things. So yeah. So I hope the peacemakers are doing everything they can to make that a reality. That’s my biggest wish going forward. And I think we’ve got to be really careful over here with some of the commentary from people who maybe mean well but are taking things into very stupid places. Like I said earlier about that guy in Oxford who got into hate speech and started saying “death to Zionists” or something of that equivalent, which is unacceptable. That’s not the language of peace. That is not helpful in any way, shape, or form. Nor would the counter to that be either, where I’ve seen far-right Israelis or people who support Israel who have said derogatory things about Palestinians as well. Neither of that is helpful.

Matt (00:27:25):
Yeah, sitting here today, I think this is probably the beginning of the end of the war that began on October 7th, but it’s not over yet. And when it is over, it definitely won’t be the end of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

Chris (00:27:41):
No, well, isn’t there a Nobel Prize for next year? So you never know. That might motivate things between now and then.

Matt (00:27:48):
We’ll see. There’s always next year. Next year in Oslo, as they say.

Chris (00:27:52):
Yeah, because some of the ramped-up commentary felt a bit like the kid handing in their homework a bit late to the nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize. Whatcha going to do?

(00:28:05):
Let’s take a break and be right back with more.

(00:28:24):
Welcome back, everybody. So our next story is about this spy case that’s been happening with regards to two alleged British parliamentary assistants who have been alleged as being spies for China. It’s been ongoing for some time. We’ve talked about this in the past, and we were awaiting this big spy trial — and then suddenly it just collapsed — and it has pissed a lot of people off. So it’s very much the talk of the town at the moment. So I’m just going to pull from The Guardian, but Matt, you had something to say before I did that.

Matt (00:28:55):
I was going to say, the government over there is very skilled at just pissing everyone off. It’s like a superpower.

Chris (00:29:04):
It is. I know the Labour government at the moment is so good at pissing everybody off. If you could, somehow — it’s like the opposite of the Midas touch, which sometimes I feel I possess — but you’ll find a way to swing that around. It’ll be good. But anyway,

Matt (00:29:21):
It’s impressive.

Chris (00:29:23):
It is impressive. So I’m going to take some reporting from The Guardian here, and then it’ll be interlaced with some bits from the BBC as well. But this is the main overview of this spy case. So the long-awaited UK spy trial against Christopher Cash, a former parliamentary aide, and Christopher Berry, his associate accused of passing sensitive political information to China, was abruptly abandoned when the Crown Prosecution Service announced that the evidential standard was no longer met. Both men, who denied wrongdoing, were cleared after two and a half years under investigation. Prosecutors claim that Berry wrote at least 34 reports for a person described as a Chinese intelligence agent, some containing information sourced from Christopher Cash, which was allegedly then passed to members of the Chinese Bureau. The CPS — the Crown Prosecution Service — said that the material could have been prejudicial to the interests of the United Kingdom. Both defendants maintained that the shared information was open-source political commentary and harmless.

(00:30:26):
Cash, 30, was a Mandarin-speaking parliamentary researcher who had worked for various MPs, and two of them were Tom Tugendhat and Alicia Kearns on China policy. He was part of the China Research Group, which promoted tougher scrutiny of Beijing. Kearns said he was trusted and had no access to classified material, describing him as critical of the Chinese Communist Party despite his admiration for Chinese culture. So there is a bit of a distinction there. The case was expected to test the UK’s strained relationship with China and raise questions about how espionage is defined under the Official Secrets Act 1911, which required proof that China was an enemy. Observers like Luke de Pulford suggest that this could have been a politically awkward argument, particularly as the UK government, under Labour, seeks to stabilize relations with Beijing. The decision to drop the trial drew frustrations from MPs and ministers, including Security Minister Dan Jarvis, who called it “extremely disappointing.”

(00:31:37):
Alicia Kearns, a key witness, expressed anger that the CPS did not test the evidence before a jury, saying that “something is very amiss.” Downing Street insists the decision was independent of government influence. Both defendants have said their lives were devastated by the accusations. Berry’s lawyer describes his client as just trying to pick up the pieces, while Cash said the ordeal has destroyed his life and the career he loved. The collapse of the case highlights the legal and political complexities of prosecuting alleged Chinese espionage in Britain’s evolving national-security landscape. So Matt, what are your thoughts on this, and how is this also being portrayed in America at the moment? Because this is a big one here.

Matt (00:32:19):
It’s not.

Chris (00:32:20):
Oh, is it not? No. Wow.

Matt (00:32:23):
That’s why I thought we should talk about it. Yeah, don’t take it personally. We’ve got our own stuff. No, it doesn’t really break through here. I mean, disclaimer: I’m not sitting here with a little powdered wig on and a black robe, so that aside —

Chris (00:32:42):
Neither of us, yeah.

Matt (00:32:44):
Yeah. So is the issue here — I’m just trying to understand this — how it was charged under the Official Secrets Act, which is written to say that the information these gentlemen allegedly would have passed on would have to be useful to an enemy?

Chris (00:33:14):
They’ve said this: there was an earlier case that sets a precedent for spying cases, and I’m assuming it’s one of the Russian spy trials that have been going on because we’ve had three in the last year. And so what tends to happen, obviously with legal cases, is sometimes something will happen in a case before that changes the legal landscape after the fact. And so it kind of looks like the Crown Prosecution Service is using a technicality and is basically saying that you would have to state that China is the enemy to say, under national-security grounds, the information that’s shared was of concern. So that seems to be what I’ve seen. I could be wrong here, but that’s what it looks like the Crown Prosecution Service is arguing. Now, they also interestingly did say there was sufficient evidence when charges were originally brought against the two men in April 2024. But because of the precedent set by another spy case earlier this year, it meant China would need to be labeled as a threat to national security at the time of the alleged offenses. So that’s the kind of wording of it.

Matt (00:34:26):
Well, I think — okay — so there are issues with the word “useful” and the word “enemy” as far as the Official Secrets Act is written. So “useful”: it was alleged they handed over Westminster gossip, right? Whether that’s useful is pretty subjective, and I think a defense attorney could poke a million holes in that. And then there’s the issue of “Did you give it over to an enemy?” Which, if the Crown Prosecution Service were to allege that and push that in the case, the government would have to stand up in court and say, “China is an enemy.”

Chris (00:35:09):
China’s an enemy. Which, politically — especially as China’s a big economic power and important to trade — I think that’s a bit of a —

Matt (00:35:18):
Different from a national-security concern.

Chris (00:35:20):
And I think they should change that wording to “foreign power,” because obviously — I think I was saying to you off-air — if I were, let’s say, accused of spying for Italy or Germany or something, and I passed some information, it might be useful to Italy or Germany. They’re not our enemy, but they are a foreign country. And any information I share — let’s say it was highly classified information — is illegal. But obviously they didn’t share classified information. So this is probably where it’s become more murky, because had they shared some secret document that was top secret, then maybe the case might have been more clear-cut, but they —

Matt (00:36:00):
Right.

Chris (00:36:01):
From what we have seen and from what’s been said in all the public commentary is that Christopher Cash and Berry claim that the information they shared was information that was in the public domain. I have seen, from some witness statements on the UK government website, that some of the witness statements taken from Matthew Collins, who is a Deputy National Security Adviser for Intelligence, Defence and Security within the Cabinet Office, were — in his first witness statement — it is claimed that there was some information shared that was only known to the two individuals hours before it became public, and it was already shared with their supposed handler, who’s been named Alex. But obviously, again, a defense attorney might well be able to counter that with something more innocent. So from our point of view, it’s difficult to say either way, but that’s what the witness statement says.

(00:37:01):
And it was read out in Parliament just the other day during Prime Minister’s Questions about the Prime Minister being grilled about this case, because obviously at the moment there’s a feeling of a cover-up of some sort for economic interests, and there’s an accusation that the Labour government has somehow turned a screw somewhere at the Crown Prosecution Service and got this case quashed. I have no idea if that’s true or not. From the letter of the law, the government is different from the prosecution service. So that shouldn’t be possible. Whether it did happen or not, I have no idea. I can’t say, but it is supposed to be unlikely.

Matt (00:37:40):
Here’s a question. So some of the other spy cases that have been tried in the UK recently — let’s say that Bulgarian spying, which we covered —

Chris (00:37:51):
Yeah. All connected to Russia

Matt (00:37:53):
— A while ago. Do you know if those cases were charged under the Official Secrets Act, and if as part of those trials the government had to allege that Russia was an enemy?

Chris (00:38:03):
I don’t know the answers to that, I’m afraid.

Matt (00:38:05):
Which is politically much easier than saying that about China. However, I’m just curious about the precedent there.

Chris (00:38:13):
Yeah, considering the bit I read out earlier from the Crown Prosecution Service, I don’t know of any other cases this year that have gone on that could have led to setting the precedent for having to name the country an enemy. So I can only assume that, in one of these Russia spy cases, Russia has been named an enemy state in court. I can assume that. Please, if anybody’s listening who knows better than I do — and certainly we will be looking into the Bulgarian spy ring in a few weeks’ time.

Matt (00:38:42):
That’s one to ask about.

Chris (00:38:45):
It is definitely one to ask about. It’s very interesting. But obviously something has happened in court that has led to this, because spy cases are notoriously difficult to prosecute. Usually — like with the FBI when they’re investigating American ones — they like to catch the alleged person in the act of handing over a document, usually to a dead drop. So like with Hanssen, yeah, and various others, they’ve usually been caught either picking up money from a dead drop and dropping off information. That’s usually because then it’s very difficult for the defense to argue that they didn’t do it. And with this case, I’m not aware of anything quite as solid as that being in place. So unfortunately these two men now have a big cloud hanging over them because they haven’t had their day in court. They haven’t been able to prove their innocence. And also the government haven’t been able to prove their guilt. And so this is just a big cloud now left, which we can talk about very carefully, but we’ve got to be — there’s only so much we can say about it because of libel laws, et cetera.

Matt (00:39:49):
So if I’m in the Crown Prosecution Service — and again, not an attorney or a barrister or however you would call it over there at all — but if I’m in the Crown Prosecution Service and I’m looking at this, and the information that they’re alleged to have given over is not super top secret codeword — like Trident computer system-type stuff, like Five Eyes, I don’t know, stuff at Menwith Hill — really, really sensitive stuff, right? Okay. That kind of serious national-security risk wasn’t alleged to have been handed over. So there’s that.

Chris (00:40:31):
No.

Matt (00:40:32):
The way the statute is written that they’re charged under with the Official Secrets Act — useful to an enemy. Okay? It’s not a slam-dunk case that I have here. That’s a concern. Prosecuting that case — that’s not a serious national-security threat there, that is not a guaranteed win, and it would require the government to call China an enemy in open court — is it a battle you want to fight? I’m not saying that they did the right thing. I don’t really have a dog in this. I’m just trying to look at this objectively and all the pieces and pick: what do you want to do here?

Chris (00:41:13):
I think if they had a slam dunk, this probably wouldn’t have happened. I think somewhere in this pipeline they have analyzed all the data and feel either the case is shaky or the information they shared was not really severe enough to be useful. To me, it looked like background commentary on MPs. From what I’ve seen — again, from these witness statements — the information shared is sort of commentary about certain MPs and certain positions of power within the Conservative government at that time. And obviously that information can be useful to China because then they can figure out how to potentially angle an argument in a way that that MP might be receptive to. Or they could also, if they know they’re dealing with a China hawk, then they can kind of react accordingly as well. And I think that’s the kind of information that looks like it’s been allegedly shared that is on this Crown Prosecution Service website that we’re able to look at at the moment.

Matt (00:42:15):
So there’s also the National Security Act 2023, which replaces the “enemy” test with a “foreign power” test — rather than saying that a country is an enemy, it is a foreign power — which is a lot more politically palatable. For instance, there are quite a few people here who went to prison for spying for Israel.

Chris (00:42:36):
Yeah, exactly. What I don’t understand is why that definition wasn’t the one they needed to use — why it had to be the earlier definition of “enemy.” I don’t understand why that’s happened. Obviously somebody, somewhere, who’s better paid than I am, has made this decision based on something. It just seems a bit odd, doesn’t it? But again, as we’re saying, the bigger geopolitical picture for Britain and British–Chinese relations also factors into this. There’s another thing going on at the moment you may or may not know about. China wants to build this “super embassy” — it’s going to be the largest embassy in Europe — and the government has already delayed its decision again, postponing it until December. The interesting thing about the placement of this embassy is that it’s next to the Tower of London, which is ironic in some ways because, obviously, Chinese intelligence would be operating from this embassy — as would any intelligence service operate from any embassy.

(00:43:40):
So it’s not like China is an exception to the rule here, but the embassy is also very carefully positioned near important fiber-optic cables that carry communications to the City of London’s financial institutions. That’s a bit hinky. It’s a very unusual spot to put your embassy — it’s not near any other embassy. Obviously, for a large embassy there are only so many plots in London, so they’ve bought the former Royal Mint site, where coins used to be made in East London. It’s a very peculiar spot for an embassy, and they’ve chosen that site in particular. Some critics have said the fiber-optic cable issue is eyebrow-raising. On top of that, there are certain rooms in the plans that have been given to the government that have been blanked out, which has led to questions about what those rooms are going to be used for. The Chinese are saying, “We don’t have to tell you everything,” and, again, I think in American or British embassy plans we don’t necessarily reveal everything either. So it’s all a bit interesting. Beijing has said there will be unspecified consequences if there are further delays over this project.

Matt (00:44:59):
Don’t let them push you around like that.

Chris (00:45:00):
Yeah, I know. And I think this is post-Brexit Britain. Britain feels a bit more exposed because we don’t have the as-cozy relationships with Europe we used to. It means Britain is now back out in the big, bad world and maybe having to build ties and relations with other places to fill the gaps where our relations with the EU once were. So it’s a funny, messy old thing, really.

Matt (00:45:27):
Yeah. When the Soviets built what is now the Russian embassy — I believe that was in the eighties, tail end of the Cold War — on Mount Alto in Northwest D.C., it’s on an elevated position in line of sight between Langley and Fort Meade. So spies do be spying.

Chris (00:45:51):
Exactly. Exactly.

Matt (00:45:53):
I think as far as defining China as an “enemy” — yeah, that definitely would’ve pissed off Beijing — but I can assure you they already consider the UK an enemy. For them, that debate is settled, and they’re actively targeting you guys in far more dangerous vectors than whatever was alleged here.

Chris (00:46:16):
Yeah, indeed. Well, this sort of syncs in nicely with what you’ve been looking at. So a select committee on China has issued a new report that talks about Chinese Communist Party activity in the U.S. Maybe you could talk to us a bit about that. I’m sure there are parallels — what’s going on in America is probably happening here too.

Matt (00:46:37):
Oh yeah. Or it will. No, for sure. Yeah.

(00:46:40):
So this is a recent congressional investigation that has raised alarm bells about how China taps into American taxpayer-funded research to advance its own military modernization. It’s a really shocking story. You could walk up to someone on the sidewalk and say, “Hey, this is what’s going on — are you cool with this?” and nine out of 10 people would say, “No, hell no.”

(00:47:06):
This is from the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party. It’s a bipartisan group and a rare corner of Congress that still shows up to work and functions. They recently released a report titled Fox in the Henhouse: The U.S. Department of Defense Research and Engineering’s Failures to Protect Taxpayer-Funded Defense Research, and it paints a striking picture. Here’s one example: between June 2023 and June 2025, roughly 1,400 academic papers acknowledged DOD funding while also involving Chinese partners, including over 700 collaborations with institutions directly tied to China’s defense research and industrial base.

(00:47:53):
These are Department of Defense funds awarded to U.S. academic institutions that then partner with Chinese institutions and researchers. The Chinese researchers get the benefit of that research and apply it toward military development aims.

(00:48:18):
The report says these partnerships span some of the most sensitive fields imaginable — hypersonics, quantum sensing, AI, semiconductors, ISR systems, cyber warfare, and next-generation propulsion systems — all areas with clear military applications. In some cases, American researchers worked with entities already listed on federal restricted lists despite their known ties to the People’s Liberation Army, the Chinese military, or their intelligence services.

(00:48:52):
There are numerous case studies in the report underlining this point, but here are two. In one, U.S. participation in hypersonic research with a Chinese university known as one of the “Seven Sons of National Defense” — seven universities geared toward their defense industrial base — allegedly helped accelerate the PLA’s own weapon systems. Another collaboration focused on nitrogen research is said to have contributed to advances in high-yield explosives and nuclear-weapons development. This is highly technical stuff, and in both examples Chinese government documents openly credited American partnerships with closing the technological gap with “more advanced countries.”

(00:49:40):
The report says these lapses stem from deep structural failings inside the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, which oversees a patchwork of inconsistent vetting, weak enforcement, and almost no award monitoring. It’s a gap in the org chart — no one is responsible for enforcing this. There are bodies like the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, the Army Criminal Investigation Division, and NCIS that enforce this sort of thing, but those are for classified programs. This is not classified research, so there’s no one there to enforce it. Many of these research-security offices, the report found, don’t share data, can’t access their own grant records, and still allow foreign students or authors from adversarial nations to work on sensitive DOD-funded projects without scrutiny.

(00:50:36):
This also highlights another ethical problem, and that’s American funding flowing to institutions implicated in China’s mass-surveillance apparatus and human-rights abuses, including research on human-genome sequencing and facial-recognition and tracking technology, both of which are publicly tied to Beijing’s domestic surveillance and social-credit systems.

(00:50:57):
The takeaway, though, is that an open, trust-based research culture has allowed itself to become a backdoor for exploitation. China’s system, by contrast, is top-down and political, built to serve its military first — not scientific curiosity or an open exchange of ideas. So U.S. taxpayers are paying to develop weapons and technology specifically meant to one day kill U.S. troops in the Pacific and here at home.

(00:51:28):
It’s one of those things where, if you went up to people on the sidewalk, nine out of 10 would say, “Absolutely not.” To plug these gaps, the committee introduced the SAFE Research Act, which would cut off federal STEM funding to anyone collaborating with entities controlled by Chinese defense-linked groups and force full disclosure of those relationships. Currently that Act is a proposed amendment to the NDAA — the National Defense Authorization Act — which is essentially the annual must-pass, gigantic defense budget bill. Before the shutdown, the House passed the NDAA with the SAFE Research Act attached, and it’s now waiting in the Senate. I don’t expect it’ll face many issues there. Again, the NDAA is one of those things that just has to pass every year.

(00:52:17):
But I wanted to sort of make folks aware of this because I think it’s important and hasn’t gotten the attention it deserves. And I assume most of us wouldn’t want our tax dollars funding the Chinese military. Not to get too controversial here.

Chris (00:52:31):
No, no, no. It’s great, because it is industrial espionage — straight military espionage — and it has happened before. Obviously Russia has stolen military secrets, et cetera, but China seems to have turned it into a fine art these days because, if you look at a lot of their advanced jet fighters, they have a lot of similarities to American ones. We’ve seen this with other military equipment as well. It’s a big problem. Couple of questions: sorry, what was the acronym again for the act? The NDAA — what was it again?

Matt (00:53:02):
The NDAA, the National Defense Authorization Act, which is the big bill that the SAFE Research Act is attached to.

Chris (00:53:09):
Yeah, so one interesting thing about the Trump administration, which might be a positive with this, is the way they insist certain, say, allied governments are supposed to act and behave to do trade with America. And I wonder if this Act — one possibility — could be that the Trump administration needs to insist that allies come up with a similar act themselves, because European and British research could be vulnerable to this and probably is already vulnerable to this and could do with tightening up as well. Because culturally in the UK, at least, particularly with academic institutions, I worry that — I’ve seen before — some universities and individuals within them have been very dismissive of government warnings, particularly around extremist recruitment and ideology on campus back in the 2010s. The government’s Prevent strategy faced heavy criticism from institutions. I felt then a lot of well-meaning people would just turn a blind eye to government recommendations and then, with regards to the extremists-on-campus thing, would allow extremists to talk on campus to students, and that was unacceptable. Things have definitely got better, but they’re still not perfect. I feel like we need something in the UK — if we haven’t already — similar to what your committee is proposing in the States. Maybe this is where the Trump administration might be able to say, “Look, guys, if you’re going to continue to do defense training with America, you need to adhere to certain standards.” I see potential there.

Matt (00:54:49):
Yeah, I mean, I think Europe, especially the UK and Germany, need to strengthen their research and development protections as well, especially as the whole European defense sector ramps up under these new pressures with Russia and the ability to respond to that.

Chris (00:55:07):
There’s a lot of espionage waiting to happen right there.

Matt (00:55:09):
Yeah, China — China’s going to jump in and do the exact same thing with you guys if they haven’t already.

Chris (00:55:14):
Yeah.

Matt (00:55:15):
I think as far as the sort of unrestricted open science advocates — and there is a lot of merit to that. I mean, it’s true. Yeah. Science knows no borders, right? It is just physics, it’s biology, it’s chemistry. It’s just how it works. I think they would argue that co-authoring a paper with a Chinese researcher is inherently harmless. Their logic is science knows no borders, and if the findings are published in a journal for anyone to read, what’s the risk, right? This information is going to get out regardless, because again, these aren’t classified programs that we’re talking about. That would be a completely different issue. There are means to handle that. There aren’t means right now to handle this. I think the difference here lies in what never makes it into print. It’s that active collaboration that can expose Chinese defense-linked scientists to the know-how, the data, and the experimental methods that give shape to a project before it gets published. And it’s that kind of access that can be far more valuable to China’s military modernization than whatever’s in a final paper.

(00:56:29):
Here’s an example from their report: a 2025 Office of Naval Research–funded study on swarm mission planning — the mission plans for drone swarms, the kind we’ve seen Ukraine use in Russia to great effect against strategic bombers. One of these studies was co-authored by the University of Texas at Austin and one of China’s “Seven Sons of National Defense” universities. That collaboration didn’t just share results with potential military applications; it opened a new window into the research process itself.

(00:57:10):
And history is also full of examples of how open science can shape military innovation. Here’s a story for you. In 1962, a Soviet physicist named Pyotr Ufimtsev, working at the Moscow Institute for Radio Engineering, published a dense mathematical paper called — ready for this? — Method of Edge Waves in the Physical Theory of Diffraction. You can keep that one on your nightstand just in case. It was a purely theoretical study on how radar waves scatter off an aircraft’s surface — sort of the underpinnings of stealth. It was not classified; just fundamental research. The Air Force translated that paper into English, and years later a stealth engineer at Lockheed Skunk Works, Denys Overholser, stumbled across it, and Ufimtsev’s equations in that paper directly resulted in Overholser’s breakthrough that led to Skunk Works’ HAVE BLUE, which was the very classified technology demonstrator for the F-117.

(00:58:40):
So the world’s first stealth fighter was born in a Soviet scientific journal. Now, picture a different version of that story: instead of just reading Ufimtsev’s paper by chance, imagine if the Soviets had actually funded Overholser’s partnership with that Moscow institute on radar signature reduction. How much sooner and how much easier would it have been for Lockheed to get the F-117 into the air?

(00:59:06):
And I think that’s the dynamic this report is warning about. It’s not about banning science or shutting down research. It’s about recognizing that direct collaboration on even fundamental research can hand an adversary the practical know-how that they’d otherwise spend years trying to discover on their own or reverse engineer.

(00:59:28):
And China is very open about this — what they’re planning to do and how they plan to do it — especially in Mandarin. In a lot of the texts and material around these programs and projects, anything in English will totally sanitize any defense-linked military application of this scientific research. If you look at the same material in Mandarin — which is aimed inward — they’re very clear about what it’s being used for and what the intent is. But unless you speak Mandarin, you don’t get that.

Chris (01:00:12):
Which a lot of people don’t. A lot of people — I don’t. Yeah. I do menu Mandarin maybe, but that’s about it. Yeah. Well, thank you very much. Is there anything else you’d like to add, or are you happy with all that?

Matt (01:00:24):
No, it’s a really — maybe “interesting” isn’t the right word — it’s an interesting problem, though, for lack of a better word that pops into my head. It’s not something you would think happens or could happen. And again, it’s not being done, at least on the U.S. side, by these researchers and scientists in these academic institutions, out of malice or anything unpatriotic. These people aren’t like Robert Hanssen or Aldrich Ames. That’s not what’s being alleged at all. I think it’s just a lack of imagination about what the threat is and the extent of the threat, and how big our own attack surfaces are. It’s a problem that has been identified, but no one has clearly defined, “Okay, this is your problem; you handle it.” The people at the Pentagon who oversee this funding don’t necessarily have the remit, personnel, or authorization to really crack down and enforce it. They should, but it’s not in the letter of the law saying that they have to — if it were a classified program, yes. That’s what the SAFE Research Act would correct.

Chris (01:01:48):
Yeah. Well, there’ll be this in the show notes, won’t there? So people can have a proper read of this and digest it. And feel free, if anybody wants to ping in questions or whatever, we can always, down the line, do our best to answer any questions you may have.

Matt (01:02:03):
And this is a bipartisan thing. This is a bipartisan committee. I do not think that — I mean, how I feel about things and the current times is very well known — nevertheless, here I am saying these things. This does not have to be a partisan thing. And this is, like I said, a corner of Congress that works. So let’s embrace that.

Chris (01:02:22):
Yeah. Well, that should be applauded. Yeah, it should be applauded. When it comes to things like national security, one hopes it isn’t partisan, and this committee is a good example of people from both sides of the aisle working together, so it should be celebrated. So yeah, important work they’re doing.

(01:02:38):
So thank you very much for all that, Matt. And that’s today. I don’t think we’re going to get to MI5 today, but it’s been a very jam-packed episode. A lot of interesting stuff about China to think about. We’ve definitely got some interviews lined up in the near future that will look at different aspects regarding America, China, and the West over the months ahead. So stay tuned.

Matt (01:03:04):
Yeah, a lot about China we’ve got coming up.

Chris (01:03:06):
Yeah, exactly. There’s a lot to discuss there. So that’ll keep the Chinese trolls employed, I guess — certainly on YouTube it will.

Matt (01:03:14):
Give the Russian ones a break.

Chris (01:03:16):
Oh yeah, the poor Russian trolls. I’m sure we’ll find some content for them too, but there we go. Cool. Well, Matt, thank you very much for your time. Anything exciting happening over the next few days for you?

Matt (01:03:27):
I am working. I’ve been working my ass off on the novels. That’s the hive of activity that’s been going on here.

Chris (01:03:34):
Good feeling.

Matt (01:03:35):
I’ve been cooking.

Chris (01:03:37):
Nice.

Matt (01:03:37):
And it’s one of those situations where the two halves of my brain are never really in agreement in terms of, “Okay, let’s cook now.” It’s more like one side says, “Okay, we’re going to do this now,” and then the other half has to get on board and not miss the moment. That’s sort of what I’m in.

Chris (01:03:55):
Yeah, the artist’s dilemma, isn’t it?

Matt (01:03:57):
Yeah.

Chris (01:03:57):
Yeah. Full of conflicting ideas and things about stuff. It is always quite hard to navigate that. The actual simple act of writing is probably the hardest thing — sitting down and getting it out there — and then being happy with it as well. That’s the other problem.

Matt (01:04:12):
Well, that’s a big problem. And then doing five of them at once — I’m not actively writing five at once, but I’m planning five at once. It’s all sort of the same stew, and that gets — very large attack surfaces. That’s what this is.

Chris (01:04:27):
Nice. While you’re doing that, I’m away next week testing my spy skills, I guess, at Spy Q. So that’ll be fun. I’m going to be shooting some video there, so maybe in the next Espresso Martini I’ll be reporting back on that. I haven’t figured out the format of how I’m going to report back on the Spy Q just yet, but I’ll figure that out and share it with you guys. I’ll take some snaps and stuff when allowed. I’ll be taking some video there — probably a bit like the John le Carré exhibition. I’ll probably do a little highlights video and then we’ll talk about it. So yeah.

Matt (01:05:00):
That’d be great.

Chris (01:05:01):
Yeah. Cool. Well, Matt, thanks again, and I will catch you on the next one. Thank you, and thank you, everybody, for listening and watching. Take care, look after yourselves, have a good weekend, and don’t get a cold. See you later. Bye.

Matt (01:05:13):
Bye.

Announcer (01:05:27):
Thanks for listening. This is Secrets and Spies.