35 - A few reasons the combination problem doesn’t bother me much

Apr 03, 2021, 03:00 AM

When it comes to the combination problem, there are almost always controversial hidden assumptions about the stuff doing the combining and about the entity being formed by the combining. The assumptions one makes about the self and physical reality alter the difficulty and nature of the combination problem.

As Luke Roelofs has argued in his extensive book, Combining Minds, the combination problem is a much wider problem that doesn’t dissipate if one rejects panpsychism in favor of physicalism. He also convincingly shows that panpsychists are not required to appeal to strong emergence to explain the existence of the self or subject.

While the combination problem does not deter me from taking panpsychism seriously, it’s nonetheless an interesting research program that warrants thoughtful study. The distinction I’m trying to draw here is between a problem that should dissuade one from adopting a view, and a puzzle that should inspire one to keep thinking about the view.

The Subject of Experience - Galen Strawson [Oxford University Press]

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