What is the Biden policy toward China? Stephen Yates, CEO of D.C. International Advisory and former advisor to Vice President Dick Cheney. @YatesDCIA Gordon Chang @GordonGChang
Sep 10, 2021, 12:07 AM
Photo: Secretary of State and National Security Advisor meet with Chinese officials in Alaska, March 2021: Secretary Anthony Blinken and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan Meet with CCP Director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi and State Councilor Wang Yi.
What is the Biden policy toward China? Stephen Yates, CEO of D.C. International Advisory and former advisor to Vice President Dick Cheney. @YatesDCIA Gordon Chang @GordonGChang
Throughout much of the 2000s, the Bush campaign argued for a move away from of “constructive strategic partnership” of the Clinton Administration towards a more realistic “strategic competition” with China. Through the first eight months of the Bush Administration, a great deal of effort was invested in redefining and resetting US policy towards China, consistent with the campaign. It didn’t happen immediately after 9/11, but soon thereafter the tone and content of Bush Administration dealings with China returned to the emphasis on cooperation over competition.
As the Global War on Terror emerged as the dominant global priority, and counterproliferation challenges from North Korea to Pakistan to Iran leaped to top-tier concerns, the president and other national security principals argued that competition with China was a long-term reality but, in the immediate term, cooperation with China was essential to address pressing national security demands. Somewhat akin to “14 days to flatten the curve” with regard to COVID, the “immediate term” pursuit of cooperation from China on GWOT and counterproliferation stretched from the end of President Bush’s first year in office all the way through the end of his presidency.
As the Global War on Terror emerged as the dominant global priority, and counterproliferation challenges from North Korea to Pakistan to Iran leaped to top-tier concerns, the president and other national security principals argued that competition with China was a long-term reality but, in the immediate term, cooperation with China was essential to address pressing national security demands. Somewhat akin to “14 days to flatten the curve” with regard to COVID, the “immediate term” pursuit of cooperation from China on GWOT and counterproliferation stretched from the end of President Bush’s first year in office all the way through the end of his presidency.